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 1 Introduction: purpose  
and design of the study
 1.1 Introduction
In the planning literature there are quite a few examples of well-documented 
cases of ‘plan-making’ and formal decision making (Altshuler, 1965; Benven-
iste, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 1998, 1955) and substantive literature on implementa-
tion (Gualini, 2001; Mastop & Faludi, 1997; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Wil-
davsky, 1979). There are not many cases that analyse planning processes from 
the perspective of intergovernmental relations and ‘political class’.1 Therefore, 
political decision making often seems like a ‘black box’ to planners (Albrechts, 
2003). Planning needs a fine-grained analysis of what actually takes place in 
formal decision making and implementation, in the transition from planning 
to formal adoption of the plan and in its actual implementation, as opposed 
to what politicians and public officials normatively would like to see happen 
(John Friedmann, 1987). Research by Flyvbjerg (1998) makes clear that criti-
cal analysis of cases is needed to discover the ‘whys and wherefores’ of how 
elected representatives or other actors influence the planning process and 
why and how executive officers depart from a formally approved plan.
The key issue that is addressed in this volume is the gap between the of-
ficial rhetoric and the political reality of democratic decentralisation and 
bottom-up planning, using an in-depth study of the process of metropolitan 
planning in Kolkata (previously called Calcutta), India. I focus on the dynamic 
interactions between planners and the operation of the political process that 
shape this reality (Albrechts, 2003; Forester, 1999; Kitchen, 1997; Krumholz, 
1982). Through the analysis of this case I illustrate that metropolitan planning 
processes have to focus on the design of institutional mechanisms through 
which to address common problems, values and images of what a society 
wants to tackle and achieve (Gualini, 2001; Healey, 1997). The case also dem-
onstrates that these processes need the expertise of people skilled in com-
municative, people-centered practices (Forester, 1989; Habermas, 1984; Hea-
ley, 1997; Innes, 1996) and shrewd strategic actors who understand the power 
dynamics of the wider political context (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Forester, 1989; Hux-
ley, 2000; Logan & Molotch, 1987; Yiftachel, 2000). In addition, it questions the 
assumption that merely holding elections for political actors responsible for 
public decision making at the local level can address issues of local account-
ability in the face of elitist and unaccountable technocratic planning (see, for 
example The Economist, 2008). The research suggests a greater role for non-
partisan and locally based civil society organisations instead (Evans, 2002; 
Mitlin, 2004a) in order to deepen democratic principles within the emerging 
decentralised institutions of metropolitan governance.
1  Here, the political class denotes the group of politicians who come to occupy public office through an electoral 
process.
[ 9 ]
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In the following section I discuss the weakness of Kolkata’s non-state ac-
tors in the planning process compared to their counterparts in Mumbai – both 
cities of similar size within the same country. It was this difference between 
the two cities which first led me to the central research question that I ad-
dress in this book.
Why do this research?
There is a growing awareness among development institutions and schol-
ars that at the most basic level, there is a need to empower individuals and 
households through what Arjun Appadurai (2004) calls the ‘capacity to aspire’: 
conceived as a cultural capacity, in order to go beyond relationships of pa-
tronage between local elites and ordinary citizens. In a detailed ethnographic 
account of an alliance of housing activists based in Mumbai, working with 
the poor and building a global coalition to serve their vision, Appadurai (2001) 
sees a kind of grassroots globalisation that has replicated itself in more than 
a dozen countries in Africa and Asia (notably in India, South Africa, the Philip-
pines and Thailand). He points out:
In this ongoing exercise, which is a textbook case of what ‘empowerment’ could really 
mean, important segments of Mumbai’s slum dwellers are exercising collectively the 
sinews of the capacity to aspire, while testing their capacities to convince skeptics from 
the funding world, the banking world, the construction industry, and the municipality of 
Mumbai that they can deliver what they promise, while building their capacities to plan, 
coordinate, manage, and mobilise their energies in a difficult and large-scale technical en-
deavor. (Appadurai, 2004)
It would be expected that in a country where such a successful case of em-
powerment evolved and then spread elsewhere that other cities in that coun-
try would have the same propensity for similar grassroots participation in de-
cision making. It is reasonable then to ask, if such a grassroots mobilisation of 
the ‘poor’ in Mumbai can be so successful in ‘empowering’ marginalised com-
munities to participate in metropolitan planning, why has it failed to make 
a similar impact in Kolkata? Indeed, there have been studies on grassroots 
movements for urban development that point to the failures of civic activ-
ism in the area of urban planning in Kolkata (KUSP Design Team, 2003; Mageli, 
2004; Sarkar, 2006). This is despite the fact that the state of West Bengal, of 
which Kolkata is the capital, has had an elected communist government ad-
vocating democratic decentralisation and bottom-up planning in the state for 
the last twenty-eight years. The issue therefore has added significance if we 
note the success of the Mumbai Alliance model being replicated not just in 
other cities in India, but in cities in other countries as well, whereas it is fail-
ing in another metropolis of similar size in the same country. Therefore there 
[ 10 ]
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is a need for comparative research2 in order to better understand the differ-
ences in contexts that might explain the difference in grassroots empower-
ment in cities in India.
There are a number of possible explanations for the difference in civic ac-
tivism between Kolkata and some of the other cities in India. In recent years, 
there has been a growing interest among scholars in various disciplines to 
include both political and planning culture (Cullingworth, 1993; Friedmann, 
2005b; Bishwapriya Sanyal, 2005a) and culture in general (Appadurai, 2004; 
Rao & Walton, 2004; Sen, 2004) in the debate over development and public ac-
tion. It is in culture that ideas of the future, as much as those about the past, 
are embedded and nurtured (Appadurai, 2004). Thus, it is in culture that the 
future-oriented logic of planning and development finds a natural ally. And 
since culture is dynamic in nature, it provides decision makers a point from 
which to intervene in the process of planning for the future. Each place has 
its own political and planning culture, uniquely defined by its local values 
and historic legacy and continually altered by the process of social learning. 
Can culture then explain the difference in civic activism between Kolkata and 
Mumbai?
I argue here that, until not very long ago, Kolkata had an active urban social 
movement (in the form of NGO activism and voluntarism) that was no less 
significant than Mumbai’s. Eldrid Mageli (2001, pp. 26-48) describes the long 
and rich tradition of associational life from colonial times in Kolkata that has 
contributed to the use of the term ‘Bengali Renaissance’ to characterise this 
epoch. She also describes the disillusionment with the government’s efforts 
to substantially improve living conditions for the poor in the late 1960s and 
the 1970s in West Bengal. Economic crises and political instability, droughts, 
floods and price rises, and the influx of refugees after the liberation of Bangla-
desh contributed to the emergence of a new generation of social and political 
activists. In Kolkata, numerous civil rights groups were formed to protest the 
imposition of a state of national emergency in 1975. Soon after, the participa-
tion of the people and the empowerment of the poor became part of the new 
rhetoric among NGO activists. In particular, an alliance similar to the one in 
Mumbai evolved under the initiative of a Kolkata-based NGO called Unnayan 
(a Bengali word meaning ‘development’). It consisted of a community based 
organisation (CBO) called Chhinnamool Sramajibi Adhikari Samity and the Na-
tional Campaign for Housing Rights, which engaged in advocacy and lobbying 
within the government’s policy-making process. The launch of the National 
2  My research was a study of a single case, with only limited comparison to metropolitan planning in other cit-
ies. Nevertheless, the selection of my case (Kolkata) was based on the above idea of comparing Kolkata with the 
political and planning culture in cities like Mumbai, whose civic activism and political and planning culture have 
been extensively researched already.
[ 11 ]
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Campaign for Housing Rights at the national level led Unnayan to be regarded 
as a significant player within the urban social movement in India. Eventually, 
in the late 1990s, the NGO and the campaign lost steam and disintegrated.
If we delve deeper into why Unnayan failed to sustain itself in its effort to 
play a significant role in metropolitan planning, we find hints of political frag-
mentation (many of Unnayan’s workers were members of the radical Naxalite 
movement of the 1960s and 70s and the general perception among the field 
workers of Unnayan was that the organisation was being driven by foreign-
educated, upper-middle-class elites) which resulted in a perceived class frag-
mentation and ultimately in the demise of the organisation (see Mageli, 2001, 
p. 221).
Non-partisan, non-governmental organisations in Kolkata are not just fix-
tures from the past. In areas other than urban development planning, Kolkata 
still has successful examples of civic activism. A case in point is public health, 
in particular, HIV/AIDS prevention among the prostitutes of Kolkata’s Sona-
gachhi red-light district. Instead of using health extension workers to spread 
AIDS awareness and increase condom use, a team of doctors trained a small 
group of twelve sex workers as peer educators to pass on information to their 
coworkers. This process of mobilising the sex workers for HIV-AIDS interven-
tion led, over a period of two or three years, to a metamorphosis in the sex 
worker’s aspirations. They founded a union called the Durbar Mahila Saman-
waya Committee (DMSC – literally meaning Powerful Women Co-ordination 
Committee) to fight for the legalisation of prostitution, reduction in police 
harassment, and other rights (Rao & Walton, 2004). The mobilisation of this 
marginalised and stigmatised population has been widely acclaimed, not just 
nationally but internationally. Now, sex workers from all over Asia visit Kolka-
ta to learn from the DMSC about how to organise themselves to demand legal 
rights and protections, how to practice safe sex by making condom use man-
datory and how to keep away those who try to take away their hard-earned 
incomes (Bhaumik, 2005).
My hypothesis is that DMSC’s success with HIV/AIDS prevention among 
sex workers in Kolkata is attributable to the political space that these margin-
alised women inhabited, where none of the political parties saw the potential 
to mobilise popular support.3 The social stigma attached to prostitutes in a 
conservative society such as Kolkata prevented political parties from co-opt-
ing HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness activities among prostitutes. This has 
allowed NGOs and civic activists to get involved and work with the sex work-
ers in a way that was hugely successful.
3  For a more elaborate comparison between DMSC and Unnayan/Chhinnamool, see Pal, 2008.
[ 12 ]
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Hypothesis
Based on the experiences from Unnayan and DMSC, I derived the following 
hypothesis: the extreme politicisation of decision making along party lines 
is obstructing the political space needed for non-partisan, non-governmental 
civic associations to effectively participate in the planning process in Kolkata. 
As a consequence, the excessive partisan politicisation of local decision mak-
ing is detrimental to the cause of decentralised metropolitan planning.
There has been insufficient evaluation of the literature and challenging 
of the established notion of developing decentralised planning and decision 
making by promoting the idea of elected local governments. My hypothesis 
therefore questions the near-universal application of the arguments put for-
ward by international agencies such as the World Bank and UN-Habitat that 
good governance can be had by promoting the holding of local elections and 
by giving more decision-making power to these elected local bodies (Linn & 
World Bank, 1983; UNCHS (Habitat), 1996).
In the subsequent chapters I will narrate a story of how public decisions 
are taken in metropolitan Kolkata and how citizens exercise their agency 
within the socio-political-historic structure of the city. From this story, which 
is specific to Kolkata, I will try to discern some generalisable lessons in terms 
of public policy and institutional infrastructure that will be applicable in oth-
er cities in India and beyond.
The selection of the case was also based on observing phenomena that 
are less frequently studied. The scale (metropolitan versus municipal level in 
most cases), the subject matter (the planning process, not a project or pro-
gramme), a different political tradition (post-colonial single-party hegemony 
in an electoral democracy in comparison to European and North American 
liberal democratic traditions or the autocratic regimes in China) all add to the 
specificity and uniqueness of this case as compared to others (Doig, 1995; Fly-
vbjerg, 1998; Friend & Jessop, 1969; Kitchen, 1997; Meyerson & Banfield, 1955; 
Pinto, 2000; Savitch & Vogel, 1996; Wu, 2002).
 1.2 A review of the literature
 1.2.1 The origins of the ‘bottom-up approach’ 
in the planning literature
The relationship between planners (seen as experts), the state (constituted of 
elected representatives of the people) and citizens themselves is a complex 
one, and one that has been constantly shifting. The theoretical foundation to 
develop an understanding of this relationship was laid out by John Friedmann 
in his book, Planning in the Public Domain (1987). Much of this section summa-
rises his thoughts on the subject.
[ 13 ]
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In the introduction to this book, Friedmann writes about the dual lega-
cies of ‘reason’ and ‘democracy’ that were bequeathed to us in the eighteenth 
century. ‘Reason’ meant trust in the capacity of the mind to grasp the orderly 
processes of nature and society, and to render them intelligible to us. ‘De-
mocracy’ meant trust in the capacity of ordinary people for self-governance. 
‘Reason’ had to do with ‘facts’ or bits of truth that only scientific reason can 
discover, and the discovery of ‘laws’. And ‘democracy’ was concerned with 
‘values’, conceived as relatively stable preferences drawn from human nature, 
social tradition, and self-interest. Among the early references to the idea of 
‘planning and decision-making from the bottom up’, Friedmann cites Thomas 
Jefferson, describing his vision for a self-governing republic whose basic units 
would be rural neighbourhoods, or wards, in a letter written to a friend in 
1816 (letter to Joseph C. Cabell, in Abbott, 1947). Only questions that could not 
be resolved at this lowest level of governance would filter upward, to be re-
solved at successively higher levels. His vision therefore presupposed a capac-
ity for reasoning in all of us – a confluence of ‘reason’ and ‘democracy’. The 
only surviving model of such an ‘elementary republic of wards’ is the Swiss 
tradition of local self-governance (Kälin, 1999; Linder, 1994) that has managed 
to forestall an excessive concentration of power in the hands of a remote and 
abstract state (Friedmann, 1987).
By the early nineteenth century, the idea of ‘reason’ and rationality had be-
gun to undergo a subtle transformation. By the early twentieth century, ‘rea-
son’ in its scientific and technical form had come to be ranked highest in the 
hierarchy of authority. The conviction that public affairs should be informed 
by planning – done by specialists who were experts in mediating scientific 
knowledge and action – was grounded in the popular belief that ordinary 
minds, untrained in the subtleties of the scientific method, were no match for 
the rationality of those who knew how to make judgments about efficiency 
in relating means to ends. Planning therefore came to be seen as a scientific 
endeavour where planners in their collective wisdom produced a comprehen-
sive plan and budget, laid out as a ‘rational’ design, and safeguarded from the 
self-serving meddling of politicians (Tugwell, 1939).
Beginning in the 1940s social planning experienced a remarkable period 
of efflorescence. Once again, as it had during World War I, global conflict re-
quired the mobilisation and management of the war economy by the state’s 
planning apparatus. When the return to a peacetime economy posed equally 
challenging tasks, the state’s planners were again the decisive agents. The 
state’s new role as a major provider of social services had to be planned. And 
in rapidly decolonising countries, development planning became a popular 
instrument for accelerating economic growth and rationalising the use of for-
eign assistance.
In the postwar United States, planners were sustained by a widely held be-
lief that science and the new technologies of decision making, such as game 
[ 14 ]
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theory and cybernetics, could help provide what the planners promised: ra-
tional counsel for charting courses of action into the future. As members of 
the state apparatus, planners were inclined to see the managerial state as a 
guardian of the public interest and an instrument for social progress. But the 
dream of endless progress did not last. Within two decades after World War 
II, the US was bogged down in its war in Vietnam. Poverty was rediscovered; 
Blacks became restless; and the inner cities burned. Militant students read 
Marx and Marcuse and organised themselves for political struggle. During 
these years, planners began to listen more attentively to the voice of the peo-
ple, and ‘public participation’ was given an official blessing in urban renewal 
and other public planning programmes and in legislation such as the Nation-
al Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
As far as the theory of planning is concerned, the culminating work of this 
period was Amitai Etzioni’s The Active Society (1968). Etzioni proposed a model 
of societal guidance in which the people make demands, the state responds 
by providing answers, the people (now pacified) accept the state’s authority, 
and the state builds a consensual basis for its policies. In making the state 
the principal player in his scenario, Etzioni was no exception among plan-
ning theorists. From Auguste Comte to Rexford Tugwell, planners had always 
sought support from ruling elites.
But in the literature on the relation of knowledge to action, there was still 
another tradition that specifically addressed the needs of those who lacked 
substantial power. Its chief proponents, drawing on certain strategic aspects 
of three political movements – utopianism, social anarchism, and historical 
materialism – saw power in collective action, which Friedmann calls ‘social 
mobilisation’. These movements arose in response to the dark underside, the 
injustices and exploitation, of industrial capitalism. Unlike social guidance 
theorists who codified the world of power holders, advocates of social mo-
bilisation sought a radical transformation of society. A sub-group within this 
group, composed chiefly of historical materialists (such as Marx, Lenin, and 
Mao), looked to a revolutionary practice aimed at transforming the structure 
of the existing power system, either through a direct assault on its strong-
holds or through a series of radical reforms. Their political strength was based 
on social movements, particularly of labour.
Friedmann finds planning for societal guidance to be incapable of coping 
with the crisis of industrial capitalism because planning is invariably inte-
grated into the state apparatus (Friedmann, 1987, p. 10). As a result, citizens 
around the world have begun to search for an ‘alternative’ development that 
is less tied to the dynamics of industrial capitalism. Emancipatory move-
ments have emerged to push for a more positive vision of the future than the 
present system-in-dominance holds out to us: a world working to eliminate 
the threat of a nuclear winter and in serious pursuit of a balanced natural 
environment, gender equality, the abolition of racism, and the eradication of 
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poverty. Though diversely inspired, these social movements appear to coa-
lesce around two central strategies: collective self-reliance in development 
and the recovery of political community.
Thus there is a renewed urgency in the question posed by the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment: Are ‘reason’ and ‘democracy’ compatible? Can ordinary 
people be trusted to use their heads in the conduct of their own affairs, or 
is superior wisdom needed? Can people free themselves from tutelage by 
state and corporate power and become autonomous again as active citizens 
in households, local communities, and regions? Industrial capitalism has 
answered these questions in the negative. It has placed its trust in men of 
wealth and power, the formally educated, and the experts. This position was 
vigorously defended by centralists, who remained profoundly suspicious of 
the ‘masses’ (Crozier et al., 1975; Huntington, 1981). The contemporary litera-
ture on planning theory, however, has come to recognise almost universally 
that the scientific mind – or the planner-as-expert, applied to practical affairs, 
cannot be trusted to itself. ‘By serving corporate capital, it is caught up in the 
vortex of unlimited economic expansion. By serving the state, it works for the 
economy of destruction. Only by serving people directly, when people are or-
ganised to act collectively on their own behalf, will it contribute toward the 
project of an alternative development’ (Friedmann, 1987, p. 11).
 1.2.2 Models for institutions that support 
people-centred planning
Assuming Friedmann’s view of people-centered planning to be an established 
position, the question that arises is: what kinds of institutions are needed to 
support planning that serves the people directly instead of serving corporate 
capital and the state? Susan and Norman Fainstein (1996) proposed a plan-
ning typology (Table 1.1) that provides a handy, practical tool for the empiri-
cal analysis of actual planning-governance case studies. Planning is political, 
and according to the Fainsteins, the types of planning practice (traditional, 
democratic, equity, and incremental) are either derived from a political the-
ory or model (technocratic, democratic, socialist, and liberal, respectively) or 
function within specific types of governance coalitions or regimes with those 
characteristics (Irazábal, 2005). Evidently, these are ideal types and any real 
planning case may present a dynamic combination of these types. Using this 
language of the four typologies, the traditional planning model is giving way 
to one of the other three models of planning, at least in terms of the official 
rhetoric.
In India, as in many other developing countries (see Kohl, 2003; see Manor, 
1995; Souza, 2001), the democratic model of planning has gained significant 
currency. The state of West Bengal was, in fact, the pioneer of the democratic 
decentralisation of urban planning within India. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
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Kolkata’s politicians and a few of the city’s planners take pride in the fact that 
it has led almost a national movement towards the political emancipation of 
elected local representatives with respect to the bureaucrats and technocrats. 
They see this as a sign of progress towards greater democratisation and local 
accountability in planning. Their glorification of the process of democratisa-
tion of local decision making is however undermined by scholars who point 
to the limitations of elections as a means of ensuring social justice. As Leonie 
Sandercock points out, democratic planning’s legal framework has been em-
bedded in a particular conception of democracy as majority rule, and a corre-
sponding belief that the ‘right to difference’ disappears once the majority has 
spoken (Sandercock, 2000).
There is yet another planning issue within the democratic planning model 
– that is to identify the right geographical/administrative scale at which to in-
tervene in the face of a planning problem. If a household or a neighbourhood 
needs additional drinking water, the solution might be to dig a tube-well. If 
a town needs additional water, an expansion of the local water-treatment 
plant might meet the requirements. If a whole region has a water shortfall, a 
system of dams to hold water and a network of artificial canals to carry the 
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Table 1.1 Types of planning
Type Traditional Democratic Equity/Advocacy Incremental
Political 
Theory
Technocratic Democratic Socialist Liberal
Who Plans? ‘Expert’ planners. ‘The public’. In practice 
those who can advance 
their interests.
Planners and 
community advancing 
the interests of the 
poor, racial or ethnic 
minorities.
No planning. Policy 
makers weighing marginal 
advantages of a limited 
number of alternatives for 
the short run.
Type of 
process
Top-down. Participatory; allowing 
‘all’ voices to be heard.
Bottom-up or 
representative. 
Participation (of 
excluded groups) is 
an ideal but not a 
necessary condition.
Step-by-step, working out 
compromises among a 
multitude of interests. 
Atomised decision making.
Objectives Rational, scientific 
planning.
Process (who governs?) 
more important than 
results. Acting in the 
public interest: rule of the 
majority.
Results (who gets 
what?) more important 
than process. 
Increasing equity, 
examining distribution 
of costs and benefits.
Small or incremental 
changes from existing 
policies.
Conflicts Planners are not free 
from class or special 
interest biases, so they 
end up serving particular 
social interests, 
generally fitting the 
predispositions of the 
upper classes.
Popular will may 
conflict with the interest 
of deprived groups. 
Dilemma: is there a 
genuine democracy 
without the representation 
of interests of typically 
excluded groups?
Equity planning is not 
always democratic, 
since it will favour 
redistributional goals 
even in the absence of 
a supportive public.
Ends and means are not 
formulated, so decision 
makers may not work out 
means to achieve socially 
desirable goals. Strategies 
to cope, but not to solve 
problems.
Source: Fainstein, S. & N. Fainstein, 1996, as elaborated by Irazábal, 2005, p. 60
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water might be a solution. Therefore, in spatial and temporal senses, there is 
no single correct level on which an administrative structure had best be situ-
ated (Berg et al., 1993). So planning intervention in the public domain needs 
to address each problem at an appropriate scale. Also, each level of planning 
intervention affects planning at the next higher level. For example, each ad-
ditional tube-well that the neighbourhood installs will cause additional pres-
sure on the ground water reserve in the locality far beyond the boundaries of 
the neighbourhood. So the municipality might have to take steps to augment 
the ground-water reserve and limit its depletion through regulations, projects 
or programmes.
The example above is an idealised version of a ‘bottom-up planning’ process 
in which plans at one level are consolidated in the plan-making process for 
the next higher level. The consolidation of plans takes place from an indi-
vidual household level, to a neighbourhood, municipal, metropolitan, state, 
national and even to an international level. Therefore each successive higher 
level is thought to intervene in a way that supports the actions taken by the 
lower levels of administration. In India, the Constitution and the legal frame-
work surrounding it have been designed to support such a process of ‘plan-
ning from below’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2000).
There are two underlying assumptions for a bottom-up process of plan-
ning and decision making to effectively allow the consolidation of plans from 
lower to higher levels. One is that the power is evenly distributed in space 
(such that there is no scope for phenomena such as NIMBY, or social and 
environmental injustice) and second, it is evenly distributed across differ-
ent levels of government. In reality, and as I describe in Chapter 4, neither 
of these assumptions hold ground. Therefore a bottom-up approach to plan-
ning often fails in identifying the appropriate administrative level at which 
planners should intervene for particular problems. This was realised in the 
1990s, which made the planning discourse move away from using the term 
‘bottom-up’ to describe the strategies by which various local level voices enter 
into the public planning process. The phrase that has gained currency lately 
is ‘participatory planning’.
This phrase has come to mean, among other things, a process by which a 
community undertakes to reach a given socio-economic goal by consciously 
diagnosing its problems and charting a course of action to resolve those prob-
lems. The process includes limited mediation by the next higher level of com-
munity aggregation. Experts are needed in this process, but only as facilita-
tors (Jain & Polman, 2003).
The expansion of participatory decision making venues may grant citizens 
greater authority, but these institutions could also undermine the ability of 
municipal councils to curb the prerogatives of mayors (see Wampler, 2004, for 
studies in Brazilian cities). Is accountability enhanced if citizens must still 
depend on mayoral administrations? The focus of the accountability debates 
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has been on how one agent (the voters, the courts) can control another agent 
(elected officials, the executive branch). One weakness of such a focus is that 
the conceptual variants – horizontal, vertical, and societal – tend to run on 
parallel tracks, unable to show how citizens, civil society organisations (CSOs), 
politicians, and institutions may place interlocking checks on the ambitions 
of other actors (Wampler, 2004, p. 75). Participatory institutions, by contrast, 
tap into all three dimensions of the debates. Participatory institutions have 
the potential to act as a check on the prerogatives and actions of mayoral ad-
ministrations (horizontal), to allow citizens to vote for representatives and 
specific policies (vertical), and to rely on the mobilisation of citizens into the 
political process as a means to legitimate the new policymaking process (so-
cietal).
Vertical accountability, generally framed as the control of public officials by 
citizens, primarily via elections, has received significant attention as scholars 
have analysed how citizens can use elections to exercise control over public 
officials (Przeworski et al., 1999). Horizontal accountability, the distribution of 
authority among different departments or branches of government, has also 
received attention as scholars have sought to evaluate the consequences of 
institutional arrangements that were designed to strengthen democratic 
practices and rights (O’Donnell, 1998). Societal accountability, the pressures 
placed on state agencies by civil society organisations to encourage elected 
officials and bureaucrats to abide by the rule of law, has emerged as a coun-
terbalance to the other two approaches; it can directly link ongoing political 
activity in civil society to formal political institutions (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 
2000).
Among the various means to achieve a participatory approach in public de-
cision making, the one that has the greatest visibility – at least in India (see 
Dreze, 2000), but also in many other countries (Shah & Thompson, 2004; Su-
wandi, 2001) – is through democratic decentralisation. This has come to be 
generally associated with holding elections at the local level. But the rela-
tionship between democratic decentralisation and enhanced participation in 
planning in the public domain has not been supported by empirical research. 
There is an inherent complexity in the relationship between decision mak-
ing by existing state agencies, including elected representatives and govern-
ment bodies, and decision making that emerges from participatory planning 
and governance. Many elected politicians oppose most forms of participatory 
governance because they see themselves as the legitimate decision takers, 
elected by citizens through a democratic process, and believe such participa-
tory processes take decisions and control away from them (Cabannes, 2004; 
Etemadi, 2004; Mitlin, 2004b).
Therefore, some scholars have argued that participatory planning (just 
like participatory governance) is a ‘necessary complement to representative 
democracy’ (Mitlin, 2004b). Representative democracy often fails to represent 
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the interests of less powerful groups, especially in situations of resource scar-
city, where elections become a way of allocating limited state benefits rather 
than making political choices. In North America, Europe and Australia there 
is already recognition of the need to infuse representative democracy with 
participatory democracy and also to extend participatory democracy (e.g. by 
funding non-statutory groups, sending delegations to neighbourhood/com-
munity groups, referendums, citizen ballots, etc.). This need is yet to be recog-
nised in the so-called ‘developing’ countries.
This research is concerned with the communicative processes of policy 
and decision making. I attempt to describe what goes on in the Kolkata plan-
ning office by using the Habermasian concept of communicative planning 
(Habermas, 1984). I am most interested in what Jean Hillier calls the ‘who, 
how and why issues of policy decisions’. Who really takes the decisions? How 
are they arrived at and why are such processes used? What power relation-
ships between the various participants may be revealed? (Hillier, 2002, p. 3)
I ashamedly admit to having been inspired by the work of John Forester, 
Jean Hillier, Patsy Healey, and Judith Innes in particular. I agree with Forester 
(1999, p. 3) on the importance of planners dealing with ‘far more than “the 
facts” at hand’. If planning is to be taken seriously in the future, planners 
must adjust their ‘toolkits’ or mindsets to the changing needs and challenges 
of democratic society (Albrecht & Denayer, 2001, p. 371). With an increasing 
number of cities in the world moving towards participatory forms of democ-
racy from merely representative democracy the challenge for the planners is 
even greater. As Young (2000, p. 4) points out, however, ‘we have arrived at a 
paradoxical historical moment when nearly everyone favors democracy, but 
apparently few believe that democratic governance can do anything. Demo-
cratic processes seem to paralyze policy-making’ [emphasis in original].
In such circumstances, it is not surprising that planners will resist working 
with, and not excluding, actors that hitherto didn’t have much say in plan-
ning. ‘Working with others that we disagree with, that we do not understand, 
that we do not have much respect for, or that we might even dislike is just 
plain hard…We think we know what should be done, and we do not want to 
listen to other people’s views’ (Briand, 1999, p. 8). Alternatively, as Hillier (2002, 
p. 5) notes, ‘some planners may be happy to talk and spin out information-
seeking so that they seem to be doing something without actually risking an-
ything’. In most cases the performance measurement of planners depends on 
minimising mistakes by avoiding taking responsibility.
Despite the emphasis on the role of planners in the planning process, in 
recent times there has been an increasing realisation that there are multiple 
actors involved. This research uses the urban governance framework (Pierre, 
2005, p. 16) to disentangle the complex web of actors in the planning proc-
ess of a large metropolis in the context of limited resources. This framework 
allows us to observe all actors (state and non-state) in the management of 
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urban affairs holistically and not in isolation from each other. (For a more de-
tailed literature review on the actors and processes through which urban re-
gions are governed, see Sellers, 2002a, p. 6). There have been studies that have 
tried to compare nations or global regions in terms of governmental struc-
tures and use them to explain how local government exercises power over its 
locality. ‘Governmental and political influences encompass a range of policies 
and institutions usually imbedded at higher levels of government. Alongside 
familiar classifications of territorial structures like federalism and unitary 
government at higher levels of states, more recently established typologies of 
local government and politics furnish part of the basis for understanding how 
these influences vary. A full analysis requires attention to the state-society 
relations of urban regions and to lateral relations among municipalities’ (Sell-
ers, 2002a, p. 16) (see Table 1.2).
In the urban governance literature there are scholars who have come up 
with models to describe the relationships between various actors who active-
ly take part in or influence the urban planning and decision-making process 
(See Fig. 1.1 for a categorisation of these actors within the State-Market-Civil 
Society framework). In addition to these actors, there are external ‘agents of 
change’ (such as international bilateral and multilateral aid agencies) that 
can sometimes play a crucial role in changing the balance of power within lo-
cal decision-making structures. Although they function in a hierarchical top-
down fashion, when they choose to work directly with grassroots groups or 
promote these groups in the formal structures of local governance, they initi-
ate positive change towards a bottom-up approach to public decision making. 
In the case of Kolkata, as we will see in subsequent chapters, the new actor 
was DFID, which tried to change the existing structure of metropolitan deci-
sion making. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
 1.2.3 Decentralisation, participation and democracy
Decentralisation is a word used by many in many different ways. Businesses 
and big corporations talk about decentralisation, as do governments. Even 
within governments, some use it to mean fiscal decentralisation (Garman et 
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Table 1.2 National infrastructures of local government and politics: the three main systems in the West 
Northern Europe Southern Europe (Anglo-)American
Administration Local Supralocal Local
Governmental organisation, 
finance
Standardised but 
decentralised
Centralised (prefectoral 
system)
Decentralised, 
unstandardised
Legal supply Extensive local authorities Administrative regulation Limited, functional authority
Politics Supralocal Local Local
Supralocal representation  
of municipal interests
Weak Strong Moderate
Political parties, organised 
interests
Strong Moderate Weak
Source: Sellers, 2002a, p. 17
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al., 2001; Rodden & Wibbels, 2002) and others use it to describe new institu-
tions of local administration. Here I use the term to describe decentralised 
decision making. In the US, state decentralisation of higher education, health 
services, etc. emerged as a significant governance trend of the 1980s to 1990s. 
Yet little is known about how or why decentralisation first became an issue 
to which state governments paid serious attention. One study (McLendon, 
2003) employs multiple theories to analyse the agenda-setting stage of policy 
formation in three states in the United States that enacted decentralisation 
legislation. Rodden’s (Rodden & Wibbels, 2002) research analyses the political 
and fiscal structures that are likely to account for the highly divergent eco-
nomic experiences of federal systems around the world. To test these proposi-
tions, the authors use an original data set to conduct analyses of budget bal-
ance and inflation in fifteen federations around the world, from 1978 through 
1996. The empirical research suggests that the level of fiscal decentralisation, 
the nature of intergovernmental finance, and vertical partisan relations all in-
fluence macroeconomic outcomes. The findings have broad implications for 
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the widespread move toward greater decentralisation and for the theoretical 
literature on federalism and macroeconomics.
Why does decentralisation attract so much coverage in both the academic 
and the non-academic literature? Many donors have great confidence in the 
potential for good governance that decentralisation offers. Also the UN (UN-
Habitat, 2004) and the World Bank (Yusuf & World Bank, 1999) have advocat-
ed for greater decentralisation. The World Bank has recognised the need to 
engage in essential institution building at both the supra- and sub-national 
(particularly local) levels in order to capture the benefits of growth in the 21st 
century (Yusuf & World Bank, 1999). It has actively advocated decentralising 
government so that more decisions are made at sub-national levels, ‘closer 
to the voters’. Such localisation, according to the Bank, ‘nourishes responsive 
and efficient governance’ (World Bank, 2000). Great publicity about the eco-
nomic benefits of decentralisation comes from China. China’s remarkable eco-
nomic success rests on a foundation of political reform providing a consider-
able degree of credible commitment to markets. This reform reflects a special 
type of institutionalised decentralisation that some have called ‘federalism, 
Chinese style’. This form of decentralisation has three consequences. First, it 
fosters competition, not only in product markets, but also among local gov-
ernments for labour and foreign capital. This competition, in turn, encourages 
local government learning and experimentation with new forms of enterpris-
es, regulation, and economic relationships. Second, it provides incentives for 
local governments to promote local economic prosperity. Finally, it provides a 
significant amount of protection from political intrusion by the central gov-
ernment to local governments and their enterprises (Montinola et al., 1995).
There is a growing realisation of the onerous economic and political costs 
of centralisation. Britain is one of the most centralised governments in the 
Western world. Local governments in Britain now raise – through property 
taxes, one of the most difficult taxes to assess and collect – only one-quarter 
of what they spend and only five per cent of total government revenue, an 
unusually low level for a large wealthy democracy.4 Central government con-
trols how much local governments tax and what they spend money on. As a 
result, voters pay them little attention: turnout in English local elections has 
slumped to around 35 per cent. In addition, monitoring local governments 
currently costs the government departments in London £2.5 billion ($4.4 bil-
lion) a year (The Economist, 2006).
Recent political and academic discourse about devolution has tended to 
stress the economic advantages of the transfer of power from national to 
sub-national institutions. This ‘economic dividend’ arises through devolved 
4  In the United States, local government tax revenues as a percentage of total government tax revenues is 15%; 
in France, it is 11 per cent and in Germany 7 per cent (OECD as cited in The Economist, February 25, 2006, p. 60).
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administrations’ abilities to tailor policies to local needs, generate innovation 
in service provision through inter-territorial competition, allow cost-sharing 
with local community in-service delivery and stimulate participation and ac-
countability by reducing the distance between those in power and their elec-
torates. Some have argued however (Rodriguez-Pose & Gill, 2005) that there 
are related caveats to all this. First, there are many forces that accompany 
devolution and work in an opposite direction. Devolved governmental sys-
tems may carry negative implications in terms of national economic efficien-
cy and equity as well as through the imposition of significant institutional 
burdens. Second, the economic gains, as well as the downsides, that devolu-
tion may engender are contingent, to some extent, upon which governmental 
tier is dominating, organising, propagating and driving the devolutionary ef-
fort. Also, decentralisation can extend the state’s control over the people just 
as it can aid the people’s control over the state and its activities. Therefore, 
decentralisation is very much a ‘double-edged sword’ (Webster, 1992, p. 130).
It is sometimes not exactly decentralisation that is problematic, but the 
way decentralisation gets adopted that becomes a problem. For example the 
involvement of political parties in local elections can be problematic (Sabatini, 
2003). But overall, by bringing government closer to the people, decentralisa-
tion has widened opportunities for deliberation and participation and has 
given citizens a more tangible and ‘close to home’ sense of their rights and 
responsibilities in the political process. Real local elections for officials with 
real authority also mean more accountability and better representation, at 
least in the near term. Groups and demands that were once excluded from 
consideration by highly centralised and self-absorbed national parties can 
now find a voice through smaller, local parties. The traditional political par-
ties that had existed before decentralisation have struggled to adapt to the 
unexpected challenges posed by the direct election of local officials and loss 
of control over patronage. The irony has been that many of the parties that 
pushed for decentralisation are simply not well-equipped organisationally to 
deal with its political consequences (Sabatini, 2003).
A recent study by Merilee Grindle on the effects of decentralisation in Mex-
ico since the 1980s looked at a stratified random sample of 30 medium-sized 
municipalities – five from each of the six regions in Mexico. The research 
noted that the effects of the policy of decentralisation on local government 
performance varied from municipality to municipality. She concludes that 
governmental performance is the consequence of a combination of differ-
ent factors, inter alia, new opportunities and resources that are created in the 
wake of decentralisation, the impact of leadership motivation and choices at 
the local level, the influence of civic history, and the effect of institutions that 
constrain and facilitate innovation (Grindle, 2007). Based on Grindle’s research, 
one can conclude that overall, the impact of decentralisation was tangible in 
the research communities and, although its impact was not always positive, it 
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held out some promise for better governance in the future.
I use the word ‘decentralisation’ to stand for a policy of allowing decisions 
to be made from the bottom up by consolidation of plans from the lowest lev-
el. By definition, then, in a decentralised government, no one level in the hier-
archy can claim to be the most appropriate level at which all public decisions 
should be made. Every decision made at any level in such a decentralised 
process, therefore, is the consolidation of decisions by its constituent units at 
the previous level.
There are a number of planning scholars whose works have tested the bound-
aries of planning with politics (Flyvbjerg, Forester, Hall, Hillier, Healey, and 
Innes among others). The effect of power in the process of ‘using technical 
knowledge in public decision making’ (Friedmann’s definition of planning) 
has been studied extensively already. This research focuses on one aspect of 
power – how power held by political parties affects decision making and pos-
sible ways to address the resulting lack of accountability.
 1.3 Research question
Based on the literature on planning theory, democratic decentralisation is 
supposed to result in an inclusive process of participatory planning from the 
bottom up. That would mean that planning in Kolkata would be more partici-
patory and inclusive than in other cities in India, where democratic local elec-
tions were introduced much later. But, based on my observations described 
earlier in this chapter, this is not the case. So the theoretical question that 
arises from the conflict between what is expected and what is actually hap-
pening is: What causes a difference in levels of citizen participation in public deci-
sion making at the local level?
More specifically, I ask: How do elected officials at different governmental levels, 
professional planners, and ordinary citizens interact, and which of these players are 
dominant in the process of metropolitan planning?
The empirical question that I address here is: How effective has the strategy 
of democratic decentralisation been in making the metropolitan planning process in 
Kolkata more participatory? The aim of this research is to understand the na-
ture of a political context that can support bottom-up planning.
The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act envisioned that the governments 
of states and union territories would take action to pass new legislation or 
amend existing laws by 31 May 1994 to bring them in conformity with the 
constitutional provisions for democratic decentralisation as proposed in the 
Act itself. This task of conforming legislation has since been completed. At 
this stage, some of the important questions that arise on municipal decen-
tralisation include: (1) Are the provisions in the 74th CAA adequate to achieve 
the objectives? (2) Does the conformity legislation provide for adequate meas-
[ 25 ]
SUA020.indb   25 12-08-2008   12:14:18
ures to honor the amendment act in both letter and spirit? (3) What should be 
done further to carry forward the decentralisation process?
  1.4 Research methods
Case study method
Research methods are selected based on the research question and also on 
what is practicable. The question that I am asking would require a compara-
tive case analysis between Kolkata and some other cities. But the resources 
(time and money) at my disposal were not enough to conduct more than one 
in-depth city case study for comparative purposes. ‘Urban governance re-
search would benefit greatly from the more widespread use of existing de-
scriptive methods and techniques which produce results that are easy to 
compare across cities, and thus expand the basis for inductive theory build-
ing’ (Gissendanner, 2003, p. 663). Therefore, I conducted a single case study 
and used literature available on other cities as evidence to support my argu-
ments.
I selected Kolkata as my case because I intended to generalise on the basis 
of a single case. As Flyvbjerg (2004) has noted in his work, one of the mis-
understandings about the case study is that it is claimed to be most useful 
for generating hypotheses in the first steps of a total research process, while 
hypothesis-testing and theory-building is best carried out by other meth-
ods later in the process. I conceive Kolkata as the ‘most likely’ critical case 
(Flyvbjerg, 2004) that would allow information that permits logical deductions 
of the type, if this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases. 
As described in Chapter 3, the West Bengal government is widely recognised 
to be in the forefront of ‘democratic decentralisation’ in India using elections 
at the local level as a means to achieve it (Thomas Isaac & Franke, 2002, p. 15). 
My argument is: if there is a deficit in democratic decentralisation and bot-
tom-up planning in Kolkata, then there is a need to more closely examine the 
institutions of governance that rely only on local elections to promote demo-
cratic decentralisation in other cities in India.
Data collection
In addition to a selective review of the planning literature and interviews with 
key political actors, this research relies on the analysis of a case study. The 
empirical material for this case study came in part from direct observation, 
from interviews with actors involved in the metropolitan planning process in 
Kolkata, and from the reading of documents, including study reports, mas-
ter plans, minutes of meetings, and official memos produced by the planning 
agency and by other organisations and individuals involved with metropoli-
tan planning in Kolkata and in the state government. Articles from local and 
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national newspapers and magazines were also used to substantiate some of 
the information gathered from other sources.
I collected both primary and secondary data. At the initial stages of my re-
search prior to my going to the field, I collected academic and non-academic 
literature dealing with urban issues in India in general and Kolkata in partic-
ular. I also established professional relationship with scholars who have done 
research in Kolkata and through them was introduced to some of my key in-
formants within the planning establishment in Kolkata.
After I arrived in Kolkata, I first spent several days collecting archival data 
– mostly in the form of plans, reports, newspaper articles, etc. I interviewed 
several key informants – urban activists, academics, private urban consult-
ants, municipal councillors, municipal chairpersons, planners, and concerned 
citizens. Most of the interviews were about an hour long and were recorded 
with the subjects’ explicit permission. My original plan of action changed 
considerably over the course of my fieldwork as some of the archival informa-
tion collected in these early stages pointed me to a different research ques-
tion than the one with which I had started. (Before going to Kolkata, I pro-
posed a research project on the costs and benefits of urban land regulations 
to different income groups in Kolkata.) Therefore, some of the initial clues as 
to possible interviewees, interview questions and analytic themes were very 
different from what I finally set out to write about in this book. Nonetheless, 
I have included all the data collected in those interviews, using them for a 
completely different purpose than what I originally intended.
In some ways I would describe my methodology as akin to grounded theo-
ry. Grounded theory was conceived as a way of generating theory through re-
search data rather than testing ideas formulated in advance of data collection 
and analysis. Although I had formulated a set of hypotheses before begin-
ning my research, I abandoned it in the course of my research. The process of 
generating ideas through data requires an innovative approach to data selec-
tion. Instead of identifying a sample at the outset, grounded theory involves 
a process of ‘theoretical sampling’ of successive sites and sources, selected to 
test or refine new ideas as they emerge from the data. Sites and sources are 
selected flexibly for their theoretical relevance in generating comparisons and 
extending or refining ideas, rather than for their representational value in al-
lowing generalisations of particular populations.
Third, grounded theory relies primarily, but not exclusively, on qualitative 
data acquired through a variety of methods: mostly observation and unstruc-
tured interviews in the initial stages, then more structured forms of data col-
lection as the study becomes more focused. Thus decisions on sampling and 
data collection develop as the project progresses, continually informed by 
and not merely anticipating the results of ongoing data analysis. The process 
of analysing data, centres on ‘coding’ data into categories for the purpose of 
comparison. These categories are analytic – not mere labels but conceptuali-
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sations of key aspects of the data. And categories are also sensitising, offering 
meaningful interpretations of the phenomenon under investigation. Through 
‘constant comparison’ their relations and properties can be identified and re-
fined. Finally, grounded theory offers pointers about how to bring the research 
to a successful conclusion. Data collection stops when categories reach ‘theo-
retical saturation’, that is, when further data no longer prompts new distinc-
tions or refinements to the emerging theory. Data analysis stops when a core 
category emerges around which the researcher can integrate the analysis and 
develop a ‘story’ encapsulating the main themes of the study (Dey, 2004, p. 80).
One of the most important cautions that a researcher needs to keep in 
mind is to be explicit about her/his internal biases. There should be a ‘com-
prehensive rather than selective examination of data/evidence’ (Seale et 
al., 2004). I very strongly believed that electoral democracy at the local level 
would enhance people’s participation. I would never have tried to challenge 
my own beliefs until they were pointed out by one of my colleagues, who read 
a draft paper I prepared after my initial analysis. She suggested that my con-
clusion – that local elections are just the first step to solving the problem of 
non-participation – didn’t make sense because all the evidence I presented 
made it seem that elections were the problem rather than the first step to any 
solution. I have since then gone back to my data, being more conscious about 
my internal biases.
In the following chapter, I describe the context of this case study, i.e. the 
political, social, demographic, and institutional contexts of metropolitan plan-
ning in Kolkata along with the historical trajectory of their dynamics. Chapter 
3 describes the planning process in Kolkata in relation to the stated decen-
tralisation policy that the West Bengal government has adopted. Chapter 4 
draws from the literature on urban politics to present Kolkata’s case in com-
parison to other cities in India and the world. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises 
some of the key lessons from this study and offers policy recommendations 
for various actors in the planning process.
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 2 Context of metropolitan 
planning in Kolkata
 2.1 Political context
Partisan politics
Politically, Kolkata and the rest of West Bengal have been through a number 
of periods of turmoil in the first three decades since India’s independence 
(see Table 2.1). The partition of Bengal led to two massive influxes of refugees 
from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), once in 1947 and again in 1971. This put 
additional pressure on the already crippled infrastructure of Kolkata. Second, 
the violence of the radical Naxalite movement of the 1960s and 70s and its 
brutal suppression and the rise of ‘electoral communism’ posed challenges 
to the existing Congress Party’s grip on the state. Finally, the electoral victory 
of the Communist Party of India – a Marxist (CPI-M)-led coalition of left-wing 
parties5 in the West Bengal legislature in 1977 and its subsequent consolida-
tion of power at all governmental levels within the state has led to its holding 
office for six consecutive terms, spanning 28 years.
The initial electoral successes of CPI-M have been largely due to the popular-
ity of its land redistribution policy, mostly among the rural poor. Over the last 
twenty-eight years, it has consolidated its power base throughout the state, in-
cluding in the urban areas6, not always by fair means. The sheer length of time 
that the party has maintained its hold on the state administration has made 
the line separating the party and the state’s administrative machinery (includ-
ing the police) less distinct (Sanyal, 2005b). Both the local and the national me-
dia have time and again reported widespread electoral irregularities – rampant 
rigging, booth jamming, casting of false votes, voter intimidation, assaults on 
opposition candidates by CPI-M cadres and the police, etc. – in both municipal 
and state legislative assembly elections (Statesman News Service, 2005).
Although these allegations cannot be independently verified – and for that 
matter the CPI–M also alleges that opposition parties indulge in poll-related 
violence – a matter of greater concern is the number of uncontested seats. In 
the local elections held in West Bengal in May 2003, about 6,300 seats (nearly 
11 per cent of the seats) went uncontested, and most of them went to the 
CPI–M and its allies (Mathew, 2003). Although one can only speculate about 
the reasons for opposition parties not fielding candidates for these seats, the 
fact remains that one party has held sway over the state administration for a 
long period of time, and that this one-party status has led the state to a con-
dition that can best be described as a pseudo-democracy (see Table 2.2).
5  The coalition is popularly known as the Left Front.
6  In the most recent elections, held in 2005, the Left Front won 75 of the 141 seats in the Kolkata Municipal Cor-
poration. The main opposition party, All-India Trinamul Congress, won 42 seats. In most of the other municipali-
ties in the KMA, the Left Front won more than a two-thirds majority. For example, in Bidhan Nagar Municipality, 
the Left Front won 18 of 23 seats.
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It would be wrong, though, to assume that fraud and the threat of vio-
lence are the only reasons for the Left Front’s continuous electoral victories. 
The opposition parties in the state are disorganised and highly fragmented. 
Internal divisions between factions in the main opposition party (the Trina-
mul Congress – TNC) and divisions among different opposition parties have 
helped the Left Front in the elections (Statesman News Service, 2002). In ad-
dition, in sharp contrast to Bangalore where a significant number of elected 
officials are elected as independents without political affiliations (Benjamin, 
2000), Kolkata’s electoral politics are extremely partisan in nature, with very 
few independents winning elections.
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Table 2.1 Kolkata’s planning practice: key turning points
1911 Capital city moved from Kolkata to New Delhi. Calcutta was the capital of British India 
from 1773 until 1911 (declaration of the British Parliament).
1947 India’s independence, Partition of Bengal and influx of refugees (national and 
international events combined with religious fundamentalism).
1958 Cholera outbreak in Kolkata.
1959 WHO expert team recommend need for planning.
1960 Ford Foundation enlisted as consultants for Kolkata planning project.
1964 Dissident CPI members form CPI(M).
1960s Equal freight introduced for balanced regional development leading to industrial decline 
(national level policy).
1967 The first CPI(M)-led United Front government took office in West Bengal; simultaneous 
peasant uprising in the Naxalbari region of northern Bengal.
1967-71 President’s rule imposed in West Bengal. 
1969-70 The second CPI(M)-led United Front government in West Bengal took office. It was again 
dismissed by the central government after one year because of its support for large-scale 
peasant mobilisation.
1970 KMDA was formed to administer funds from the World Bank for infrastructure 
development based on the Basic Development Plan.
1971 Congress Party overwhelmingly returned to power in West Bengal.
1971 Second wave of refugees from Bangladesh arrive in KMA.
1977 The Left Front Government comes to power in West Bengal.
1979 The West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) Act was passed, making 
KMDA the statutory planning body for Metropolitan Kolkata (it was based on the British 
Town and Country Planning Act).
1980 The Bengal Municipal Act 1932 was amended.
1981 Municipal elections in West Bengal were held for the first time after a 15-year suspension. 
Regular municipal elections were held thereafter, without another interruption – the only 
state in India that can boast of this record.
1983 Third phase of the Calcutta Urban Development Programme in which a budget for local 
governments was approved for the first time.
1992 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Act was passed in the Indian Parliament.
1993 West Bengal Municipal Act was passed in the state legislature.
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In addition, a recent article (Sarkar, 2006) argues that economic stagna-
tion and the increasing informalisation of West Bengal’s economy, far from 
weakening the Left Front’s hold in the state, have actually helped enhance its 
power. Using social, economic and election data for West Bengal, Sarkar in-
fers that the vulnerability of those who depend on the informal economy has 
made them increasingly dependent on the Left Front for protecting their live-
lihoods. He argues that if formal-sector jobs were readily available in the state, 
and if the formal legal system were less costly in terms of time and money so 
that the common citizen could seek its protection, the people would have en-
joyed a more secure life and hence dependence on politics would have been 
minimal. Even many among those who are employed in the formal economy 
in West Bengal – particularly those in state government institutions – believe 
that they owe their employment to the Left Front. A Class-IV staff member 
from a local state-run university in the municipality of Kalyani confided dur-
ing an informal interview that he voted for the party that he believed was his 
annadaata (a Sanskrit word for ‘food provider’, referring here to the CPI–M). He 
believed that ‘the party’ hired him to work for the public university because 
he sees no difference between the party and the administration. This is evi-
dence of a paternalistic relationship (as described by Rudolph, 2000) between 
the state and the citizens of West Bengal.
Civil society
West Bengal has a seemingly vibrant civil society comprising trade unions, 
trade associations, cooperatives, citizen groups such as Nagarik Samities, media-
based groups and organisations, women’s groups, advocacy groups, communi-
ty-based groups (better known as community-based organisations, or CBOs) 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, these are not uni-
formly distributed throughout West Bengal. With the exception of Howrah, 
and to a lesser extent Bally, NGO presence is extremely sparse in the outlying 
KMA municipalities (KUSP Design Team, 2003). Youth groups exist in practi-
cally every settlement and in many cases provide a safety net for some of the 
poorest people. The women’s groups organised under Swarna Jayanti Shahari 
Rozgaar Yojana (SJSRY, a central government-funded urban employment pro-
gramme) are found in every KMA town and have the potential to become a 
powerful platform for women’s participation and empowerment.
The Nagarik Samiti – a formation that pre-dates ward committees – pro-
vides a public platform for civic engagement in many towns. Trade unions 
and other occupation-based organisations in the industrial towns have often 
been instrumental in improving job security and working conditions. They 
have been identified by consultants hired for the Kolkata Urban Services for 
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Table 2.2 Number of state assembly seats won by CPI-M, of 294 total seats*
Year 1977 1982 1987 1991 1996 2001 2006
Number of CPI-M 
seats
177
(230)
174
(238)
186
(251)
189 157
(203)
143
(199)
175
(233)
Source: Basu, 2002; Chaudhuri, 2001; the Election Commission of India website 
* Figures in parentheses are the total number of seats won by the Left Front Coalition.
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the Poor (KUSP), a project to improve urban services in the Kolkata Metropoli-
tan Area, as having the potential to play a role in negotiating improvements 
in living conditions in defunct industrial areas, and in freeing such areas for 
more productive use to benefit the poor. The informal sector has spawned 
several associations, related to rickshaw pulling, hawking and vending, daily 
labour and so on, to deal with issues of extortion and official harassment.
In the subsequent chapters I will discuss some of the reasons why civil 
society in Kolkata, unlike in other Indian cities, has not been very successful 
in playing a constructive role in planning and decision making. There are two 
main deficiencies: first, the groups are mostly associations of individuals with 
very little say in the decision-making process. And second, those groups that 
have any influence in the decision-making process are closely associated with 
one political party or another. This makes them less effective in representing 
the interests of people within a particular geographic community. I will come 
back to these two points in subsequent chapters.
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 2.2 Socio-economic context
Kolkata is one of the most populous metropolises in India. It also one of the 
poorest urban centres in India, with a visibly crumbling public infrastructure 
and widespread poverty. In addition, it is not homogenous spatially or tem-
porally (Chakravorty, 2000). There are distinct parts of the city with very dis-
tinguishable economic and demographic profiles (see Fig. 2.1 for a plan of the 
Kolkata Metropolitan Area).
Urban demographic trends in India and West Bengal
According to the 2001 census, in India around 285 million people or about 28 
per cent of the population live in urban areas. In 1991 there were 300 Class I 
cities accommodating about 65.2 per cent of the total urban population, while 
1135 Class IV cities accommodated only 7.7 per cent. In most towns of oth-
er class sizes a declining trend was discernible. In Class I cities however, a 
steady growth was registered, with 44.6 per cent of total urban population liv-
ing in them in 1951, 57.2 per cent in 1971, and 65.2 per cent in 1991. Amongst 
the Class I cities in India those with a million-plus population were growing 
at an alarming rate. According to the 1991 census there were 23 cities com-
prising 32.5 per cent of the total urban population. Some Indian metropolitan 
areas have the world’s highest population densities (Kundu, 2003).
Urban areas form the backbone of the country’s economy, acting as ma-
jor attraction zones and reservoirs of skills for the millions of migrants from 
the rural areas. In India, about 29 per cent of GDP was contributed by the ur-
ban sector in 1950-51 and since then the share has steadily increased; it had 
passed the 60 per cent mark by the year 2001. Thus, a little more than one-
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quarter of the population generates more than half of the country’s total GDP. 
Nevertheless, urban growth, especially in the metropolitan areas, has been 
exploitative and chaotic, resulting in rising unemployment and low produc-
tivity work-sharing in the informal sector, squatting in teeming slums, con-
gestion, encroachment on public space, water and air pollution and deterio-
rating infrastructure and services (Kundu, 2003).
Against the background of these changes in the demographic, economic 
and social geography of India’s largest cities, there is also the emergence of 
new cores and peripheries. The old hierarchy of four megacities (Delhi, Mum-
bai, Kolkata, and Chennai) located in different regions of the country is giving 
way to urban corridors and clusters of new investment located mostly in the 
southern and western parts of the country (Shaw, 1999).
Only eight of the 23 metropolitan cities fall in what Shaw (1999) calls ‘the 
periphery’ (a broad term that encompasses all those regions not experiencing 
growth of the type described above). It contains regions and cities that once 
saw better times – Kolkata best epitomises this decline. Kolkata today ranks 
fourth – after Mumbai, Delhi and Chennai – in many important economic 
functions. Though Kolkata’s decline began with its loss of national capital-city 
status in 1911, it was hastened further by the overall decline in manufactur-
ing industry that has beset the state of West Bengal (of which Kolkata is the 
capital city) since the early sixties and which persists (Shaw, 1999).
In the 1960s West Bengal, along with Maharashtra, was India’s leading in-
dustrial state, accounting for 14 per cent of India’s industrial output. This had 
fallen to 9.8 per cent by 1980-81 and to 5.6 per cent by 1992-93. Industrial de-
cline has affected all spheres of business and commerce and is reflected in 
the slowly declining share of Kolkata’s port and airport in all-India foreign 
trade. According to 1964 figures, Kolkata port handled 92 per cent (by ton-
nage) of India’s exports and 25 per cent of its imports (Banerjee & Chakra-
vorty, 1994). In 1985-86, 10.57 per cent of India’s exports and 9.57 per cent of 
India’s imports passed through Kolkata’s port and airport taken together. By 
1995 this had fallen to 2.69 per cent and 5.5 per cent respectively (Shaw, 1999).
The local economy
At the macro level, the economy of metropolitan Kolkata since India’s inde-
pendence has been characterised by the decline of the traditional jute, engi-
neering and textile industries. Many industrial sites are derelict or occupied 
by terminally sick industries. This is reflected in the slow growth of the popu-
lation, high levels of unemployment and dependence on the informal sector, 
with the poor competing for survival as hawkers, rickshaw pullers or domes-
tic servants.
Youth unemployment is high and many end up participating in antisocial 
activities – gambling, using drugs or illicit liquor, and prostitution. Many poor 
households are dependent on the earnings of women (see Roy, 2003).
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The most dynamic sector is small informal and unregulated industry and 
services, often sited in poor neighbourhoods and providing a vital source of 
employment (Sarkar, 2006). Many of these activities are dangerous or pollut-
ing and working conditions are poor, with low wages, long hours, a reliance 
on casual and often piece-rate labour, and with little concern for the health 
and safety of workers and the frequent use of child labour. As traditional in-
dustries close down and lay off their workers, the livelihoods of the poor and 
lower-middle-class are becoming less and less secure. At the same time there 
are areas of the KMA where small-scale entrepreneurs are developing new 
options. The livelihoods of the poor can be divided into several categories:
Mill workers: mostly men with regular, seasonal or temporary work.■■
Small-scale manufacturers and microentrepreneurs: particularly refugees ■■
from Bangladesh, engaged in the manufacture and sale of articles such as 
bangles, toys, bags, hosiery and so forth using traditional or acquired skills. 
They operate on a small scale, due to lack of operating capital and secure 
markets. The working conditions may be hazardous, and may include the 
use of dangerous chemicals, like acids.
Skilled labour: in the informal sector, engaged in rod binding, painting, ■■
white washing, carpentry, plumbing, electrical work and so on. They have no 
guarantee of regular work.
Unskilled labour: manual workers on building sites, roads or any kind of ■■
unskilled local work; if work is not available locally they travel long dis-
tances to find it. Other jobs include carrying metal scraps and loading/un-
loading cargo trucks.
Hawkers: often with very little capital, selling used garments or a variety of ■■
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low-end products for the poor and middle class in local markets or on the 
pavements of Kolkata.
Vendors: retailing small domestic articles or vegetables or running teashops ■■
and small wayside eateries.
Rickshaw pullers: as a full-time or part-time activity, usually involving pay-■■
ing rent or a portion of the profit to the owner of the rickshaw. The typical 
daily income is Rs 30-40, although on special occasions this may go up to 
Rs 150-200.
Domestic workers: thousands of poor, unorganised women, many of whom ■■
come into the city every day by train.
Fishing: this age-old occupation for communities on both sides of the river ■■
is declining. Fishermen who are better-off have moved to organised inland 
fish farming in ponds and bheris.
Scavengers and garbage pickers: desperately poor households resort to gar-■■
bage picking and scavenging plastic bags, papers, bottles and so on and selling 
them to wholesalers and organised buyers. Another widely practiced income-
generating option for the poor – especially old women – is the collection of 
cow dung for making fuel cakes (KUSP Design Team, 2003, Annex 1, p. 3).
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Poverty in KMA: an overview
It is difficult to give a precise measure of poverty in the KMA. The best avail-
able information is SUDA’s survey of Below Poverty Line (BPL) households, 
which gives a figure of around 425,000 BPL households in the ULBs situated 
outside the Kolkata Municipal Corporation area. With an average household 
size of 5-6 people, this would give a figure of around 2,350,000 people, or 30 
per cent of the total population of 7,800,000, with an income that is insuffi-
cient to feed themselves adequately (KUSP Design Team, 2003, Annex 1).
West Bengal has been successful in reducing poverty from 55 per cent 
(1983) to 36 per cent (1993-94).7 The urban poverty rate was estimated as 22 
per cent (1993/94). Nevertheless, urban poverty has increased in absolute 
terms. The most common definition of poverty in use is income that is Below 
Poverty Line (BPL). In urban areas it is defined as the per capita income re-
quired for a minimum of 2,100 calories per day or Rs. 415 (approx US $10) per 
month.8 
Following the introduction of SJSRY in 1997, the ULBs were expected to un-
dertake a household survey to identify the BPL population and identify the 
poorest among them. Kolkata and Howrah Municipal Corporations and a 
few municipalities have not completed the first stage of the BPL survey. Most 
ULBs have not completed the second stage, which is intended to identify the 
poorest households among the BPL population for the purpose of targeting 
the economic benefits of the SJSRY scheme. The priority rating of each BPL 
household is determined by seven non-economic criteria related to living 
conditions, access to water supply and sanitation, levels of education, type of 
employment and the status of children. SUDA provided financial and techni-
cal assistance to undertake the survey, which was carried out by a variety of 
people, including councillors and Honorary Health Workers. The accuracy of 
the data is questionable.9 Existing figures may be overestimated by 15-20 per 
cent.10 The proportion of BPL households varies from 12 per cent (Chandan-
nagore Municipal Corporation) to 58 per cent (Khardah municipality).
The urban poor are characterised by linguistic and ethnic diversity that re-
flects the historical processes of migration into the KMA. They include refu-
gees from Bangladesh, migrants from rural areas of West Bengal and neigh-
bouring states – particularly Uttar Pradesh and Bihar – and minority groups, 
especially Muslims, who have been associated with Kolkata for generations.
The situation of the poor is characterised by unemployment and low lev-
els of income, a degraded environment, deficient levels of basic services and 
7  Planning Commission, government of India as cited by (KUSP Design Team, 2003).
8  See (Ganguly, 2003). This newspaper article talks about the difficulty of identifying BPL households.
9  Report of the Municipal Administrative Reforms Committee 2001, ILGUS, GoWB.
10  Source: Director, SUDA in an interview with KUSP Consultants as cited in (KUSP Design Team, 2003).
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varying degrees of social exclusion. In some municipalities the organised 
middle poor – such as the refugees represented by the United Central Refu-
gee Council (UCRC) (for a more detailed study, see Dasgupta, 2000) – have a 
voice in municipal affairs and are able to press their demands for improved 
levels of service. However, the poorest and most vulnerable – those who live 
in areas with irregular tenure – have no access to services and little or no say 
in the decisions that affect their daily lives. They include pavement dwellers 
and people living in irregular settlements on land belonging to defunct mills 
or government agencies or along drainage canals, railway tracks and under 
bridges. They are handicapped by low levels of literacy, and have little un-
derstanding or ability to deal with the institutions that are intended to serve 
them.
The most explicit social exclusion is tenure-related. The very poorest 
settlements – perhaps 10 per cent of the total – are those with problems of 
tenure. These are settlements of last resort, occupied by people who have 
nowhere else to go and who are unable to pay even the lowest rents. They 
include large numbers of households headed by single women, widows or 
women whose husbands are sick or handicapped. Since they have irregular 
income, they lack the most basic service provisions, and the inhabitants are 
often subject to harassment (KUSP Annex 1, p. 2).
Historically many poor settlements grew as non-Bengalis migrated from 
adjoining states to work as labourers in the jute mills. The population in the 
KMA towns was also swollen due to an influx of refugees in 1947 from what 
was then East Pakistan and as a result of the war in 1971. The refugees settled 
on government, private and railway land, often in hazardous conditions.
Despite the diversity of low-income settlements within the KMA, it is 
broadly possible to identify the following typologies:
Peri-urban settlements: those in outlying towns with rural characteris-■■
tics, heterogeneous populations and the poor living in single bamboo mat 
rooms between better-off neighbours. Many of these are in low-lying ar-
eas, subject to flooding. Most of the land is privately owned, although it is 
sometimes sublet.
Refugee settlements: peri-urban areas dating back to partition; others from ■■
1971 with conditions similar to those above but with a marked difference 
between settlements that have achieved security of tenure and those that 
have not.
Bustees and mill lines in high-density industrial areas located along both ■■
sides of the river Hooghly, especially to the north of Kolkata: many of the 
housing colonies established by jute mills in the past have fallen into dis-
repair. Other workers, mainly from rural areas of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and 
Orissa, rent rooms in the large, densely packed slums that grew up outside 
the mills. Even where mills have closed or no longer provide a significant 
source of employment, housing may be characterised as densely packed, 
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rented accommodation organised into baris – single-storey buildings di-
vided into 15-20 rooms facing into a common courtyard or alley. Each room 
is occupied by a family or joint family, with as many as 20 people sharing 
a single room. The landlord often lives in the bari, in similar conditions to 
those of his or her tenants. Most tenants have occupied their rooms for at 
least 20 or 30 years, a factor that has encouraged a high level of bari and 
neighbourhood solidarity. Many migrant families retain ties with their vil-
lages of origin, and remit part of their earnings back to their families. One 
of the reasons they prefer to remain in the slums – despite the poor stand-
ard of housing – is that the rents are low, typically in the order of Rs 25-50 
per month. New tenants pay much higher amounts – up to Rs 200-300 per 
month. Outside Howrah there is little evidence that these neighbourhoods 
are being redeveloped. This may be because bari landlords are unable to ac-
cumulate or borrow capital to buy out tenants and construct multi-storey 
apartment blocks, or because of the political pressure tenants can bring to 
bear if landlords try to increase the rents.
Squatter settlements: the very poorest neighbourhoods with irregular set-■■
tlements situated on private or government-owned land. These have little 
or no access to services, and are frequently located in hazardous areas, un-
der bridges or on canal banks and railway lines. Most unrecognised settle-
ments have been occupied for a long time – at least 20-30 years. To avoid 
encouraging squatters the Government of West Bengal does not allow the 
provision of infrastructure in irregular settlements. However, the West 
Bengal Municipal Act provides for measures to be taken to protect public 
health, for citizens dwelling in such areas and in the surrounding neigh-
bourhoods. In practice, service provision is typically limited to stand posts 
provided outside the settlement.
Pavement dwellers: live in the most dynamic areas of the city with a large ■■
number in and around Howrah station. Outside KMC and Howrah there 
are a few places where people live on the streets, as in the immediate sur-
roundings of Dakshineshwar temple where one finds a concentration of 
beggars, street children, hawkers and the mentally handicapped. The peo-
ple who live on the streets are a particularly vulnerable group, and are of-
ten subject to harassment and abuse.
Environmental and infrastructure context
Kolkata is characterised by very poor levels of environmental and infrastruc-
ture provision. This is particularly so in poorer neighbourhoods. Nearly all 
low-income neighbourhoods have a degraded and unhealthy environment 
with a deficient level of basic services. Water supply is intermittent. The wa-
ter from shallow tube wells is often contaminated, while drinking water is 
only available for a few hours a day, leading to long queues at stand posts (see 
Basu & Main, 2001). Drainage is poor, with drains often blocked by waste. Sol-
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id waste disposal is irregular and garbage accumulates providing a breeding 
ground for flies and vermin. Many areas are low-lying and flood during the 
monsoon. Sanitation is deplorable. In densely populated neighbourhoods it is 
common for as many as 40 households to share only one or two latrines. The 
latrines are often blocked and people may have to queue from the early hours 
of the morning to use them. Children, and some adults, rely on open defeca-
tion, on pavements, areas of waste ground or in open drains. Environmental 
problems are not simply caused by lack of investment but by poor planning, 
the absence of consultation, bad construction and no maintenance (KUSP De-
sign Team, 2003).
 2.3 Planning institutions in India
The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act passed by the Indian Parliament in 
1992 provided for:
regular and fair conduct of municipal elections by statutorily constituted ■■
State Election Commissions;
limiting the state power to do away with democratically elected municipal ■■
governments;
adequate representation to weaker sections and women in municipal bod-■■
ies through reservation of seats;
constitution of ward committees in municipalities with a population of ■■
three hundred thousand or more, with no bar on such committees in cities 
having lesser population, to ensure popular participation in civic affairs at 
the grassroots level;
specification by law, through the state legislatures, of the powers and func-■■
tional responsibilities to be entrusted to municipalities and ward commit-
tees;
a relationship of state governments and urban local bodies on firm footing ■■
with respect to local taxation powers and revenue sharing between state 
and local authorities through statutory state finance commissions, to be 
set up every five years; and
involvement of elected representatives in planning at the district and met-■■
ropolitan levels.
The planning institutions in India are complex and often have overlapping 
jurisdictions.11 The function of the National Planning Commission at the na-
tional level is mostly recommendatory; it includes preparing a plan model for 
11  For an in-depth historical analysis of the roots of contemporary urban governance institutions in India starting 
from the Mughal era see (Datta, 1999).
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the allocation of national resources among various central government min-
istries and among different states. These tasks are increasingly being seen as 
irrelevant by some, even within the Commission (Shourie, 2004).
[W]hat the [National Planning] Commission says or decides on even those traditional 
functions, carries much less authority:
As an institution it has no greater expertise on those questions than other institutions: ■■
the operational ministries, for instance, or the better-run states.
In part because, with the weakening of the ■■ political class [emphasis added by the 
author], more and more of its allocations have become formula-based: just two fac-
tors – last year’s allocation, and assorted formulae – are estimated by senior officials 
of the Commission itself to determine nine-tenths of the annual allocations to central 
ministries and to states.
In part because, having become and having come to be seen as but a limb of Govern-■■
ment, the Commission has got into the habit of not speaking the whole truth (Shourie, 
2004).
The Planning Commission has also come under attack for not being cognizant 
of the constitutionally mandated district and metropolitan plans prepared by 
the District Planning Commissions and the Metropolitan Planning Commis-
sions, respectively, which are constitutional entities (Bandyopadhyay, 2000). 
This is seen by many as a violation of the constitution by the planning com-
mission, which has not recognised the district and metropolitan plans and is 
not trying to incorporate them into the state and central plans.
Planning functions at a sub-national scale have been assigned to different 
agencies at different levels. ‘At the state level Planning Boards have been set 
up. These Boards are neither Constitutional bodies nor are they statutory enti-
ties. (The same is true for National Planning Commission.) The State Five-year 
Plans generally follow the formula of the national plans not only in content 
but also in methods and techniques of preparation of plans’ (Kolkata Metro-
politan Development Authority, 2001). Therefore the main task of the state 
planning board is to allocate state resources to various districts and local 
urban bodies within the state. The board is afflicted with problems that are 
similar to those faced by the National Planning Commission discussed above. 
These boards do not concern themselves with spatial planning in the context 
of sectoral planning for housing, infrastructure, land use, and urban and rural 
development. ‘There is nothing in the Constitution to indicate how these dis-
trict plans [and likewise the metropolitan plans] would be integrated into the 
state plan. Theoretically state plans could be prepared independently totally 
ignoring the district draft plans. In that case it would be an ungainly carica-
ture of planning from below’ (Bandyopadhyay, 2000).
The first two five-year plans (both at the national and state levels) did very 
little for cities. When India gained independence in 1947, 85 per cent of the 
population lived in villages. Rural poverty was seen as a central challenge for 
[ 42 ]
SUA020.indb   42 12-08-2008   12:14:21
the political leadership, economists and planners. Successive five-year plans 
earmarked large amounts for agriculture and rural development, and in the 
1960s, drought and famine further encouraged a rural focus. The problems of 
urban India were barely recognised. This is particularly true for Kolkata. The 
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)-led Left Front government in the 
state of West Bengal had given relatively little attention to Kolkata. Both ideo-
logically and politically it was in the interest of the Left Front to focus its at-
tention on rural West Bengal. Through vigorous pursuit of land redistribution 
programmes and village-level electoral politics, the Left Front has effectively 
consolidated its political base in rural West Bengal. Kolkata has thus suffered 
from a Marxist policy of benign neglect. Today, in spite of rapid urbanisation 
(with an urban population of 300 million, and 35 per cent of India’s popula-
tion living in urban areas), the mindset of giving priority to rural areas has 
changed little (Burra, 2005).
India’s constitution is federal insofar as certain areas of concern fall within 
the legislative domain of the central government of India (for example, for-
eign affairs, defence and finance). Other areas fall under the states (for exam-
ple, housing and urban development) and in others, both the central and state 
governments have jurisdiction (such as education, criminal law, economic and 
social planning). With regard to urban development, the central government 
can influence states in only limited ways, through national policies that the 
states are not obligated to follow and through centrally sponsored schemes 
implemented through budgetary transfers to the states (Burra, 2005).
Despite progressive policies in the past, many state governments in India 
have continued implementing flawed urban development policies with little 
or no concern for the urban poor and other politically marginalised sections 
of urban society.12 Between December 2004 and February 2005, 50,000 to 70,000 
hutments were demolished in Maharashtra (whose capital is Mumbai), in vio-
lation of poll promises and of international covenants to which India is a sig-
natory (Burra, 2005). Similar demolitions have occurred in other cities in India, 
including Kolkata.13 As described by Burra, ‘[T]hese actions by the government 
raise fundamental doubts about the health of self-professed democracies in 
the absence of counteracting powers, and underline the vulnerability of the 
poor where there is a consensus across political parties, significant sections 
of the media, and captains of industry and trade’ (Burra, 2005, p. 88).
12  This fact is discussed in greater detail by Benjamin (2000).
13  On 22 September 2001, the West Bengal government and the Kolkata Municipal Corporation evicted some 
20,000 people from Tolly Nullah; on 10 December 2002 another 40,000 people were evicted in Kolkata; on 2 
February 2003 some 7,000 Dalits were evicted; and on 15 December 2003, 75,000 people along the canal side set-
tlements at Bagbazar and Cossipore area were evicted. See Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (http://www.achr.
net/impacts.htm) for details.
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Planning institutions in West Bengal
Kolkata’s post-colonial planning experience is noteworthy for several rea-
sons. First, it included an unprecedented effort at transferring Western plan-
ning technology (mainly through the Ford Foundation) to a Third World city. 
Second, this particular transfer represented a major ‘paradigm shift’ – from 
the highly codified physical master planning of the British colonial adminis-
tration to a performance and mission-oriented strategic planning approach 
heavily influenced by contemporary social sciences. Third, it serves as a 
graphic example of how the larger picture of a city’s future is drawn by the 
forces of politics and economics (Banerjee & Chakravorty, 1994).
It is now clear that since the departure of foreign experts from Kolkata, the 
institutional apparatus for planning has undergone several mutations as it 
has adapted to local expertise, politics and bureaucracy (Banerjee & Chakra-
vorty, 1994). The urgency of planning for Kolkata was first recognised as the 
result of a public health crisis in 1958 – an outbreak of cholera in the city that 
claimed about 250 lives. In 1959, a team from the World Health Organization 
recommended immediate planning for potable water supply, drainage and 
sewerage, along with a general planning effort to address the abominable 
condition of the city’s transportation system, housing, slums, and land use. In 
1960, the Ford Foundation was enlisted as consultants to a Kolkata planning 
project.
When Ford Foundation consultants came to Kolkata in the early sixties, 
however, no state or local agency with responsibility for urban or regional 
planning existed. An authority was needed to receive the advice of the Ford 
Foundation experts; the Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization (CMPO) 
was created in 1961 to plan for the entire metropolitan area and to offer the 
experts a base (Banerjee & Chakravorty, 1994).
The effect of the American planning style was apparent from the very be-
ginning. Despite the presence of the prominent land-use planners, the con-
ventional British master plan approach, still popular in most parts of the 
world, was dropped. The Basic Development Plan (BDP) concept was advanced 
instead. Such a plan was seen as much more encompassing and strategic in 
scope than a physical master plan. The BDP was to emphasise economic de-
velopment within the regional context (Banerjee & Chakravorty, 1994).
The planning document proposed that separate, detailed plans for water 
and sanitation, and for traffic and transportation be made within the over-
all framework of the BDP, whose recommendations nevertheless remained 
indicative only. That is, instead of earmarking specific projects, the BDP 
should simply outline the desired direction of growth. The plan was meant to 
be comprehensive, covering all facets of urban life including health, educa-
tion, recreation and beautification. An urban policy planning exercise of such 
scope had never before been attempted in India. The data requirements were 
immense, while the resources were scant.
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The document finally published in December 1966 was the first perspec-
tive plan for Kolkata. It was expected to cover the twenty-year period from 
1966 to 1986. Although the BDP was never intended to be project-specific, it 
now included a list of projects already underway or under consideration. The 
list of specifics, although perhaps inevitable, greatly compromised the plan’s 
original intent. Yet this list turned out to be the very essence of the BDP.
Other criticisms of the BDP did not surface publicly at that point. Over 
time, however, the BDP’s emphasis on economic development was criticised 
as grandiose but lacking in tangible prescriptions for generating hard reve-
nue. The plan was also criticised as being remiss in encouraging participation 
by local urban public works agencies (e.g. the Calcutta Improvement Trust) 
or local governments (e.g., the Kolkata Municipal Corporation or the Howrah 
Municipality). Moreover, despite the preponderance of urban informal sector 
employment in the Kolkata area, its role in economic development was not 
incorporated into the BDP perspective (Banerjee & Chakravorty, 1994).
But what really upstaged the BDP were the political changes that began in 
the late 1960s. By the mid-sixties the leftist political parties led by the Com-
munist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) had made strong inroads into state pol-
itics. In the state elections of 1967 the BDP’s principal patron, the Congress 
Party, which had held power in the state without interruption since independ-
ence in 1947, lost to a coalition of leftist parties. Although technically the BDP 
survived, it was pushed to the side by the political instabilities of subsequent 
years. The next four years saw three elections and several coalition govern-
ments of left- and right-wing parties, each lasting for about a year on average. 
The political instability and partisan infighting soon escalated to widespread 
violence, triggered mainly by a new radical force, the Naxalite movement. 
Marxist-Leninist in ideology, the Naxalites rejected the democratic process 
and sought to capture the state through revolution. They challenged the au-
thority of the established political parties, especially that of the CPI-M. Such 
confrontations led to political conflicts and violence throughout the state of 
West Bengal. As the political chaos continued unabated, the national govern-
ment (with the Congress Party in power) finally intervened. What was need-
ed at once in Kolkata (and West Bengal), the reasoning went, was a massive 
infusion of funds for physical improvement projects that would improve the 
physical city, create jobs, and ultimately counteract the rising twin forces of 
‘revolutionary Marxism’ and ‘electoral Marxism’.
Accordingly, a special presidential decree created the Calcutta Metropoli-
tan Development Authority (now called Kolkata Metropolitan Development 
Authority (KMDA)) to serve as a conduit for funds. Ostensibly the purpose of 
KMDA was to coordinate the implementation of projects and not duplicate 
the functions of the Calcutta Improvement Trust and other line agencies. The 
KMDA was flush with funds from the central government and internation-
al aid agencies such as the World Bank; to move expediently it adopted the 
[ 45 ]
SUA020.indb   45 12-08-2008   12:14:22
BDP’s appended list of projects as its own mandate. The underlying assump-
tion was that ‘better’ infrastructure would lead to a ‘better’ and less Marxist 
city (Banerjee & Chakravorty, 1994).
Thus in 1974 KMDA, with the help of a $35 million World Bank loan, be-
gan major projects in Kolkata. It has been noted by Banerjee and Chakravorty 
(1994) that the World Bank chose only 44 out of 160 projects recommended by 
BDP that met the bank’s criteria and development philosophy. Thus the Bus-
tee (slum) improvement programme, which has been widely acknowledged 
as a major KMDA achievement, was not among the projects funded by the 
World Bank. The authors also argue that planning projects in Kolkata even to-
day remain driven by external donor agencies such as the World Bank, which 
subscribes to the neo-liberal development agenda, often ignoring local per-
ceptions of the needs and priorities within the community.
Curiously, CMPO, the original planning organisation that gave birth to BDP, 
was neither abandoned nor folded into the newly created KMDA. The CMPO 
was allowed to continue its planning mission; meanwhile, however, the KM-
DA had the authority to plan and the funds to implement. In 1977, CMPO was 
formally merged into the Town and Country Planning Organisation (TCPO), a 
state agency; CMPO, an urban planning body, became responsible overnight 
for planning for villages and for those cities that did not yet have any plan-
ning or development authority.
The KMDA, though, is an organisation in decline (B. Sanyal & Tewari, 1990); 
previously, the KMDA was the supreme planning body. According to the West 
Bengal Town and Country planning Act, in 1979 KMDA was made the statu-
tory planning body for metropolitan Kolkata. (This act was based on the Brit-
ish Town and Country Planning Act.) The Municipal Development Programme, 
initiated in the 1980s by the Left Front government, was an effort to decen-
tralise planning and curtail the powers of the KMDA. In the 1983-84 financial 
year, during the third phase of the Calcutta Urban Development Project, some 
of the major changes in planning in metropolitan Kolkata began. Some of the 
local governments were given a budget and they prepared a plan of action 
for a 5-year period with a set of guidelines (such as encouraging the use of 
locally available technology, and stressing sanitation and water supply, finan-
cial discipline, and revenue performance targets with incentives and penal-
ties attached to funding based on whether those targets are met). These are 
some of the major departures that have taken place from the earlier practices. 
Because of its earlier centralised planning process, KMDA had failed in most 
cases to appreciate needs and priorities at the local level. In addition, when 
KMDA finished a particular infrastructure project, they asked the Urban Local 
Body (ULB, i.e. municipalities and municipal corporations) to take it over. A 
number of problems in maintaining the newly created infrastructure cropped 
up because of mismanagement by ULBs.
Meanwhile, institutions involved in planning have proliferated. TCPO is en-
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gaged in planning outside Kolkata. The State Planning Board, although more 
policy-oriented and ostensibly concerned with state-wide issues, maintains a 
strong interest in urban matters as well, and in Kolkata’s affairs. Such institu-
tions (and commissions, task forces, research organisations) are predictable 
bureaucratic responses to the complex social problems in developing coun-
tries, serving as effective foils against political heat, diffusing accountability, 
and excusing failure to act (Banerjee & Chakravorty, 1994).
Why did the West Bengal government initiate decentralisation at such an 
early stage, when no other state initiated it? First, the decentralisation process 
in West Bengal began even before 1977 when the Left Front came to power. In 
1973 a congress ministry passed the West Bengal Panchayat Act, creating a 
four-tier structure (Thomas Isaac & Franke, 2002, p. 15). Second, the main rea-
son why the West Bengal government pushed forward the introduction and 
implementation of decentralisation was to implement land reforms in rural 
areas so as to increase its electoral strength. ‘The primary activity of the West 
Bengal local governments during their first term in 1978-83 was to implement 
land reforms. The panchayats became the main administrative instruments 
for detecting illegal landholdings, identifying the sharecroppers, and distrib-
uting the land. They were able to carry out these tasks successfully because 
the 1978 elections, held during the heyday of the peasant movement in West 
Bengal, had brought up landless and poor peasants into panchayat leadership 
positions’ (Thomas Isaac & Franke 2002, p. 15). That is the monitoring and po-
licing role of all the different roles of local government that was played by 
the panchayats. Decentralisation in urban areas came by proxy, not by design. 
Most of the designed decentralisation was in rural areas.
Different people have different notions of what planning is. For the pur-
pose of this research it is important to discuss what planning means in the 
context of Kolkata. There are basically two categories of plans, differentiated 
in terms of their overall objectives, as per one of the senior KMDA planners:14
One kind of planning is narrowly defined by the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning 
and Development) Act, 1979 as the Land Use and Development Control plan. It contains a 
written statement formulating the policy and the general proposals including maps of the 
Planning Authority (in this case KMDA) in respect of development and general use of land 
in that area predominantly concerning itself with measures for improvement of the physi-
cal environment.
This kind of plan contains zoning and subdivision regulations that are expect-
ed to be enforced by the respective local governments. According to the act, 
these plans need to be advertised in one or more local newspapers for com-
ments from citizens before they are adopted and approved by the state gov-
14  Interview with Mr. Kalyan Roy, Director Macroeconomics, KMDA.
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ernment (e.g. regulations for wetland conservation, FAR and density restric-
tions, ground coverage restrictions, etc.). It is rigid in the sense that it doesn’t 
change over a long period of time. It is restrictive, i.e. it is more about regu-
lations controlling the density of development and the type of land use. For 
Kolkata Metropolitan Area, KMDA has been made the statutory planning au-
thority as per the West Bengal Town and Country (Planning and Development) 
Act of 1979. The Act specifies a detailed procedure for publishing information 
about this kind of plan, before it is accepted, in one or more local newspapers 
and seeking comments from the general public.
The second kind of plan has social equity and economic development as 
its main objectives as opposed to improvements in the physical environ-
ment.15 The West Bengal Municipal Act, 1994 defines a Draft Development 
Plan (DDP) for any municipal area as a written statement that includes the 
schemes administered by the municipality or the notified area authority for 
social and economic development. It has a provision for review every 5 years. 
KMPC has the mandate to prepare such plans for KMA for all sectors (water 
and sanitation, bustee improvement, traffic and transport, health, and educa-
tion). These sectors represent the five responsibilities that were conferred to 
the local bodies in the 12th Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The objec-
tives of this plan are not to regulate or control density or land use. Since KM-
PC already has elected representatives, the plans prepared by KMPC are not 
released to the public for comments. According to a senior planner in KMDA,16 
‘there is no need for it to be presented to the public as it is prepared by elected 
representatives’.
There is a third type of plan, called the annual action plan, prepared by 
the various state departments. The five-year DDP has no significance in the 
finance department of the state, for investment decisions are made in an an-
nual cycle. Since the investment actions in the state are rigidly compartmen-
talised through the various departments, each department (such as the state 
irrigation department, KMDA, public works department and others concerned 
with a drainage-related project that might be part of DDP) needs to prepare 
its annual plans for approval and allocation of funds by the state government. 
In some cases a development or infrastructure project within KMA might in-
volve action on the part of multiple state-level departments. Although KMPC 
allows the participation of all the departments and agencies concerned (both 
state and federal) in the planning process for such projects, the different de-
partments and agencies still need to prepare the action plan for each year for 
the purpose of resource allocation.
15  As per author’s interview with Mohit Bhattacharya, an ex-academic and an independent consultant in public 
administration.
16  Author’s interview with Mr T. K. Mitra, Director General (Planning and Development), KMDA.
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Metropolitan planning
The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts of 1992 mark a watershed 
in the evolution of local-level planning and decision making in India. For the 
first time the panchayati raj (village council) institutions in rural India and the 
municipalities and municipal corporations in urban India were accorded con-
stitutional status in these two amendments. They were therefore raised to 
the status of ‘governments’ at the local level, like the union government at 
the national level and the state government at the state level. These constitu-
tional amendments were followed by state legislation compatible with these 
amendments. The legal framework for ‘planning from below’ throughout the 
country came into being by April 1994.
These developments bestowed constitutional status on ‘planning’ at three 
levels: (1) the village and the municipal level, (2) the district level, and (3) the 
metropolitan level. The National Planning Commission at the national level 
was established by executive fiat and has no constitutional status. But local 
and regional (district)-level planning was accorded constitutional status, which 
underscores the importance the national political class attached to ‘decentral-
ised’ planning (Bhattacharya, 1998). The intent of the constitutional amend-
ments was to induce the state legislatures to make laws that would lead to the 
devolution of power and responsibility to the municipalities with respect to 
the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice.
The Left Front government that came after the Congress government in 
1977 had already adopted a decentralised planning and development policy 
as discussed earlier. But for a city-region like Kolkata with 41 contiguous ur-
ban local bodies and 100 or so rural local bodies, some of the planning inter-
ventions and physical infrastructure cut across the boundaries of local bodies. 
There was a felt need for a metropolitan-wide planning body to administer 
such a planning exercise.
In this regard, the state of West Bengal enacted the West Bengal Metro-
politan Planning Committee Act, 1994 for the purpose of decentralising spa-
tial and socio-economic planning in Kolkata. The Act provided for the consti-
tution of the Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Committee (KMPC) and for the 
preparation of a draft development plan for the metropolitan area as a whole 
by consolidating the development plans for its constituent municipalities 
and gram panchayats (village councils). Two-thirds of the committee is elected 
by, and from, the elected councillors of the 41 municipalities and around 100 
chairpersons of the village councils in the Kolkata Metropolitan Area (KMA). 
Another one-third of the committee is made up of nominated representatives 
of the Government of India and the state government and of organisations 
and institutions relating to urban development and infrastructure. It took 
seven years after the enactment of the Act before the Kolkata Metropolitan 
Planning Committee was formed and began deliberations.
The KMPC is currently in the process of finalising five sectoral plans for 
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the KMA area. In this exercise KMDA has been made the technical secretariat 
following which KMDA was asked to prepare a perspective plan for the Kolk-
ata Metropolitan Area. This they did in the form of the ‘Vision 2025: Perspective 
Plan of CMA’ in 2001 (Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, 2001). It is 
worth noting that a perspective plan with a time horizon of 20 years, called A 
Perspective Plan for Calcutta: 2011 had already been prepared by the State Plan-
ning Board in 1990-91 (see Figure 2.2).
The idea of the KMPC is to consolidate local needs and priorities, as ex-
pressed in the municipal development plans for the local bodies, into a metro-
politan development plan. This invariably involves resource allocation within 
Kolkata Metropolitan Area that has a variable impact on different local bodies 
within the metropolitan area. Thus KMPC is envisioned to assist also in man-
aging conflicts among various local bodies within KMA and letting the local 
bodies negotiate development-related allocation with the state government.
It is a hard reality that the task involved in preparing the municipal devel-
opment plan according to the constitution’s guidelines, cannot be performed 
by the municipalities all by themselves. The reason lies not in municipal in-
stitutional debility, but in a lack of organisational capacity (Bhattacharya, 
1998). Given their fiscal constraints, the municipalities will remain incapaci-
tated from bearing the financial cost of internalising the required planning 
expertise. A cost-effective and workable alternative is the preparation of mod-
el development plans for a municipality in each size class – small, medium, 
and large – by a multidisciplinary expert group. KMDA has offered to prepare 
model plans for two municipalities (Titagarh and Barrackpore) within KMA. It 
remains to be seen how successful these model plans will become as helpful 
tools for other municipalities to prepare their plans themselves.
Municipal institutions
In most ULBs ward committees have only recently been formed, and as such, 
their role is still evolving. The value of the ward committee is, however, gen-
erally accepted, and most committees meet on a monthly basis, with annual 
meetings open to the general public. Membership in the ward committees is 
broadly determined by ward committee rules set by the government of West 
Bengal. The background and range of members varies from ward to ward de-
pending on such factors as the councillor, chairperson and the nature of the 
ward. In poorer wards there tends to be greater representation of poor and 
unemployed individuals. Some councillors place an emphasis on representa-
tion from those living across the ward, and some on ensuring that the com-
mittee has people with a range of backgrounds, hence bringing different skills 
and knowledge to the committee. Common features include:
Under-representation of women. Most of the committees that were visited ■■
did not have more than one or two women members.
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Limited representation of SJSRY■■ 17 or Indian Population Project VII (IPP VIII) 
representatives on the committee.
In general SJSRY Neighbourhood Committee members and IPP VIII workers 
were not represented on the ward committees. As a result the representation 
of the poor is weak, and the integration of SJSRY with ward committee plan-
ning has to be mediated through the office of the councillor. In wards headed 
by a woman councillor the poverty agenda is often better integrated with the 
work of the ward committee, since the councillor is better acquainted with 
the neighbourhood groups, neighbourhood committees and other women’s 
organisations.
The committees prepare annual plans to prioritise their needs. These con-
sist primarily of small-scale infrastructure requirements, combining new cap-
ital works with maintenance functions (such as repairs to roads, drains, etc.). 
Plans are generally short-term and tend to be ‘wish’ lists of requirements and 
outline costs prepared with little or no technical input from engineers. The 
planning process is weak for a number of reasons:
Plans are short-term with a focus on small-scale infrastructure and lack an ■■
integrated vision.
There are limited mechanisms for public consultation. (Details follow in ■■
the next chapter.)
Local level planning is undertaken with a limited information base, and ■■
there is little information about the problems facing the urban poor, or in-
tegration with the para18 level needs-identification promoted under SJSRY. 
(It is an irony that these committees are closest to the ground and that 
they lack information. This is a complete contrast with Mumbai Alliance’s 
neighbourhood mapping activities.)
Committee members commonly identify needs on the basis of their knowl-
edge of the ward and limited discussions with others. Formal consultative 
mechanisms are not well established. The majority of annual public meet-
ings serve as a forum at which the priority lists compiled by the committees 
are presented and ratified. Because the poor are generally not represented on 
the committee their needs are not necessarily reflected in the annual plans. 
Beneficiary committees overseeing local development schemes were found in 
a number of wards. Although empowered to do so, ward committees do not 
play an active role in the implementation of urban poverty programmes un-
der SJSRY or NSDP.
17  SJSRY is a central government sponsored urban employment programme to alleviate poverty, with neighbour-
hood-level committees.
18  “Para” is a Bengali word that refers to a geographical unit synonymous with neighbourhoods.
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Most councillors hold meetings of the ward committee in their own homes 
or in local clubs or public buildings. Some of the more prosperous munici-
palities (such as Kalyani municipality) have constructed ward offices for each 
of their wards. There were some discussions about the extent to which ward 
committees should be supported with additional staff (with a municipal of-
ficer reporting to the ward committee) and with funds to cover their admin-
istrative costs and some minor maintenance activities. Such discussions are 
sporadic and not institutionalised in the ward committee rules.
Capacity of municipal and community institutions
The 3-tier women’s community-based structures required by SJSRY have been 
set up in all but 3 of the towns. In addition there are CBOs such as youth clubs, 
savings groups and trade organisations in almost every poor neighbourhood. 
Currently TPOs have been appointed in 29 towns and there are 64 COs spread 
across 33 towns, 37 of whom are women. Urban poverty alleviation schemes 
are coordinated by the Urban Poverty Eradication (UPE) cell at the municipal 
level. It can be said that the base for community participation exists both in 
poor communities and in the municipality. However there are serious con-
straints to capacity and functioning, which will assume greater proportions 
with the additional and diverse demands made on the municipalities once 
the KUSP project gets underway.
Neighbourhood Groups (NHGs) have not yet been set up in all poor settle-
ments, raising questions about the representation of poor women at higher 
levels of the structure. Also the ambit of their activities is narrow. Municipali-
ties and the State Urban Development Agency (SUDA) attribute this to limited 
staff capacity. Community development staff capacity is limited not only be-
cause of limited numbers but also because TPOs and COs are not skilled or 
experienced at the time of recruitment. Training courses by the state govern-
ment’s Institute for Local Government and Urban Studies (ILGUS) and other 
institutions and exposure on the job have helped to develop skills to some 
extent. But a consolidated salary of Rs 2000 per month hardly offers incen-
tives or career prospects to COs. COs are even expected to incur the expense 
of travelling across the wards under their supervision, which are sometimes 
spread over a large area. TPOs are paid a consolidated salary of Rs 4000 per 
month and are usually retired state government or municipal employees.
To summarise, in this chapter I have presented the context – political, so-
cio-economic, and institutional – within which the planning process of met-
ropolitan Kolkata operates. I have described Kolkata’s extreme poverty, the 
political turmoil in its recent history, followed by the long and continuing 
dominance of the Left Front coalition at the state level, and the Left Front’s 
past and recent experiments in decentralising urban planning. The following 
chapter presents an analysis of the information I have gathered on the plan-
ning process in Kolkata in the backdrop of the context presented in this chap-
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ter. It will provide a closer look at the stated goals and objectives of decentral-
ised planning as implemented by the West Bengal government in relation to 
the reality of the decision-making process as it exists in metropolitan Kolkata.
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 3 Decentralisation of 
Kolkata’s metropolitan 
planning
 3.1 The ‘official story’
There is a story about a would-be school teacher who was asked during an 
interview by the principal of a conservative religious school, ‘Is the earth flat 
or round?’ The hapless teacher looked around at the faces of the interviewers 
for hints and, not finding any, settled for this response: ‘I can teach it flat or 
round.’ The above story might help us understand the relationship between 
the planners of Kolkata and their political bosses at the state and local level. 
In this section, I discuss the role played by the political culture at the state 
level in influencing the planning process at the local and metropolitan level.
West Bengal is one of the few states in the country to have carried out all 
the compliance legislation in connection with the 74th CAA, either with new 
laws or amendments of the existing ones. The West Bengal Municipal Act 1993 
(including the formation and functions of borough committees, and reserva-
tion of seats) has become a national reference point (at least in its conceptual 
form); the West Bengal District Planning Committee Act, and Rules 1994; the 
West Bengal Metropolitan Planning Committee Act 1994, and Rules 2001; the 
West Bengal Municipal (Ward Committee) Rules 2001 have been enacted. Two 
State Finance Commissions (SFC) were appointed as per the new requirement 
of the CAA during 1995-2000, followed by a Municipal Administrative Reforms 
Committee (MARC) in 2001 and most recently Kolkata has become the first 
metropolis in the country to constitute a Metropolitan Planning Committee 
(KMPC) which started functioning in December 2001.
Although the legal framework for decentralised planning is in place, some 
have expressed doubts about its real efficacy in the political context of West 
Bengal. In the state, among its bureaucrats in particular, there is a perception 
that the state has been at the forefront of the current shift to decentralised 
planning and administration. In one of the interviews, a senior planner in KM-
DA even attributes West Bengal’s success with decentralisation as the ‘driving 
factor’ for the passage of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts 
in the National Parliament in 1992. A number of documents produced by state 
agencies (CEMSAP, 1996; Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, 2001) 
and also by academicians and practitioners (Ghosh, 1996; KUSP Design Team, 
2003) have claimed West Bengal to be a pioneer in terms of developing the 
legislative framework for elected local self-government in India. At the same 
time, there are others (Webster, 1992) who have expressed doubts about the 
state’s real motive for decentralisation. Some have clearly suggested that the 
Government of West Bengal is not functioning as well as it should. One study 
provides an interesting insight into the difference in perceptions of the coun-
cillors in local bodies and their voters in explaining the inadequacies in basic 
services in their localities:
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…the majority of councilors in local bodies perceive shortage of funds to be one of the most 
important factors affecting the provision of adequate basic amenities…while only 7.6% of 
voters agreed with this….The majority opinion (60.66%) was that the administrative defi-
ciency was the main culprit (Ghosh, 1996, p. 45-46).
Is it really in support of the notion of ‘planning from the bottom up’ as an 
ideological goal that is pushing the drive towards decentralisation in West 
Bengal? And if that is really so, does the official policy of decentralisation ac-
tually get translated into an effective strategy for ‘governing from below’ (as 
described in Sellers, 2002a)? Are the current structures of power facilitating 
or hindering the local level plans from informing higher level decisions? This 
chapter tries to answer some of these questions.
On reading the planning history of Kolkata through the eyes of planning 
academicians and practitioners (see Bagchi, 1987; see Banerjee & Chakra-
vorty, 1994; S. K. Roy & Roy, 1990 among others) one can easily see that what 
they describe in their works is the ‘official story’ (see Sandercock, 1998, p. 2) 
of planning in Kolkata. The official planning history only helps in justifying 
the planning profession and doesn’t document the criticism inherent in the 
profession. Sandercock (1998) argues for the need for two diversions from the 
current trend in planning history: (1) The object of planning history should 
not be just to describe and celebrate the profession’s emergence and achieve-
ments but also to be critical about things that have gone bad or haven’t gone 
the way they were intended. (2) The subject should not be just the planning 
‘profession’ and state- and market-sponsored planning but include non-pro-
fessionals resisting and making positive changes in their community and en-
vironment.
Although I agree with her on the need for a shift in focus of both the object 
and the subject of planning research, the resources and time available to me 
to conduct my fieldwork placed artificial boundaries on the scope of my re-
search. To identify and document cases where citizens or communities have 
come together in an effort to resist ‘official’ planning and development or 
have an ‘alternative’ planning and development (see Friedmann, 1992) of their 
own would have required much more fieldwork than my available resourc-
es could permit. I chose instead to focus my data collection and analysis on 
the edges of the ‘official’ or the state-controlled planning institutions, where 
voices from the citizens and communities gain entry, often times under con-
ditions of harsh structural constraints and bureaucratic barriers. These edges 
exist at all levels of decision making – ward, municipal, metropolitan, state, 
national and even beyond. Although in this research I do not study the non-
state planning aspect, I do hope the critique of the state-sponsored planning 
and changes in the state-sponsored planning process will bring important 
changes to the way planning theory, planning culture and planning history is 
written and talked about.
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In the existing planning literature on Kolkata, which has focused main-
ly on the ‘official story’ we also find instances of influence from actors be-
yond their local, regional or even national realm. One such study (Banerjee & 
Chakravorty, 1994) serves as a graphic example of how the larger picture of a 
city’s future is drawn by the forces of politics and economics in conjunction 
with ‘foreign’ expertise and values that are often attached to external fund-
ing. My research also delves into the dynamics of external funding and how 
that changes the structures within which the voices of ordinary people are 
inserted in the public decision-making process. I will come back to this as-
pect later in Chapter 5. In the following section I outline the unique features 
of decentralised planning in West Bengal’s context.
 3.2 Decentralisation in West Bengal
I begin by asking: what does decentralisation mean to West Bengal’s Left 
Front government? Which of its characteristics are different from the word’s 
commonly understood idea? First, the policy to decentralise decision making 
was primarily meant for rural West Bengal. So decentralised planning in ur-
ban areas in West Bengal was not by design but as a consequence of rural 
self-government. Next, I argue that decentralisation in West Bengal is more 
or less understood as local representative/electoral democracy. Participatory 
democracy is not very well developed in West Bengal. The third point I make 
here is that democracy (like participation) is seen as ‘instrumental’ – as a 
means to some other end, rather than an end in itself. I present evidence in 
support of these three points below.
Since India gained independence, there has been a systematic rural bias 
not just in West Bengal but throughout India. At the time of independence 85 
per cent of India’s population was living in rural areas. Rural poverty was seen 
as a greater challenge for the political leaders and economists. The problems 
of urban India were barely recognised (Burra, 2005, p. 68). The administrative 
system for the country after Independence was designed with the vast rural 
population particularly in mind, with very little thought given to urban ad-
ministration. In West Bengal in particular, experiments with decentralisation 
began during the late 1960s when the Communist-led United Front coalition 
briefly came to power and tried to implement a policy of large-scale redistri-
bution of agricultural land in rural areas. To mobilise support for the policy lo-
cally and to implement such a policy effectively CPI-M decentralised the way 
its cadres operated. Even though the United Front government did not last for 
very long, the seeds for a decentralised administration had been sowed. After 
the CPI-M came back to power in 1977, mainly due to the support it received 
from the rural poor, it embarked on even greater decentralisation – resum-
ing local level elections with a focus on strengthening its rural support base 
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(Webster, 1992). ‘The process of decentralisation in West Bengal happened not 
by design but by event [reference to CPI-M coming to power] starting with its 
practice in the rural areas’.19 For a long time the governmental needs of urban 
areas,20 and metropolitan areas like Kolkata, in particular, remained more or 
less unchanged from what was inherited from the British administration. On-
ly after the 74th CAA, when the West Bengal Municipal Act 1993 was passed, 
was there a concerted effort in the West Bengal legislature to implement the 
policy in urban areas.
The decentralisation process in West Bengal is characterised by its insist-
ence on representative democracy, with a negligible amount of participatory 
democracy. The area of governance relating to the consultation for public 
policy and planning necessitates actions at the city level and beyond, where 
the conflict between representative and participatory approaches comes into 
sharper focus. It also relates to decisions which have larger regional impact 
and, therefore, are not generally given priority by small, community-based 
groups (Mehta, 1999, p. 174). Not only does West Bengal lack the civil society 
infrastructure needed for participation by various interest groups at the city 
or regional level, but also technocrats, planners and politicians have hardly 
shown any interest in including non-partisan civil society groups in the plan-
ning process. When he was asked if the five sectoral plans prepared by the 
KMPC are to be made public before they are approved, so that concerned 
citizens or groups can comment or raise objections to them, KMDA’s Director 
General (Planning and Development), Mr Tushar Mitra stated:
“KMPC is given the authority to prepare the plans. Once KMPC approves of the plan, it will 
be final. No public hearing or publication of the draft plan in local newspapers is proposed 
since KMPC already has 40 elected representatives.”
He legitimises adoption of the plan without inviting comments from the gen-
eral public on the basis that there are already elected members21 in KMPC. A 
non-partisan civil society organisation, the Bus and Railway Commuters’ As-
sociation, for example, can have no direct say in the preparation of the traffic 
and transportation sector plan in Kolkata. In spite of their repeated grievanc-
es about train and bus service in the city, they were never invited to be part 
of the process of route and fare rationalisation of buses and minibuses that 
were part of KMPC’s sectoral plan for traffic and transportation. Can KMPC’s 
elected representatives substitute for the participation of concerned citizens 
and civic groups in the planning process? In other words, does KMPC claim to 
19  According to Mr Sunil Kumar Roy, ex-Director General (Planning and Development), KMDA and a nominated 
member of KMPC, interviewed January 11, 2005.
20  The administrative and governmental needs of the urban areas are different from those of rural areas where 
the spillover effects of decisions made in one local jurisdiction on another are limited.
21  A point to be noted is that these elected members are not directly elected by the citizens of KMA.
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include all interest groups, making a public hearing of the plan redundant? 
These are some of the questions addressed later in the chapter.
What were the main arguments within the planning discourse that led to 
the adoption of the policy of a decentralised and participatory planning and 
decision-making process in Kolkata? The initial driver for greater decentrali-
sation in KMDA’s planning process derived from the failure of the centralised 
planning strategy in improving the living environment and service delivery. 
The planning process that KMDA had initially adopted was based on the ra-
tional comprehensive planning model where ‘experts’ armed with data and 
prediction tools made the decisions on land use and infrastructure develop-
ment without (or with very little) participation from local communities or end 
users. In an interview Mr. Kalyan Roy, Director (Microfinance) in KMDA, identi-
fied two reasons for the failure of this kind of planning process. First, it failed 
to capture the needs and priorities at the local level. Second, the operation 
and upkeep of the infrastructure that was built by KMDA was transferred to 
the municipalities, but they failed to take ownership (in terms of responsi-
bility) of these projects because they were never made part of the planning 
process earlier. So many of the projects soon went into a state of disrepair 
and subsequently ceased to operate. Mr Roy therefore attributes the policy of 
decentralised and participatory planning in KMA to the failures of the incum-
bent planning process.
This idea of participation, as largely linked to development projects, was 
with a view to improving effectiveness and project efficiency and, in some 
cases, to encouraging cost-sharing. These project-linked objectives or ration-
ales of participation have often been called ‘instrumental’ or a means to oth-
er ends (Mehta, 1999). This rationale is significantly different from the idea 
of empowerment and capacity building through participation that the NGO 
sector has long advocated. This latter rationale treats participation as an end 
in itself but one which often leads to other positive spin-offs in the form of 
empowerment and capacity building, enabling communities to continue with 
their regular functions as well as participating in project deliberations more 
effectively.
In the following section I examine the influence of party politics on the de-
centralised planning process at the metropolitan, municipal and ward levels.
 3.3 Partisan politics and urban planning
Although many officials in West Bengal’s Left Front government often claim 
that it was the pioneer in democratic decentralisation and bottom-up plan-
ning in India, many scholars (Webster, 1992) have noted a gap between the 
official rhetoric and existing reality.
In Calcutta, as in West Bengal and the rest of India, planning is done from 
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the top-down. It has been argued that planning is fundamentally a ‘state ap-
paratus’, and that seems particularly true in India. After forty years of post-
colonial organisational developments, few municipalities can plan, and ac-
tivism by citizen groups is minimal. Calcutta, despite its heightened political 
culture, is no exception.
The apathy of the urban public means that the political parties have little incentive to 
decentralise planning. In examining the recent experience with district-level planning in 
West Bengal, Ghosh (1988) points out that the idea of bottom-up planning is contradictory 
to any political framework, regardless of who holds power.…And while the rural reforms 
pursued by the Left Front have significantly increased political awareness and participa-
tion at the Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Samiti levels, partisan politics [emphasis 
added] still shape its policies. (Banerjee & Chakravorty, 1994)
My research reconfirms the above mismatch between the strict top-down hi-
erarchy in which political parties are organised and the approaches of bot-
tom-up planning as envisioned by the constitutional amendments.
As Susanne Rudolph notes in her article on civil society (Rudolph, 2000), 
not all kinds of civil societies (in her words, ‘associationalism’) are friendly to 
democracy. Differentiating types of associations might produce better assess-
ments of their effect on democracy. To differentiate among associations she 
addresses three types of questions: (1) Are associations political or non-polit-
ical; if political, are they deliberative or interest-oriented? (2) Are they hierar-
chical or egalitarian? (3) Are they voluntary or natural (ascribed)? According to 
her, such differences may be consequential for the relationships between as-
sociations and democracy. In the case of Kolkata, the dominant forms of civic 
associations that are part of the metropolitan decision-making process, i.e. 
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the political parties, are polit-
ical associations by definition 
and strictly hierarchical. They 
are structured on Leninist-
style principles of leadership. 
Members in this kind of asso-
ciation stand in a dependent, 
clientelist relation to patrons. 
They are habituated to com-
ply with and act on the di-
rectives of those in authority. 
‘Hierarchical associations are 
not likely to create the sort of 
psychological and moral pre-
conditions that generate the 
social capital considered a 
pre-condition for democracy’ 
(Rudolph, 2000).
Since 1977 the CPI-M party 
organisation in West Bengal, 
along with various mass fronts 
affiliated to it, have witnessed 
a steady growth in member-
ship which has narrowed the 
bridge between the population and party members. For instance, in 1992, the 
total membership of all the mass fronts of the CPI-M in Burdwan district in 
West Bengal was 2,466,728 (this excluded the party membership which in 
1992 was 10,676) when the total population of the district was about 6 million 
(Sain, 1995, p. 241-266).
In the following section, I describe the planning process at three levels 
– metropolitan, municipal and ward levels – in greater depth. Figure 2.1 in the 
previous chapter illustrates the institutional framework for Kolkata’s decen-
tralised planning.
 3.3.1 Three-tier metropolitan planning
Planning in India is a function of elite civil services at both federal and state 
levels that were designed to encourage separation between the political and 
administrative arms of the government. Admission to and promotion with-
in the civil services are considered to be based on merit, not patronage. The 
cadre of administrators responsible for planning is presented as a socially 
representative, civic-minded, politically independent group working to im-
prove the general living conditions of Indian citizens. In reality, women are 
[ 61 ]
CPI(M) flags on a traffic pedestal at Nagerbazar intersection in North 
Kolkata
SUA020.indb   61 12-08-2008   12:14:24
largely under-represented in the civil service, which is comprised mostly of 
urban, upper-middle-class males. The theoretical separation between political 
and administrative functions is often tangled and blurred (Friedmann, 2005b). 
Planners at the metropolitan level in Kolkata are supposed to be doing what 
the dean of Berkeley’s Graduate School of Public Policy referred to as ‘speak-
ing truth to power’ (Wildavsky, 1979, as cited by Friedmann, 1987, p. 8). In the 
days of royalty, such speech had been the privilege of trusted chamberlains – 
and the court jester. Now it is the planners’ turn. But are they really doing it?
An example of the hierarchical patron-client relationship among elected 
officials of different administrative levels is illustrated by what a senior plan-
ner in KMDA (who was also serving as a nominated member of KMPC) had to 
say about KMPC meetings:
“We wouldn’t expect a councilor or a municipal chairperson [i.e. a municipal-level politi-
cian elected to be a KMPC member] to oppose any suggestions made by a [state-level] 
minister [also belonging to the same party], would we?”
Most councillors have political ambitions beyond ward- or municipal-level 
politics. To bring these ambitions to fruition, they need to avoid antagonising 
(if not actively seeking favours from) their party leaders at the state level. And 
even those councillors and municipal chairpersons who would like to remain 
active only in their local politics, need the patronage of their party bosses at 
the state level in order to secure the party ticket to contest the next munici-
pal election. Along with the fact that the Minister for Municipal Affairs in the 
state-level administration (ex-officio chairperson of KMPC) presides over all 
KMPC meetings, this makes the power relations between the state and the 
local similar to those in a patron-client relationship. Such a relationship un-
dermines the state government’s efforts towards democratic decentralisation 
in urban development.
It is implicit in the quote above that the interviewee omitted any mention 
of elected members in KMPC who are from political parties other than the 
ones that form part of the ruling coalition in the state government. Of course, 
this omitted group of ward and municipal-level politicians would be freer to 
voice their local concerns in metropolitan-level deliberations. But they are 
only a handful in number compared to the majority who belong to the ruling 
Left Front coalition. In addition, according to another nominated member of 
KMPC, most of the elected KMPC members from political parties outside the 
Left Front fail to take an active interest in the workings of the KMPC – they 
feel they have very little political influence in decision making through KMPC 
due to their very limited representation. They seldom attend KMPC meetings.
Such hierarchical relationships of patronage are not limited to the circle of 
elected local officials. They also apply to the technocrats employed in KMDA, 
including their planners. When talking to the planning officials from KMDA, 
and a few academicians who have turned to advising the state government 
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on issues relating to urban planning and decision making, there seems to be a 
general sense of approval (and in some instances, enthusiastic support) of the 
Left Front government in the state and in many municipalities in KMA. Some 
citizens have noted and voiced their concerns over the lack of independence 
of the bureaucratic machinery in the state of West Bengal from influence of 
dominant political parties:
[T]here is no one in West Bengal today who has not witnessed vote fraud in some form. 
Consider the methods of intimidating the voters of the opposition parties that the CPI-M 
uses to achieve uncontested victory – ‘motorbike brigades’, ostracism, threats of rape, ac-
tual murder and all that. And who has not seen the televised reports of vote rigging at 
the Salt Lake [one of the municipalities within KMA] civic poll in 2000, with Alapan Ban-
dyopadhyay, district magistrate [who coincidentally was to be made the CEO of KMDA 
during the course of my fieldwork in 2004], and Gautam Chakraborty, DIG, Presidency 
Range, looking on as nonplussed bystanders? A much respected former IAS22 officer says 
a government-officer must needs deal with governments run by rival parties in order to 
realise what it means to achieve stability in a democracy despite political flux. In this view, 
those who joined the services in 1977, and are going to retire before long, without working 
with any government other than the Left Front have clearly developed a vested interest in 
inefficiency by being party to the vote fraud. (S. Sanyal, 2005b)
This not only holds true for IAS officers working in state departments but also 
for planners working in KMDA. The CEO of KMDA is usually an IAS officer on 
deputation by the state government. Most often CEOs have little or no plan-
ning experience; their professional training is mainly in the area of public ad-
ministration. Friedmann (2004) has already noted that India’s planning func-
tion is directed by the elite civil service bureaucrats. And Indian civil service 
entrance exams favour general knowledge over specific skills, leading to criti-
cism that the civil service lacks professional and technical proficiency in en-
deavours such as planning. In addition, the ruling political party is highly in-
fluential in decisions such as the promotion and transfer of these bureaucrats. 
Further, the newspaper editorial that reported the local district magistrate 
deliberately ignored (if not actively assisted) vote rigging by the ruling politi-
cal party and was then deputed to head the organisation entrusted with the 
planning function (rationality being key to its process) for Kolkata Metropoli-
tan Area is an extreme example of the blurring of the theoretical separation 
between power and rationality, similar to what Flyvbjerg (1998) finds in his 
Aalborg Project case in Denmark.
Therefore, the ‘latent’ function (Merton, 1957, p. 60) of KMDA’s planners 
was ‘mere rationalisation of political decisions’ (see Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 19) al-
22  IAS is an abbreviation for Indian Administrative Service, the post-independence equivalent of the Indian Civil 
Service.
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ready made by the politically stronger interests within the KMPC. It is worth 
mentioning here that, based on my analysis of the minutes of the KMPC’s var-
ious sector committee meetings, only rarely did the nominated (non-elected) 
members (representing planners and engineers from various public agencies, 
such as KMDA, Port Trust of India, Indian Railways, etc.) in the KMPC propose 
any new plan or alternatives to existing plans or opposed to any of the pro-
posals that came from the elected members (politicians) of KMPC. The plan-
ners in KMDA did have a role to play though. When they were to make de-
cisions on how to allocate limited state resources among the various plan 
proposals that came from many elected members of the KMPC, they had to 
justify the inclusion of some of the proposals and the dropping of others 
based on some kind of ‘technical’ analysis. The minutes of the KMPC meet-
ings did not provide enough data to decipher any real pattern in the way 
some of the proposals made their way in the annual plan-of-action of KMPC 
and whether and how power relations among the members of KMPC had a 
role to play in the so-called ‘technical’ analysis conducted by KMDA. Never-
theless, the dominance of the state’s ruling party and its regimental hierar-
chical organisation seemed to significantly reduce alternative proposals that 
came to be discussed in KMPC.
In order to understand how planning at the metropolitan level is informed 
by more local municipal and ward-level plans, I asked one councillor from 
Kolkata Municipal Corporation and one councillor from South Dum Dum Mu-
nicipality, who were not members of KMPC, about the processes of informa-
tion flow between them and KMPC. To my surprise, neither of them was aware 
of the metropolitan level sectoral plans prepared by the KMPC. One of them 
did not even know who among the councillors in his municipality was elect-
ed to represent the municipality in KMPC. Talking to some of the planners in 
KMDA who are non-elected (nominated) members of KMPC, I learned that 
there were a few councillors who were not members of KMPC but who regu-
larly sought information about KMPC decisions; two of them even proposed 
projects in their locality to be included in the KMPC sector plan for traffic and 
transportation. Therefore, despite KMPC being seen by the state government 
as providing a forum to help information flow between metropolitan planners 
and local leaders who are most aware about local needs and priorities, the 
elected members of KMPC were not obliged to report the proceedings of the 
KMPC meetings to their colleagues at the municipal level. Neither were the 
local councillors who are not members of KMPC aware of the role and func-
tions of KMPC or the ways in which they could have a voice in the decisions 
taken by KMPC.
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 3.3.2 Agents of change in the decentralisation process
Among the professional planners in KMDA with whom I spoke, and contrary 
to Sandercock’s (1998) thesis, I found a general consensus in the perception 
that all planning and development work that goes on in the city is driven by 
the ‘government’. But the notion of which governmental level – national, state 
or local – initiates and implements the policy of democratic decentralisation 
is more ambiguous. In response to my question, ‘who is the change agent in 
the process of democratic decentralisation in Kolkata?’ a planner in KMDA 
noted:
“Frankly speaking, whatever changes are taking place in developing countries are initiated 
by the government. In West Bengal the changes were initiated when the Left Front govern-
ment came to power in 1977. They adopted a policy of decentralisation of planning and de-
velopment in both urban and rural areas. Dwelling on the experiences in WB, the central 
government initiated the proposed bill for the constitutional amendment in the parliament. 
[The] late Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, initiated it in parliament but he didn’t live to see 
it approved.”
Despite his attributing the role of change agent more broadly to the ‘govern-
ment’, he assigns the Left Front government in West Bengal, in particular, the 
role of initiator of the process of decentralisation, not just in the state but 
for the entire country. This is yet more evidence of the widespread perception 
among planners within KMDA that the Left Front Government in West Bengal 
has been the pioneer of democratic decentralisation in India. But the above 
quote also illustrates that the Congress(I)23-led government at the national 
level adopted this policy to be implemented nationwide through the 73rd and 
74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. The Constitutional Amendments 
mandated all state governments to amend their laws relating to local admin-
istration. West Bengal, where the state government had already introduced 
some of these changes24, still required additional changes in its laws on town 
and country planning to bring it in conformance with the mandates of the 
constitutional amendments of 1992. So, in a way, the national government 
adopted the policy of decentralisation as practiced in West Bengal and took it 
one step further.
The quote also places significance on the efforts by individuals within the 
‘government’ – in this case, India’s late Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. As point-
ed out by Nas (2005), current urban social science research often neglects the 
role of those individuals who take decisive action for urban change and in-
23  Congress(I) is a rival political party to the Left Front coalition in West Bengal.
24  For example, the West Bengal Government had introduced the Mayor-In-Council (MIC) and Chair-In-Council 
(CIC) forms of local government in urban areas a decade earlier than the constitutional amendments in 1992.
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stead overemphasises impersonal aggregative social processes as the main 
determinants of urban structure and change. Although this research recog-
nises the importance of viewing ‘governments’ as being made up of individu-
als, each of whom brings their own values and charisma with them into the 
institution, it is beyond the scope of this research to actually study their influ-
ence in any detail.
Local planning institutions and organisations are also affected by donor 
agencies, which exert an important influence, one which is often ignored in 
the literature on local government. Donor agencies can be either higher levels 
of government or external bilateral donors or development banks. The cen-
tral government funds projects and programmes in various states contingent 
upon their adopting certain policies. This gives them added leverage in ne-
gotiating with the states to implement some structural changes to make the 
process of decentralised planning more participatory. In Kolkata, a number 
of central government-sponsored programmes like Environment Improve-
ment in Urban Slums (EIUS), Urban Basic Services Programme (UBSP), Nehru 
Rozgar Yogjana (NRY), National Slum Development Policy (NSDP), and recently 
Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojna (SJSRY) have also resulted in making the 
state government agree to certain policies of the central government. Simi-
larly, external donor agencies play a significant role in making ‘structural’ (as 
(Giddens, 1984) would call it) changes in the context of local planning and de-
cision making. In Kolkata, the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) has been an important donor for urban development and 
municipal capacity building since the 1980s. Recently, DFID agreed to fund 
the Kolkata Urban Services for the Poor (KUSP) programme that would build 
capacity for decision making and planning at the ward and municipal level 
for all the 40 urban local bodies in order for them to provide urban services 
with a focus on the poor and on marginalised groups. The programme began 
in March 2004 and is scheduled to run for 8 years with a budget of Rs 800 
crores (Biswas, 2003). The Metropolitan Planning Committee Act, which was 
mandated by the 74th CAA, proposed the creation of the Kolkata Metropolitan 
Planning Committee. Although this Act was passed in the West Bengal State 
Legislature in 1994, KMPC was not formed till 2001. KMPC did not function for 
years, until DFID made it a condition for going ahead with funding for KUSP. 
Many believe25 that KMPC was a way to keep KMDA alive by making it serve 
as its technical secretariat. Once KUSP is fully operational, the major funding 
route for the municipalities will be through the Draft Development Plan that 
they prepare at the municipal level and which is consolidated at the Metro-
politan level. In the first phase of the programme, it is expected that at least 
12 ULBs will have their municipal development plans approved for funding 
25  Source: Personal communication with Ms. Banashree Banerjee (Aug. 25, 2005).
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(Biswas, 2003).
In addition to agents of change, it is important to identify the agents that 
have resisted change towards decentralisation in West Bengal. According to 
Arun Ghosh (Ghosh, 1989), a former member of the National Planning Com-
mission and the key architect of decentralised planning in West Bengal, de-
partmental sectarianism and the resistance of the bureaucracy were the 
most serious impediments to the meaningful integration of the district sec-
tor schemes with the local plans (as cited in Thomas Isaac & Franke, 2002, p. 
15). Others have also noted the problem of inertia within the bureaucracy that 
was inherited without serious changes from the colonial past:
Within the Indian bureaucracy, as in most bureaucracies, the hierarchical structure of com-
mand and responsibility and other factors such as the process of promotion serve to rein-
force the concentration of power at the top. This has in turn reproduced the strength and 
power invested in the bureaucracy which was originally developed to serve the needs of a 
colonial state (Webster, 1992, p. 131).
I cannot conclusively verify this claim through my research. I did not specifi-
cally pose this question to my interviewees from the planning bureaucracy, 
but a veteran housing activist in Kolkata whom I interviewed described KMDA 
as a ‘mafia organisation’ and said that with a few exceptions, most high-lev-
el planners are benefiting from the old ways of centralised planning through 
corruption in land allocation and development rights.
 3.3.3 Actors in planning at the ward level
One of the significant provisions of the 74th CAA has been the setting up of 
wards and ward committees (WC) in urban local bodies with a population of 
more than three hundred thousand. This was envisaged to ensure people’s 
participation in civic affairs at the grassroots level. Ward committees were 
therefore meant to be the lowest level of organisation of the state. This places 
them at the edge of the state (the government) and the non-state (the cit-
izenry or the governed). In the present discussion it is therefore important 
to understand how the state and the non-state interact from the two sides 
of the edge in the public planning and decision-making process. This section 
will describe the functioning of the ward committees in greater detail.
The objectives of the WCs are firstly, to ensure the enhanced proximity 
of elected representatives for better accountability and performance at the 
neighbourhood level, and secondly, the increased participation of people in 
the delivery of services and governance of their areas. Article 243S of the 
constitution empowers the legislatures of a state to make, by law, provision 
with respect to the composition and the territorial area of a ward committee 
and the manner in which the seats in a ward committee are to be filled. Even 
though all states have incorporated the provision regarding the formation of 
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WCs in their conforming legislation as per constitutional requirements, wide 
variations are found across states in terms of constitution, composition, nom-
ination and also in the functional and financial powers of the WCs. Different 
state governments have different rules for the formation of WCs. There may 
be one committee for each ward or for a collection of wards. The decision de-
pends entirely on the state government (Ghosh & Mitra, 2003).
The West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 (amended in 1994) has the provision 
to constitute WC in each municipal ward. All the municipal corporation acts 
have also been amended to include that provision. According to the West Ben-
gal Municipal (Ward Committee) Rules, 2001, WCs have been entrusted with 
most of the important functions that an urban local body performs at the 
ward level.
After the municipal elections in 1995 consequent to the 74th CAA West 
Bengal was one of the few states that ensured that WCs were formed in every 
municipality. However, the functioning of WCs is not uniform in all munici-
palities within the state. It differs from one WC to another in the same mu-
nicipality (Ghosh & Mitra, 2003).
There have been studies that describe the functioning of ward committees 
in West Bengal. According to a study (Ghosh & Mitra, 2003) in two ULBs in 
West Bengal (six wards in Siliguri Municipal Corporation and four wards in 
Bidhannagar Municipality, (the latter is within the Kolkata Metropolitan Ar-
ea)), in the low income and slum dominated localities, people’s interest and 
participation in the day-to-day activities of the WCs is more than in middle 
and high-income communities where people feel that because they pay taxes 
to the municipalities, they are entitled to all services and their participation 
in local affairs is not necessary. There are a number problems in terms of rep-
resentation and participation through ward committees that this study has 
identified. The inadequate representation of women and youth in most ward 
committees is widely recognised. Also some have pointed to the fact that WCs 
do not have any financial allocation or resources to take up developmental 
work. Their job is confined primarily to monitoring and supervision. In addi-
tion, the performance of a WC depends heavily on the initiatives of the ward 
councillor. If he is enthusiastic and committed, he can select good members 
without political considerations who are more involved in the ward activi-
ties (Ghosh & Mitra, 2003). Otherwise, monthly meetings and annual general 
meetings become ‘rituals’.26
I identified some problems from my fieldwork. One is that the population 
size of the wards is often too large for effective participation by its citizens. 
For example, among the two wards that I studied, Ward 7 of the Kolkata Mu-
nicipal Corporation has a population of about 30,000. The other ward that I 
26  As per one of the councillors I interviewed.
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studied (Ward 11 of Kalyani Municipality, about 50 km north of Kolkata Mu-
nicipal Corporation) has a population of about 10,000. The latter of the two 
wards had an attendance of about 100 people (1 per cent of the total popula-
tion of the ward) in the annual general meeting.27
Second, the ward committees are currently not performing any planning 
function – not even collecting information that might be useful for planning 
and decision making at higher levels. Even though the constitution provides 
for its role in the overall planning of the metropolitan area, ward committees 
have not been involved in the planning process at all. The West Bengal Munic-
ipal (Ward Committee) Rules, 2001 (Part IV, Rule 11) clearly states the planning 
function of the WCs: (1) to prepare a list of the schemes for development of 
the ward to be undertaken within the next five years; (2) to prepare annual pri-
ority lists of these schemes and submit the same to the municipality (or the 
Notified Area Authority) for incorporating them in the Development Plan of 
the Municipality as per the provision of the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993.
In reality however, neither of the two ward committees that I studied were 
performing the planning functions as envisaged by the Indian Constitution. 
Ward 11 of Kalyani Municipality was somewhat better than Ward 7 of Kolkata 
Municipal Corporation in that it at least brought problems of maintenance 
and upkeep of municipal facilities like parks and roads to the attention of the 
municipal authorities. Other than that, I did not find either of the ward com-
mittees engaged in identifying problem areas or preparing a list of schemes 
to address them.
Third, like the KMPC and the municipal councils, the ward committees 
were found to be working in extremely partisan ways. The system of selection 
of ward committee members by the ward councillor is highly discretionary 
and the ward committee rules specifying the types of nominees to be selected 
are often violated. Since the ward councillor nominates the WC members, the 
general tendency has been for them to select people from their own political 
party. WCs under a councillor from the party opposing the party in control 
of the municipality also complain of discrimination by the municipality in fi-
nancial allocation, provision of services and general neglect. Therefore even 
though ward committees were designed to be ‘non-political entities’,28 the 
field observations show that they are becoming another political organisation 
at the sub-municipal level. Other studies on WCs have shared this observa-
tion:
The ULB’s nominees may come from another party if the chairperson belongs to that par-
ty but in such cases the members do not take much interest in the WC as they are in 
the minority. Also sometimes they create problems in the smooth functioning of the WCs. 
27  Annual general meetings are open to all citizens residing in the ward.
28  As per Mr Prabhat Dutta (Advisor, ILGUS), interviewed on January 8, 2005.
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Therefore the 2003 amendment to the Rules, which proposes that the names of the mem-
bers selected by the councilor have to be presented before the first AGM [Annual General 
Meeting] to public for their approval so that the selection could be more democratic, is a 
welcome step (Ghosh & Mitra, 2003).
However the additional clause making it mandatory to present the names of 
the councillor’s nominees for membership of the ward committee to the pub-
lic and seeking people’s approval was found to have a limited effect on mak-
ing the process more democratic. Most of the participants in the annual gen-
eral meetings organised by ward committees were found to be either close to 
the ward councillor or were drawn by the various incentives29 that some of 
the more innovative ward councillors provided in order to enhance attend-
ance at AGMs. The people who are critical of the councillor’s leadership in the 
ward, including those belonging to the other political parties, have not used 
the AGMs to voice their concerns so far.
Fourth, councillors, in general, were found to be ignorant of many of the 
ward committee rules. One of the councillors I interviewed in fact mentioned 
to me that among the many ward committee rules, there is one which says 
that the person who lost the municipal election cannot be a member of the 
ward committee. In fact, there is no such rule stipulated in the West Bengal 
Municipal (Ward Committee) Rules, 2001 or the amendments made to it in 
2003.
Fifth, inequity in the distribution of power and influence within the ward 
has created problems described by some as ‘elite capture’ (Azfar et al., 2004; 
Crook, 2003; Kimenyi & Meagher, 2004; Olowu, 2003). The following extract 
from my field notes presents the political dynamics among the different actors 
and ordinary citizens in a ward in Kolkata Metropolitan Area. Although this 
ward may not be representative of all wards within KMA, this description will 
help us appreciate the complexity of power relations at the ward level, some 
of which are inherited from the past and are therefore structural in nature.
Three years ago, in a neighbourhood in a municipality adjacent to Kolkata Municipal Cor-
poration, a locally influential and prosperous trader of timber (Mr. X) sold part of his land 
to a promoter to construct an apartment complex where his timber workshop once stood. 
Mr. X is locally known well enough that the local rickshaw pullers and autorickshaw and 
taxi drivers would take you to this apartment complex without having to give them direc-
tions if you just asked them to take you to Mr. X’s timber workshop. According to long-
time residents in the neighbourhood, Mr. X has close links with the local and state-level 
party bosses in the sense that they benefit from each others’ influence. He is also known 
to have close ties with antisocial hoodlums in the locality.
29  An incentive that Councillor of Ward 11 of Kalyani Municipality provides to increase attendance at the AGMs 
is having people enter into a lottery for small gifts.
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Even after the apartments in the complex were sold and individual homeowners 
moved in, the influence of Mr. X in the area remained. Some of the people who worked for 
him earlier and who got into a patron-client relationship with Mr. X kept receiving favours 
in kind, often at the cost of causing a nuisance to others. For example, some of the ex-
employees of Mr. X park their pushcarts and taxis inside this apartment complex at night 
for security reasons. Some of them even use part of the building complex as a cowshed for 
their cattle. The apartment owners secretly expressed to me their displeasure about the 
arrangement as it makes the entryway to the building complex dirty and smelly (because 
of cow dung) and more crowded. No one raises the issue of the cattle, pushcarts, rick-
shaws and the taxi in any of the resident committee meetings. This is less out of respect 
for Mr. X than out of fear. No one wants to confront him and the subtle authority that he 
exercises locally. Since the new residents in the apartments moved in, he no longer holds 
the same ‘godfather’ position in this neighbourhood that he previously enjoyed. The com-
position of the neighbourhood has started to change from generally poor residents to an 
upwardly mobile middle-class community that sees his political influence both as an asset 
and as a nuisance. Many of the new residents in the building complex have developed cor-
dial relations with Mr X in the hope that they can tap into his ‘political connections’ if ever 
needed. One of the apartment owners from this building complex and a long-time resident 
of the neighbourhood is a member of the local ward committee. He too receives patronage 
from Mr. X.30
There are a few points that can be drawn from the above description. First, 
ward committees operate in the same patron-client relationships that they 
were intended to replace. Second, there is a general disinterest among resi-
dents to publicly voice their opinions in matters of the public good due to a 
fear of antagonising the established authority. Third, new people in the neigh-
bourhood did reduce the influence of the existing power structures. But at the 
same time, with the waning of the existing power structure, which provided 
some sort of support for many of the poor households, even though it was in 
the form of patronage, a need has grown for other forms of organised mobili-
sation of the interests of the poor households.
Generally speaking, the WCs were found to have the following roles: (1) 
monitoring and policing; (2) information collection (very weak but potentially 
useful); (3) implementing projects and policies (executive role); (4) planning 
(very limited – based on available resources and local level needs); (5) capacity 
building and mobilisation (ward committees also become the training ground 
for many in their political career); (6) representing local interests in municipal 
level decision making (lobbying role – mainly for maintenance and repair of 
infrastructure). This last role of WCs is key to a successful bottom-up met-
ropolitan planning institution; because of this, it was mandated by the 74th 
30  This account is based on my interviews with two residents living in the above-mentioned housing complex.
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Constitutional Amendment Act.
To summarise, in this chapter I have discussed the reality – as distinct 
from the official rhetoric – of democratic decentralisation in West Bengal in 
the context of party politics, the absence of non-partisan civil society actors 
and the lack of political opposition to the ruling party. It describes the real-
politik at the metropolitan, municipal and ward levels in Kolkata, which un-
dermines the notion of bottom-up planning that the institution was designed 
to promote. The next chapter draws lessons from some national and inter-
national comparisons of planning institutions and processes using Kolkata’s 
planning process as described here as a benchmark.
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 4 Comparative urban politics
 4.1 Why study comparative urban politics?
Within comparative macro-sociology, quantitative or ‘variable-oriented’ and 
qualitative or ‘case-oriented’ methodologies are typically counterposed. 
Goldthorpe (1997) argues that by emphasising the distinctions between the 
two methodologies, the nature of key methodological problems is obscured. 
Three such problems – the small N, the Galton, and the black-box problems – 
are shown to arise with both approaches.
However, Ragin (1997) suggests that the case-oriented approach poses 
important challenges to variable-oriented research, challenges which, if an-
swered, would make variable-oriented research more rigorous. For example, 
in most variable-oriented research the sample of relevant observations is 
usually set at the outset of a study and is not open to reformulation or re-
definition. In most variable-oriented research, the operation of causal condi-
tions that are constant across cases is obscured. In most variable-oriented re-
search, it is difficult to examine multiple conjunctural causation (the complex 
web of interrelationships that occur among various causal variables) because 
researchers lack in-depth knowledge of cases and because their most com-
mon analytic tools cannot cope with complex causal patterns. Finally, in most 
variable-oriented research, ignorance of cases may find its way into the error 
vector of probabilistic models. Of course, the practical concerns of case-ori-
ented research may be difficult to address in variable-oriented approach. It is 
still reasonable to hope, at a minimum, for greater appreciation of the special 
strengths of different ways of constructing social scientific representations of 
social life.
There are important challenges in conducting international comparative 
social science research (for an elaborate discussion of these challenges, see 
Øyen, 1990). But urban research is a more promising field of comparative re-
search than comparing nation states. First, for the comparative urbanist, the 
embeddedness of cities in national institutional contexts offers good possi-
bilities for intra-national comparison among cities, an analysis that allows for 
full control of national policies or factors related to political culture (Sellers, 
2002b, as cited by Pierre, 2005). Furthermore, by using countries as cases and 
cities as units of analysis, the scholar can conduct intra-national as well as 
international comparisons. Finally, there is the simple observation that there 
are more cities than countries in the world and subsequently a greater uni-
verse is available for case selection, thus addressing the ‘small N problem’ 
mentioned above. All other things being equal, that should make it easier to 
find cases that allow the observer to use the most similar systems design or, 
alternatively, the most different systems design (Pierre, 2005, p. 455).
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 4.2 What is the framework for comparison?
Jon Pierre (2005) suggests using urban governance as a framework for the 
comparative analysis of urban politics. Comparative urban governance holds 
tremendous potential for assisting scholars in uncovering the causal mecha-
nisms and drivers of political, economic, and social change at the urban level. 
This framework makes two propositions: first, that any analysis of livability 
should begin by looking at communities, NGOs, political parties, and ‘the vari-
egated collection of organisations that constitute the state’; second, that all 
of these were likely to be imperfect agents of livability and therefore it is nec-
essary to think of agents of livability in terms of ‘ecologies of agents’ rather 
than single actors (Evans, 2002, p. 222).
Urban regime – a relatively stable set of rules, both formal (for example, a 
constitution) and informal (common law, cultural or social norms, etc.) that 
regulate the operation of a city government and its interactions with the 
economy and society – is only one specific type of urban governance; there are 
other types that are better-suited to cities outside the United States. Urban 
regime theory came to prominence with the publication of Clarence Stone’s 
study of Atlanta in 1989, although earlier studies by Fainstein & Fainstein 
(1983) and Elkin (1987) have also been influential. Since then, regime analysis 
has been extensively used to examine urban politics both inside North Amer-
ica and beyond. Mossberger & Stoker (2001) argue that the wide use of regime 
analysis is a recognition of its value and insights but that some applications 
have stretched the concept beyond its original meaning to the point that the 
concept itself runs the risk of becoming meaningless and a source of theoreti-
cal confusion. It is suggested that regime analysis has helped considerably in 
reorienting the power debate in North America and in facilitating the analysis 
of politics beyond the formal institutions of government outside North Ameri-
ca. The genius of the concept is its synthesis of elements of political economy, 
pluralism, and institutionalism. This synthesis, however, creates complexity. 
It views power as fragmented and regimes as the collaborative arrangements 
through which local governments and private actors assemble the capacity 
to govern. Although regimes represent the way in which local actors mediate 
external pressures such as economic change, the focus in regime analysis is 
on the internal dynamics of coalition building, on civic cooperation or infor-
mal modes of coordination across institutional boundaries. By this definition, 
Kolkata’s governance does not fit into the idea of a regime for two reasons. 
First, it clearly lacks the prerequisites of public-private cooperation in pursuit 
of a common agenda. The Left Front government in West Bengal has shown 
little interest in partnering with local businesses and grassroots organisations 
on equal terms but has preferred to offer political patronage to them occa-
sionally. They believe that only the public sector can restore the local econ-
omy although this belief is increasingly being questioned by a section of the 
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Left Front government at both the state and municipal levels.
Second, the intergovernmental relations between the local and the provin-
cial levels are quite different from what Clarence Stone (1989) describes in his 
study of Atlanta as an example of an urban regime. American cities exist in a 
substantially different policy environment than cities in India because Ameri-
can local government is more dependent on cooperation with business to 
carry out projects such as downtown redevelopment or maintaining the local 
tax base. In India, local governments depend on the state government (and 
to a limited degree on the national government through special programmes 
or projects) more than on businesses and local fiscal revenue. In Kolkata, this 
dependence is exacerbated by the CPI-M’s near-total control over public deci-
sions as described in the previous chapter.
If Kolkata does not have an urban regime, what kind of urban governance 
framework can be used to compare Kolkata with other cities? I use the term 
‘governance’ in a neutral sense to refer to the range of relationships between 
civil society and the state. According to Halfani (1997), governance provides 
the institutional framework within which the civic public realm is managed. 
My analysis of urban governance is an adaptation of Nick Devas’s framework 
and includes a whole range of actors and institutions, and it is the relation-
ships and interactions between them that determine what happens in the 
city (Devas, 2004). The actors and institutions involved include: private sector 
businesses, both corporate and informal; civil society, including community-
based organisations, NGOs, political parties, religious groups, trade unions 
and trade associations; and the whole range of governmental agencies of na-
tional, regional, and local government, including traditional authorities where 
they exist. These are illustrated in Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1. Urban governance 
also, crucially, involves individual citizens and households in as much as they 
have any influence over what happens. Within this framework, the municipal 
government is but one element, albeit often the largest and most obvious.
There are comparative studies in India where the unit of analysis is the 
state rather than the cities. One such study compared the progress made 
towards decentralised decision making in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and 
West Bengal. It finds that the Karnataka experiment has been widely hailed 
for the non-partisan way in which it was conducted and for the substantive 
devolution of authority from the state level to local bodies, in terms of both 
executive powers and financial resources. States other than Andhra Pradesh, 
Karnataka, West Bengal, Kerela and Tamil Nadu did not make any worthwhile 
efforts to restore elected local bodies in rural areas (Raghavulu & Narayana, 
1999).
The same study also questions the love for grassroots democracy on the 
part of the states introducing major reforms on the grounds that the then-
ruling parties were motivated by a vested interest in accommodating local 
political elites in the power structure with a view to broadening and strength-
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ening their power base. The restoration of democracy at the local level was 
definitely helpful in broadening the political base of the then-ruling parties 
at the grassroots level in the respective states (Raghavulu & Narayana, 1999, 
p. 124). But equally important is the argument that the ruling parties in other 
states were free to follow the same strategy – but they did not.
There can be no genuineness about decentralisation unless there is an 
assured devolution of funds. The state budget of Karnataka is split into two, 
providing a separate budget for local bodies. The action of the state legisla-
ture in this regard enables the statutory and automatic transfer of over Rs 900 
crore annually, both on plan and non-plan accounts, to local bodies. There 
is no provision for the statutory allocation of funds among local bodies, let 
alone the machinery, in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. In the latter, there 
are allegations that at present the financial devolution from the state govern-
ment to local government institutions is done arbitrarily and along partisan 
lines (Raghavulu & Narayana, 1999). Local governments that are in the good 
books of the ruling party are being favoured at the cost of others (Raghavulu 
& Narayana, 1999).
Apart from municipal institutions, the Indian urban scene is cluttered with 
a host of parastatals, and departmental agencies dealing with urban services, 
in addition to the general regulatory activities through the police and district 
administration, so much so that the substance of urban governance really lies 
with the state government, rather than in the municipal institutions (see Ta-
ble 4.1). Jones explains this phenomenon in his case study of Indore31 city pol-
itics: ‘The bulk of the important decisions affecting the city’s political destiny 
are made externally, at higher levels of politics. In fact, the governance of the 
city...is essentially by the state government’ (Jones, 1974).
Since this study focuses on the government’s role in planning, it will be 
worthwhile to point to already completed comparative studies on state-initi-
ated planning and urban development. One recent comparison of eight case 
studies (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2004) concluded that one of the reasons for 
government failure is its unwillingness to act appropriately (for political rea-
sons or because of a lack of profit; no democratic pressures; no accountability 
to populations; no developmental state; national or provincial governments 
allocating city and municipal government’s responsibilities without the nec-
essary powers and resources). Comparing Kolkata with the eight case studies 
presented in the above research, the city belongs to the category of those that 
lack democratic pressure and those with an inadequate devolution of powers 
and resources to local authorities.
Another cross-country comparison (Meenakshisundaram, 1999) finds that 
even though countries favour local governments with minimal controls from 
31  Indore is a city in central India in the state of Madhya Pradesh.
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the centre/state in theory, in actual fact they pursued a centralist develop-
ment strategy. This goal is achieved either by surreptitiously subverting con-
stitutional guarantees (as in Nigeria, during the civilian era) or by openly by-
passing the local bodies through the creation of development agencies which 
are directly under the surveillance of the higher-level governments (as in In-
dia) or by tight party control over the local bodies, at both horizontal and ver-
tical levels (as in China). Kolkata resembles China more than it resembles the 
rest of India, although up until KMPC was set up in 2001 it also shared the 
problem of the rest of India – that of powerful state-government-controlled 
development agencies bypassing local bodies. It is widely believed that most 
developing countries seem to favour administrative rather than political de-
centralisation at the local level, a view held even by the World Bank until not 
too long ago. The poor quality of political leaders, the shortage of trained and 
qualified bureaucracy, the generally low status accorded to local governments 
and the resultant corruption and poor performance have left even the local 
people unenthusiastic about local governments (Meenakshisundaram, 1999).
Also, the responsibilities and resources of local governments vary in differ-
ent countries. The local government share of major public consumption func-
tions has gone up in many countries that adopted decentralisation policies. 
For several decades, most local governments in northwestern Europe have ex-
perienced a growth in tasks and resources. In the Scandinavian countries, this 
has been because local governments have administered most of the functions 
of the welfare state: social security, social services, health and schools; func-
tions whose expenditures have grown because of a more fine-tuned coverage 
system (see Table 4.2). Of the total public consumption in 1992, local govern-
ments spent 69 per cent in Denmark, 60 per cent in Norway and 70 per cent 
in Sweden (Nordic Yearbook of Statistics 1994, Table 198).
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Table 4.1 Jurisdiction and ownership of special authorities within metro areas in 1981
Function Delhi Kolkata Chennai Mumbai
Water and sewerage UT(L) M(S) S(S) S(S)
Bus transport UT(N) M(S) M(S) L(L), S(S)
Suburban railways UT(N) M(N) M(N) M(N)
Electricity UT(L,N) M(S), S(S) S(S) L(L), S(S)
Town planning UT(N) M(S) M(S) L(L), M(S)
Area development UT(N) L(S), M(S) M(S) M(S), S(S)
Housing UT(N) L(S), S(S) M(S) M(S), S(S)
Slum improvement UT(N) M(S), L(S) S(S) S(S)
Telecommunications M(N) M(N) M(N) M(N)
Industries UT(UT) S(S) S(S) S(S)
Source: Datta, 1999
L = Local, M = Metropolitan, UT = Union Territory, S = State and N = National.  
Notation outside the parentheses indicates jurisdiction, and notation within parentheses indicates 
ownership.
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These numbers are not available for India. Also the varying geographic def-
initions of the local governments in different countries make comparisons of 
these numbers of little use. For example, the whole of metropolitan Beijing 
consists of one municipality. In such cases, the sub-municipal levels of gov-
ernments resemble local governments in India.
 4.3 A comparison with Mumbai, revisited
Based on the discussion in Chapter 1, there seem to be two distinct factors 
that contribute to the difference in the effectiveness of community organisa-
tions at the grassroots level in Mumbai and Kolkata. One is the absence of 
political space for such organisations in Kolkata. And second, Kolkata’s ad-
ministrative and planning bureaucracy is extremely dependent on the politi-
cal class, unlike Mumbai’s. This section elaborates these two points in greater 
detail.
 4.3.1 Political space for non-partisan 
grassroots organising
The success of Mumbai’s ‘Alliance’ is due to the demands made by organisa-
tions representing the urban poor, when they are allowed the space to make 
them. In Mumbai, women pavement dwellers have been important prece-
dent-setters. Since 1984, when SPARC was founded, the National Slum Dwell-
ers Federation and Mahila Milan membership at local levels made demands on 
SPARC for activities that the poor and the NGOs who work with them, do not 
generally take on. For instance, when the women pavement dwellers in the 
Byculla district of Mumbai urged SPARC to help them do something about the 
eviction notices against them that had been posted in 1985, they did not want 
to fight the municipality (the weaker groups always lose in such fights); they 
wanted to avoid the violent reaction that their men were moving towards 
and they sought a long-term resolution to their problems. From discussions 
between women pavement dwellers and SPARC came the first enumeration 
of the pavement dwellers (published in 1985 as We the Invisible), which set a 
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Table 4.2 Local government share of major public consumption 
functions (in %)
Denmark Norway Sweden
Education 63 76 79
Health 93 93 99
Social security and welfare 95 83 92
Culture and recreation 60 66 90
Transport and communication 66 46 46
Housing and community amenity 50 N/A 82
Public order 9 16 18
Source: Nordic Yearbook of Statistics 1994, Table 198 cited in Bogason, 1996, p. 2
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precedent for showing how community-centred enumerations can provide 
the information base from which community-driven solutions (and partner-
ships with local governments) can be developed. When the immediate threat 
of evictions was over, the women demanded that something be done about 
their inability to get alternative housing – and from this came savings and 
credit schemes, collective leadership, life-sized house models and, later, these 
women’s survey of vacant land to demonstrate that there was land available 
on which they could be re-housed. The inter-city community exchanges be-
gan when the women pavement dwellers were discussing which building ma-
terials might reduce housing costs. One type that appeared to have potential 
was the funicular roofing pre-cast tablet developed in Kerala that had greatly 
reduced the cost of roofing, so a group of pavement dwellers made the long 
trip to Kerala in 1986. The women pavement dwellers also created the concept 
of a house model exhibition to demonstrate publicly and visibly what they 
wanted – because risk-averse bureaucrats are much more likely to accept a 
new idea if they see it working in practice (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005, p. 50).
The Alliance in Mumbai has used precedent setting to change many of the 
city’s rules and regulations. This included promoting the use of a mezzanine 
floor in the design of houses developed by the federation, because it provides 
households with more room and more flexibility in their homes but costs 
much less than a two-storey unit. Government designs did not allow this. So 
the federation demonstrated what could be done (and how well it worked) be-
fore negotiating for its approval. Now this design is being used in a new hous-
ing development for pavement dwellers, and in housing being built within 
one of Mumbai’s densest and largest slums (Dharavi), to allow all the inhabit-
ants access to better-quality accommodation. The community-directed house 
modelling described earlier has also produced precedents showing how par-
ticular designs better serve low-income households’ needs; so too have the 
community-designed and managed toilets (Bartlett, 2005). These are excellent 
examples of a bottom-up approach to public decision making where decisions 
at the city level help support the solutions proposed at the grassroots level.
Why didn’t the urban poor in Kolkata achieve similar success in plan-
ning from below despite a communist government which is ideologically 
pro-poor? Based on Mageli’s work, Chhinnamool had the potential to do this 
sort of thing but it fell apart because it was driven mainly by its NGO part-
ner, Unnayan, which itself disintegrated because of internal divisions. The rea-
sons for the lack of independent grassroots organisation in Kolkata can only 
be speculated upon. Based on the discussion on Kolkata’s sub-municipal level 
governance in Chapter 3, we see the influence of CPI-M offering its patronage 
to all forms of community organising – even the most innocuous ones that 
relate to organising religious festivities or cultural/sports events.
A recent article by Abhirup Sarkar (2006) about the political economy of 
West Bengal takes a somewhat unorthodox route to explain the role of politi-
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cal organisation in Left Front’s continuing electoral victories. He argues that 
economic stagnation has actually helped maintain political stability in the 
state rather than opposing it. He characterises economic stagnation in the 
state to focus on its ever-increasing informal sector. The following quote from 
his article sums up his main thesis:
People dependent on the informal sector for their livelihood do not always live by the for-
mal laws and norms. Some live illegally on government or railway land, others encroach 
upon city streets to sell their ware. A third group, owning shops or small businesses, is 
exposed to the local thugs because it is too costly to get protection from the formal legal 
system. All these people need political protection, which has to be provided by one party 
or the other. Of course, in West Bengal it is best provided by the Left who are better organ-
ised. Had the majority been securely employed in the formal sector their dependence on 
the party would disappear. Thus it is the increasing informalisation of the economy on the 
one hand and a strong political organisation of the Left on the other which have helped to 
gain support for the rulers and maintain political stability in the state for such a long time. 
(Sarkar, 2006, p. 342)
The role of the informalisation of the economy in creating new dependencies 
for political protection is particularly relevant in the context of Left Front’s 
increasing influence in urban areas in recent years. A number of people in 
Kolkata depend, in a fundamental way, on political parties for their livelihood. 
A political party gives them protection and in return gets their support at the 
time of elections. Chatterjee (2004) has called it a ‘political society’ as opposed 
to a civil society. Indeed an individual living in a political society has one im-
portant commodity to sell, apart from his labour, namely, his right to vote, 
which makes him attractive to the political parties. Contrast this to Mumbai, 
where pavement dwellers, who are generally seen as a nuisance by most ur-
ban dwellers, attract very little political patronage from the multiple political 
parties competing for votes. This is because this marginalised section is spa-
tially scattered across the city, and a large number of them are not registered 
to vote, so they don’t constitute a viable ‘vote bank’ for the political parties. 
This has led self-help groups among Mumbai’s pavement dwellers to utilise 
this political space to be their own representatives in their community deci-
sion making. They have then sought assistance from more formal NGOs such 
as SPARC in negotiating with the city authorities to recognise their commu-
nity solutions. The comparison with Mumbai therefore strengthens my argu-
ment relating to the need for adequate political space for non-partisan grass-
roots organisations in order to promote and sustain a bottom-up approach to 
public decision making.
So what if Kolkata and Mumbai are different? What does the literature 
say on contexts that politically resemble that of West Bengal, i.e. an elected 
government ideologically inclined to social justice and with very little politi-
cal opposition? A comparison with South Africa points towards similar prob-
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lems relating to party dominance. Despite the successes of the South African 
Homeless People’s Federation and despite a national government strongly 
committed to improving housing conditions and ensuring universal provision 
for basic services, the South African federation has had to face many diffi-
culties. These include national and local political structures that distrust any 
movement that is not within the ruling party (the ANC). As in Kolkata, poli-
ticians in South Africa work through patron-client relationships and do not 
want their decisions challenged or discussed by community organisations. 
This can also be seen in South Africa’s surprising lack of support for federa-
tion schemes from the national housing subsidy programme (d’Cruz & Satter-
thwaite, 2005, p. 38).
 4.3.2 Politically independent bureaucracy
Another reason for the difference in the success of community-based organi-
sations in Mumbai and Kolkata is the difference in the degree to which the 
planning and administrative bureaucracies in the two cities are dependent on 
their political masters. West Bengal has adopted a Mayor-in-Council system 
of urban administration throughout the state, thereby strengthening the pow-
ers of the political class over the bureaucrats (the municipal commissioner) 
in urban areas. In contrast, in Mumbai and throughout Maharashtra, although 
the mayor is the head of the house, his role is largely ceremonial and almost 
all powers are vested in the commissioner. The commissioner is an Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS) officer appointed by the Maharashtra state gov-
ernment. He is responsible for the infrastructure of the city and its mainte-
nance. Sewage, lighting, roads, schools, water, garbage – all of these are his 
responsibilities.
The experience of the Mumbai Alliance suggests that bureaucrats show 
themselves to be better partners to community-based organisations than 
elected politicians. In most cities where federations of the poor have been 
successful, their first choice has been to begin a dialogue with the local bu-
reaucracy, not the politicians (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). This has several 
advantages. In most instances, it is the bureaucracy that ultimately influenc-
es most political decisions and that is in charge of implementing most gov-
ernment programmes and policies. This is not quite so in Kolkata, where the 
mayor holds the most power as well as influence in political decisions at the 
local level.
In addition, educating civil servants and including them in federation dis-
cussions and initiatives from the beginning has been extremely beneficial in 
Mumbai. It is also a long-term investment that often brings benefits to the 
federations in Maharashtra, even when the civil servants with whom they 
have worked get transferred – as these civil servants take with them their 
experiences working with the federations to their new department (d’Cruz & 
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Satterthwaite, 2005). This indeed was the case in Mumbai.
Having said this, there also are good reasons (beyond political expedien-
cy) why West Bengal adopted a system with greater power allocated to the 
elected head of the local authority compared to state appointed bureaucrat 
– the municipal commissioner. Municipal commissioners belong to the elite 
national or state civil services in which admission and promotion are consid-
ered to be based on merit rather than patronage, and the administrator in In-
dian society is regarded as both an employee of the state and a servant of the 
public. To accommodate the diversity of Indian society within the civil service, 
an official policy is in place to attract women, ethnic and religious minorities, 
the disabled, individuals of certain castes and rural inhabitants. The cadre of 
administrators responsible for planning is presented as a socially representa-
tive, civic minded, politically independent group working to improve the gen-
eral living conditions of Indian citizens. Yet, in many ways, this official story 
belies the realities on the ground, both in terms of empirical evidence and as 
perceived by the public (Friedmann, 2005b). To begin with, both central and 
state civil services are far from representative of the actually existing diver-
sity within Indian society. Women are grossly under-represented, and the 
civil service is staffed primarily by members of the urban upper-middle class. 
More problematic, perhaps, are structural issues that have limited the actions 
of the civil service in India. At both federal and state levels, the civil service is 
a highly regimented work environment, defined more by procedural account-
ability than by pragmatic decision making. Hierarchical in structure, there is 
little direct communication between individuals of different rank. The civil 
service entrance exams favour general knowledge over specific skills, leading 
to criticism that the civil service lacks the professional and technical profi-
ciency in endeavours such as planning. Finally, the theoretical separation be-
tween political and administrative functions is often tangled and blurred. In 
the field of planning, this has led to large-scale improprieties and corruption 
related to land allocation and development rights. The inability to elevate the 
living standards of the common Indian citizen in combination with the news 
of corruption scandals has begun to erode public confidence in the civil serv-
ice, and the country’s planning establishment is increasingly seen as a career-
oriented elite with an incentive to maintain the status quo while minimising 
public participation in the decision-making process (Friedmann, 2005b).
West Bengal’s response to the failures of such bureaucracy-led local ad-
ministration was to give greater powers to the elected mayor. But drawing les-
sons from international experiences of similar policy direction highlights the 
limitation of this tactic. A study of the process and effects of democratic de-
centralisation in thirty medium-sized municipalities in Mexico (Grindle, 2007) 
shows that elected mayors can play an important role in reforming local ad-
ministrations. The commitments, personality, persistence, and political net-
works that mayors brought to the office in Mexico were important factors in 
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determining how much was done during a three-year term of office. But the 
lack of institutional constraints that helped mayors to exercise their discre-
tion also systematically undermined the sustainability of change as succes-
sors reversed policies when they came to office.
In most societies in the modern world, planners and elected politicians 
have generally accepted a norm that defines their role in the public decision-
making process. The planners have tended to take on the role of technical ra-
tional experts who make use of information and knowledge to design public 
action towards larger societal goals. The elected politicians, as the represent-
atives of the people, assume the responsibility to define these larger goals. 
But by the nature of the institutional relationship between the planning bu-
reaucracy and the political class, where one is the boss of the other, there re-
mains the danger of undue political dependence of the planning bureaucracy 
to the extent that might be detrimental to the public good. Bent Flyvbjerg’s 
book, Power and Rationality (1998), which describes the planning process of the 
‘Aalborg Project’ in the city of Aalborg in Denmark, demonstrates that mod-
ern ‘rationality’ is nothing more than an ideal when confronted with the re-
al rationalities involved in decision making by central actors in government, 
economy, and civil society. He describes how planners ‘rationalise’ decisions 
that have already been made elsewhere, defeating the purpose of the divi-
sion of the responsibilities between planners and politicians. Flyvbjerg makes 
a strong case for ‘participation…practical, committed, ready for conflict’ as a 
‘superior paradigm of democratic virtue’ (p. 236).
In this chapter, I present a framework for comparative research on urban 
governance, following which I draw lessons from some national and inter-
national comparisons of planning institutions and processes using Kolkata’s 
planning process as described in the earlier chapter as a benchmark. I have 
discussed how political space for non-partisan grassroots organising can be 
opened up in places where it has not existed before. I also describe some fail-
ings and opportunities that bureaucrats have in a bottom-up planning institu-
tion. In the following and concluding chapter, I offer some theoretical impli-
cations of my research along with generalisable lessons and possible research 
questions to explore in the future.
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 5 Lessons in decentralised 
planning
 5.1 Theoretical implications
This research has focused on planning in the context of the decentralisation 
of governmental authority. This transformation of the formal institutional in-
frastructure of urban governance reflects the changes in the decision-making 
process within the ‘government’ or the ‘state’ arena. These changes have the 
potential to provoke deeper structural changes that can eventually transform 
the on-going routines of governmental practices. But the domain of urban 
governance includes other actors, events, and sites of decision making. As 
noted earlier in Chapter 1, in Kolkata the amount of influence that non-state 
actors have on the public decision-making process has varied considerably 
with time and place (for instance comparing Kolkata with other cities and al-
so comparing Kolkata now with Kolkata in the 1970s and 1980s). The question 
that planning theoreticians need to ask then is: what affects the extent of the 
role of non-state actors in public decision making?
As the literature on urban social movements emphasises (Evans, 2002; S. 
Fainstein & Hirst, 1995; Mayer, 2000; Pickvance, 2003), the proponents of lo-
cal initiatives arising from neighbourhood mobilisation and civil society are-
nas have great difficulty accumulating power sufficient to shift the dominant 
governance cultures within which they are situated (Gonzalez & Healey, 2005). 
Among the methodological strategies with which to analyse the qualities 
of governance capacity to promote socially innovative32 initiatives, the one 
proposed by Gonzalez & Healey (2005) uses a three-level conception of gov-
ernance dynamics with which three questions are addressed. First, how do 
we identify and assess that urban governance is changing and that emerg-
ing forms might have the potential to significantly transform existing ways 
of doing things? Second, once we have identified that significant transforma-
tion of institutional dynamics is taking place, how do we evaluate whether 
the emerging forms allow for social innovation? Third, what kind of power 
dynamics are mobilised in initiatives that promote socially innovative local 
development and what resistance is encountered by such initiatives in their 
struggles to expand and institutionalise?
The story of Kolkata’s planning process can be described using the above 
methodology to show the dependence path and also the effects of unex-
pected events in bringing about social innovation. How do innovations in the 
planning process occur and how can they be institutionalised for replication?
Decision making involves not just formal processes, but also the myriad of 
informal processes by which resources are allocated, access is achieved and 
32  By social innovation, Gonzalez & Healey (2005) mean ‘changes in governance institutions and agency that 
intend to or have the effect of contributing to improving quality-of-life experiences in a socially inclusive and so-
cially just way’ (p. 2055).
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development takes place. In particular I am concerned with processes and 
mechanisms, both formal and informal, which enable the poor to have influ-
ence over, and thereby to benefit from, the decisions and actions of the vari-
ous institutions of city governance. In this research I have sought to explore 
the influence that the various actors, interests and institutions have on deci-
sions and outcomes. This has involved looking at the relationships between 
the various actors, the interests and institutions involved, the processes of 
decision making, and what gives the various actors and interests power and 
legitimacy, as well as what constrains that power. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
process where outcomes of one decision change the context of power and 
legitimacy within which actors shape the subsequent decisions. This makes 
the process path-dependent at the same time, allowing scope for transforma-
tion to occur, either when new actors are thrown into the mix or global or na-
tional forces change the contexts within which cities function. This research 
helps us understand how new actors in the urban governance process (such 
as DFID or new middle-class residents in redeveloped neighbourhoods) can 
change the context and the rules of the game as traditional actors play it.
As described earlier, DFID made its funding for the Kolkata Urban Servic-
es for the Poor (KUSP) project contingent on the implementation of the West 
Bengal Metropolitan Planning Committee Act 1994. DFID’s project design, in 
fact, made the Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Committee (KMPC) a key actor 
in determining priorities that the KUSP project needed to address. The West 
Bengal Government reluctantly agreed to the establishment of KMPC in 2001. 
Although KMPC in its current form has failed to fully achieve metropolitan 
planning from the bottom up, it has played a significant role in sensitising 
some of the local level politicians to what planning is all about. Some among 
them now realise the significance of planning and the political nature of 
planning. This planning consciousness had previously been absent among 
ward councillors and municipal chairpersons owing to the long-held notion 
in India that planning is done by planners and not by elected representatives. 
KMPC also enhanced transparency in metropolitan planning by exposing the 
distribution of power between different groups of elected local representa-
tives and networks and alliances that they formed with the bureaucrats and 
planners in order to exercise some agency in the planning process. KMPC al-
so provides a forum for information exchange between local representatives, 
planners, bureaucrats and the state level ministry of urban development and 
municipal affairs. All these changes have invariably weakened the state gov-
ernment’s absolute control over Kolkata’s planning process. It has also made 
the planning bureaucracy open to criticism from the local politicians. These 
are welcome changes that came about due to DFID’s influence on the state 
government. Pressures for change from below did not have much political 
support; without DFID’s bargaining power, it is unlikely that such deep struc-
tural changes would have come about.
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Another example of structural change in local power dynamics due to new 
actors/interests was at the neighbourhood level. Parts of Kolkata have seen 
the rapid redevelopment of land earlier occupied by informal workers or the 
low-income population. As identified in Chapter 3, this has led to a change in 
the socio-economic profile of some of the neighbourhoods where new middle- 
and upper-middle class households have moved in. This has diluted the influ-
ence of local political elites who had earlier held significant power over the 
original residents through patron-client relationships. This has, on the one 
hand, dispersed power that was earlier held by a few in the neighbourhood, 
on the other hand, it has left the marginalised households vulnerable as their 
patrons lose control.
An important implication of this research is that the usual discourse about 
the need for participatory and communicative planning, as Habermas, Innes, 
Hillier and others have described, doesn’t apply to Kolkata, which is led by 
a single party in a democratic country that has historically had rigid class, 
gender, and other social hierarchies. There is also a body of literature about 
the Chinese system of urban governance where some have described local 
governments as ‘amphibious’ organisations (Friedmann, 2005a) that are ex-
tremely decentralised in terms of their freedom in local investment decisions. 
These ‘amphibious’ local governments act less as a state and more as busi-
ness enterprises. Kolkata does not fit this model either. What kind of plan-
ning theory would then best describe the scenario in Kolkata? I address this 
question by theorising about the planning process within the context of par-
tisan politics. Primarily, I argue that partisan politics determines the planning 
process when other forms of civic associations are absent.
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 5.2 Lesson drawing
Knowledge is a resource for influencing those with power. Specialist knowl-
edge of a repertoire of successes and failures in effect elsewhere can gain an 
expert the ear of a policymaker wanting to do something. When policymakers 
are under great pressure to act and do not know what to do, policy entrepre-
neurs can market their prescriptions for action. If a prescription is accompa-
nied by evidence that a similar measure has brought satisfaction elsewhere, 
then promoters of a new programme gain greater credibility (Rose, 1993, p. 14).
Although this research is based on a single case of the planning process, 
there are a number of generalisible lessons that can be drawn from it for use 
in other cities. Below I discuss some of the principles that I derived from my 
research.
1. There are differences in what the real motives are for the state to pursue decentrali-
sation and what it claims to be behind its decentralisation policy. This difference hides 
the real impact of the policy on the planning process. The policy discourse then tends 
to emphasise the indicators of ‘input’ (legislative reforms, special programmes, etc.) 
rather than of ‘effect’ in measuring the success of democratic decentralisation in mak-
ing the planning process bottom-up.
In Kolkata, the official rhetoric of the Left Front government emphasis-
es decentralised decision making as a means to democratise the planning 
process and correct the historical structural imbalances between the dif-
ferent classes of society. A secondary goal was to make planning decisions 
more responsive to the needs of the local people. In reality, this research 
concludes that the institutions of decentralised planning in Kolkata have 
in fact helped strengthen the ruling party’s influence but have done little 
in the way of democratising local decision making or responding to local 
needs and the aspirations of the people. Many of the leaders within the 
CPI-M cadre come from modest backgrounds which is a welcome change 
from the social elites who used to dominate the political space prior to the 
Left Front’s coming to power. But it was only a changing of the guard; the 
old patron-client relationship between the rulers and the ruled remains, 
and as I argue earlier, has in fact worsened in the absence of any cred-
ible opposition to the ruling party. Despite this, West Bengal’s experiments 
in putting in place institutions for decentralised planning is pointed to by 
many as being an exemplar. The emphasis on the state government’s pio-
neering effort in putting legislation for decentralised planning in place has 
therefore overshadowed an examination of the actual effects of that legis-
lation on the planning institutions.
The literature on China’s fiscal and administrative devolution to sub-mu-
nicipal levels (Friedmann, 2005a; Wu, 2002) also points out the gap between 
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the stated goals for such a policy33 and the actual consequences of its imple-
mentation. If we just go by the input indicators to evaluate the decentrali-
sation process in China, it can be said to be hugely successful. Indeed, dis-
tricts and street offices within Beijing municipality have raised considerable 
revenue through fiscal decentralisation, resulting in significantly improved 
urban infrastructure. But the competition among the different districts to at-
tract foreign investments has also seen negative consequences. For example, 
district level governments have indulged in widespread redevelopment and 
forced evictions, leading to social unrest. This again highlights the need to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of decentralised governance within particular 
contexts in actual effect, independent of the government’s stated objectives.
Readings of the literature on Brazil’s experience with decentralised partic-
ipatory budgeting also suggests similar lessons. The large numbers of com-
munity councils that now exist in Brazil have enhanced the ‘voice’ of the 
marginalised but have done little to empower them, i.e. these councils have 
transformed unorganised people into members of a civil society that can in-
fluence – but not decide – issues that directly affect them (Souza, 2001, p. 174). 
Stimulated either by national policies or by foreign grants that require the 
creation of community councils in return for funds for local government’s ba-
sic responsibilities, almost all local governments in Brazil have created com-
munity councils. This has generated a merely formal reproduction of what 
the rules say, therefore threatening participation’s fundamental assumptions 
of credibility, trust, transparency, accountability, empowerment, etc. Although 
there is still no body of research analysing these community councils in depth 
and in comparative terms, there have been several accusations in the media 
about the control mayors exert over them, together with suspicions of corrup-
tion in the use of resources for education and health (Souza, 2001, p. 175).
2. The planning process is unlikely to be truly bottom-up if power is concentrated with-
in any one political organisation. In the absence of multiple and competing channels to 
organise themselves to participate in the planning process, citizens and neighbourhood 
groups get co-opted by the government, resulting in their acceptance of decisions made 
at higher levels. This phenomenon is aptly described by V. Ramaswamy, a social activ-
ist in Kolkata, as ‘the orchestration of the disgruntled by the political elites’.34
In Kolkata, the lack of an effective opposition to the ruling party, along 
with a dearth of non-partisan civil society organisations in the city, mean 
that there are very limited opportunities for individual households to channel 
33  The official goal was to improve urban public services and the targeting of populations in need of public as-
sistance. But Friedmann and Wu suggest that China’s real reason for devolving certain powers to sub-municipal 
levels was to replace the old danwei (work unit) system of public service provision in China’s transition to a mar-
ket economy and still maintain the party’s influence in urban decision making.
34  Source: interview with author, September 28, 2004.
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their voices in local planning. To represent the multiplicity of voices within 
a society there need to be multiple organisations that can compete with one 
another on an equal basis. According to Leonie Sandercock, public planning 
needs to be seen as ‘managing coexistence in shared space’, with an explicit 
recognition that there are ‘differences’ in opinions, values, and aspirations 
among individuals within the space. Kolkata’s urban governance framework 
is embedded in a particular conception of democracy which strictly believes 
in majority rule, and a corresponding belief that the right to ‘difference’ dis-
appears once the majority has spoken (Sandercock, 2000).35
3. External funding, either from international agencies or higher levels of government, 
has the potential to force change in the local and regional structures of decision mak-
ing so that the voices of ordinary people are inserted in public decision making.
Changes to the existing power structures are not easy. DFID’s funding for 
KUSP, made contingent upon the implementation of the MPC Act, is an ex-
ample of how external funding agencies can significantly alter planning prac-
tices locally. Higher levels of government or international donor agencies who 
share common values in terms of democratic and participatory decision mak-
ing can change local structural barriers to effective participation. However, it 
should also be noted that their influence can bring changes in only the formal 
rules of the game; they do not alter the informal balance of power between 
ordinary citizens, bureaucrats and the elected politicians. These donors and 
charismatic local leaders who are ideologically inclined towards bottom-up 
planning can create opportunities for sub-municipal governments to express 
their voice in local planning but cannot really empower them to make their 
own decisions without a sustained demand for such empowerment from be-
low.
The comparison between the chairman of Kalyani municipality and the 
chairman of Borough 1 of Kolkata Municipal Corporation also suggests the 
difference that local powerful individuals can make within existing systems. 
Both chairmen belonged to the Communist Party of India – Marxist and both 
were elected members of the KMPC. Whereas the chairman of Kalyani mu-
nicipality was pro-active in setting up and conducting regular meetings of 
ward committees within his municipality, the chairman of Borough 1 of KMC 
expressed disinterest in the functioning of ward committees or their role in 
local planning.
In Mexico, Grindle (2007) finds that mayors and other elected and appoint-
35  It is not easy to generalise on the basis of one case and there are cases that defy my reasoning above. For 
example, Porto Alegre in Brazil was dominated by a single party for many years (the PT) but this was the party 
that also helped pioneer the application of participatory budgeting (Souza, 2001). Further research is needed to 
identify aspects of the PT in Brazil that differ from those of the CPI(M) in India.
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ed officials are the most important source of change in local governments. 
Mayors in Mexico are almost always the primary movers and shakers of lo-
cal government. But she also acknowledges that a lack of institutional con-
straints, allowing mayors to exercise their discretion to bring about difficult 
change, also systematically undermines the sustainability of change as suc-
cessors reverse policies when they come to office.
In Brazil too, the vitality of participatory institutions that delegate au-
thority to citizens builds on the intense support of mayoral administrations. 
If mayors and their political allies have significant ties to participatory civil 
society organisations, then it is far more likely that mayors will seek to pro-
mote the delegation of authority. In Recife, São Paulo, and Porto Alegre, may-
ors had deep connections to the new civil society, which helps to explain why 
they were all willing to experiment with the delegation of authority. The form 
of delegation differed in each municipality, largely based on the degree to 
which the mayor sought to include citizens in the decision-making process 
(Wampler, 2004). This reiterates the need for support from those in positions 
of power and authority to effectively change the local structures of power in 
which decisions are made in the public domain.
Similarly, there are ample opportunities for international development 
agencies to be active agents of change at the local level. This can happen in 
more ways than one. For one, donor agencies can make funding of develop-
ment projects and programmes contingent on reform of the ground rules that 
form the basis of local decision making institutions to favour bottom-up plan-
ning. (DFID funding for KUSP is an example of such leverage by external agen-
cies.) But there are other ways as well. Mitlin & Satterthwaite (2007) describe 
an initiative by which international donors can support grassroots initiatives 
directly by setting up an international fund managed by a transnational net-
work of slum/shack/homeless people’s federations and their support NGOs. 
Official international aid agencies and development banks are not set up to 
work with groups of the poor or to be directly accountable to them, even if 
their work is legitimised on the basis of these groups’ needs. The bureaucracy 
of such agencies works primarily with and through national governments and 
is generally unable to catalyse or support the local social processes needed to 
make external finance effective in addressing many aspects of poverty. The 
fund demonstrates to international agencies what their monies could do if 
they were willing to relinquish more decision-making power and more finan-
cial control to local organisations of the poor rather than local, regional or 
national governments. In so doing, they also fundamentally change the power 
relations between urban groups of the poor and the local state.
4. For an effective implementation of bottom-up approaches to metropolitan planning, 
the planning bureaucracy needs to be independent of the political class. In the absence 
of an independent planning bureaucracy, professional planners employed by the state 
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are less likely to be ‘rational’ (in Flyvbjerg’s words) in informing the decision-making 
process.
The current institutional framework, within which Kolkata’s planning bu-
reaucracy functions, blurs the role of planning as linking ‘scientific and techni-
cal knowledge’ (Friedmann, 1987, p. 38) with public decision making. Kolkata 
Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA), in its role as the ‘technical sec-
retariat’ of Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Committee (KMPC), has failed to 
provide independent, objective scientific and technical knowledge to inform 
metropolitan decision making. The state government has absolute control 
over KMDA through the department of urban development. As suggested in 
Chapter 3, appointments and promotions of senior bureaucrats and tech-
nocrats within KMDA go through the state government. Only rarely did the 
nominated (non-elected) members representing planners from KMDA and en-
gineers from various public agencies such as the Port Trust, Indian Railways 
and Calcutta Improvement Trust propose any new plan or alternative to ex-
isting plans or oppose any proposals that came from elected members from 
the Left Front. Proposals from opposition party members in KMPC received 
less enthusiasm from KMDA, which made them reluctant to participate in the 
KMPC deliberations. The subservience of the planners to the state adminis-
tration did not allow them to provide wholehearted support to sub-municipal 
level planning initiatives even if they came from elected representatives from 
the ruling coalition.
5. The politicisation of local decision making along party lines has severe limitations 
in encouraging public decision being made from the bottom up. Where parties are hi-
erarchical organisations whose members are accountable only to those above them, 
they are unlikely to act as effective agents of change for bottom-up planning that re-
flects the needs of their constituents. What this suggests is that civic participation in 
public decision making is unlikely to happen by means of political parties or partisan 
organisations without greater accountability at the ward level.
As Kolkata’s case demonstrates, local level civic participation is lacking be-
cause political parties dominate the local and regional political space and be-
cause these political parties have a very rigid hierarchical organisation where 
local leaders hardly challenge their party bosses at the state level. This doesn’t 
allow the local leaders to effectively participate in the planning process on 
equal terms. Local leaders are accountable to the citizens who elected them 
to power; at the same time, they hold a subordinate position to their party 
bosses at the state and national level. The lack of local autonomy due to party 
politics is reinforced by strong systems of patronage that reward loyalty with 
jobs and civic works. With party politics increasingly shaping council politics, 
an efficient and remunerative way for councillors to elevate the system is to 
attempt to gain the confidence and support of members of the state legis-
lative assembly (i.e. state level politicians) without reference to local needs. 
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This is especially in order to get nominated to the important municipal com-
mittees, such as the works or finance committee. Decisions about larger civil 
works projects are driven by and further reinforce ‘party politics’. It is com-
mon knowledge that between 25 and 30 per cent of construction funds are 
routinely diverted through the party system – forming a significant incentive 
for compliance with the party system, including compliance by political func-
tionaries of the opposition (see Benjamin, 2000, p. 51). Thus, any attempt at 
political autonomy, both from within the party or from the opposition, is dif-
fused via the potential benefits of these funds.
Unlike Kolkata, Bangalore’s local politics appear to be much less partisan 
in nature. ‘While the party system may be rootless in Karnataka, the political 
climate [in Bangalore] is also known for the large number of independents 
[candidates with no political affiliations] and cross-party shifts’ (Benjamin, 
2000, p. 54). Benjamin also notes that the large number of independents and 
the frequent cross-party shifts by local politicians benefit and secure the ef-
ficacy of the local economy and are driven by a complex coalition of the local 
elite, workers, small landlords and their political and bureaucratic connec-
tions at various levels of government. In other words, in Bangalore political 
functionaries are not as dependent on their party bosses for their political ca-
reer as they are in Kolkata.
6. Bottom-up planning requires planning capacity to be built from grassroots organi-
sations. This requires the devolution of both responsibilities and the means/resources 
to carry out those responsibilities to the lowest level of planning. Legislation by itself 
is not sufficient.
Municipalities in West Bengal do not employ planning professionals. Up until 
2001 all development planning activity within Kolkata Metropolitan Area was 
undertaken by planners in KMDA with no dialogue with the constituent mu-
nicipalities. KMPC meetings did help in sensitising some of the ward council-
lors – at least those who are members of the KMPC – to the issues involved in 
the planning process and the preparation of the Draft Development Plan. But 
wards and municipalities still lack professional planners on their staffs. This 
is in sharp contrast with the way planning has been decentralised in Karna-
taka (Raghavulu & Narayana, 1999) and Kerala (Thomas Isaac & Franke, 2002) 
where planners employed by the state government were sent on deputation 
to work for local governments.
Another dimension of decentralised planning where West Bengal differs 
from Karnataka is the extent of its devolution of fiscal resources. There can 
be no genuineness about decentralisation unless there is an assured devolu-
tion of funds to the local governments. The state budget of Karnataka is split 
in two, providing a separate budget for local government bodies. The action of 
the state legislature in this regard enables the statutory and automatic trans-
fer of over 9 billion Rs. annually in total, both on plan and non-plan accounts, 
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to local governments in the state. There is no provision for the statutory al-
location of funds among local bodies, let alone the machinery, in West Bengal. 
In fact there are allegations that at present the financial devolution from the 
West Bengal government to local government institutions is done arbitrar-
ily and along partisan lines. Municipalities that are in the good books of the 
ruling party are being favoured at the cost of others (Raghavulu & Narayana, 
1999, p. 124).
 5.3 Policy implications
Based on the comparison of Kolkata’s case with the literature on other cities 
in the world, what are the key policy recommendations for a bottom-up ap-
proach to metropolitan planning? In this section, I discuss the policy lessons 
for each category of actors separately.
 5.3.1 Lessons and policies for civil society organisations
While aware of the ambiguity of civil society’s role in rebuilding governance 
relationships, this research argues that non-partisan civic activism is abso-
lutely critical in bridging the divide between public and private interests in 
planning from below. Such conditions involve the existence of a multi-sca-
lar democratic governance regime that favours public deliberation and so-
cial economy initiatives. In many countries, welfare states are in crisis, suf-
fering from post-Fordist transformations. In cities, new ways of governance 
are needed to overcome the consequences of economic, social and political 
restructuring. Civil society in new urban governance arrangements will hope-
fully contribute to counteracting the trend towards social exclusion under 
such circumstances.
A form of civil society organisation that has been very successful in insert-
ing the voices of the marginalised sections of the urban population in the 
planning process has been the federations of urban poor in alliance with in-
termediary organisations (such as NGOs) that form horizontal networks with 
similar federations in other cities in the world. These federations are by defi-
nition organisations that develop from the bottom-up and are therefore ideal 
partners in decentralised metropolitan planning.
The tools that the federations use allow the negotiations and long-term 
pressures to go beyond negotiated deals for individual settlements and to 
change the contexts that allow many more such deals to happen within the 
city. This means that their negotiations are also directed toward changing 
laws, regulations and housing finance systems. The city level may be particu-
larly important, being the level at which organised groups of the poor can get 
government organisations to address structural issues that national govern-
[ 94 ]
SUA020.indb   94 12-08-2008   12:14:27
ments won’t address. For instance, local organisations can address the alloca-
tion of land and infrastructure to urban poor organisations and can change 
standards and the ways in which government agencies work with poor or 
homeless groups. This ability to get change at the city level may then feed in-
to national processes – as was evident in the response of the Cambodian gov-
ernment to the community-driven innovations in Phnom Penh, and in the re-
sponse of the Thai government to the urban poor organisations and networks 
described in detail in a report from IIED (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). This 
may provide a critical clue as to how it is possible to get the kinds of struc-
tural changes in what governments do and how they do it that are central to 
‘significantly improving the lives of slum dwellers’ on a large scale. The ambi-
tious Baan Mankong programme in Thailand that the IIED report describes de-
pended on city-wide processes through which urban poor communities and 
their networks engaged with city governments and other key actors to see 
how the needs of all urban poor communities can be addressed generally, and 
how they can respond to the needs of particular communities.
This emphasis on the importance of processes managed by urban poor 
groups and their federations is controversial, in that many researchers and 
activists think that it pays too little attention to the role of governments (and 
political will) and of representative democracy in driving change.36 There is 
not much disagreement on the need for democratic processes, political will 
and continuity, or on the need for changes in political practices and large-
scale public investment. Rather, the point of contention is the extent to which 
community-driven processes can contribute to these changes. The evidence 
presented by d’Cruz & Satterthwaite (2005) suggests that community-driven 
processes have strengthened democratic processes – especially those within 
the organisations comprised of the urban poor. They have produced many 
examples of commitment from senior politicians, including prime ministers, 
other ministers in national governments, mayors, city administrators and 
heads of housing departments.
There is yet another reason why it is important to have strong non-parti-
san organisations of the poor. Without a strong, effective urban poor organi-
sation exerting political pressure, maintaining continuity in policies towards 
36  This proved to be a contentious point in the discussions of the Millennium Project’s Taskforce on Improv-
ing the Lives of Slum Dwellers. It also led to disagreements among taskforce members about the emphasis 
that should be given to the role of international funding and international development agencies. The taskforce 
members who work with NGOs or government agencies that support community-driven processes, and who have 
long worked with the urban poor/homeless organisations and federations, assigned less importance to the role 
of international agencies and more to locally generated resources and local political change. They also wanted 
less emphasis on estimating the cost of significantly improving the lives of slum dwellers, based on the costs of 
international projects and on the assumption that it would be primarily international agencies that funded the 
interventions. (See d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005)
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bottom-up planning when governments change is almost impossible. This is 
especially true where change in political parties in power also means whole-
sale change in senior government positions. In West Bengal, decentralisation 
and bottom-up planning have always been on the agenda of the Communist 
Party of India alone. After they came to power in West Bengal in 1977, there 
was no political pressure from outside the party to evaluate its commitment 
to bottom-up planning. This has partly contributed to the gap between the 
official rhetoric of the Left Front government and the reality of the planning 
process in Kolkata that is discussed in this research.
What kind of policies should guide the civil society organisations? The fail-
ure of the alliance of the CBO Chhinnamool and the NGO Unnayan in Kolkata 
as mentioned in Chapter 1 suggests, among other things, that their policy of 
making demands on the government led to too many disappointments when 
the demands were not met. This gradually led to the organisations’ disinte-
gration. This suggests that non-partisan civil society organisations should 
move away from a strategy of making demands to a strategy of constructive 
engagement with the government that allows small successes that can build 
confidence in the organisation’s abilities, both internally and externally. The 
urban poor may have set precedents in their organisations for land invasion, 
site layouts, house forms and community-developed infrastructure, but these 
were not systematically used as evidence of precedents that could form the 
basis of effective community–government partnerships. Several case studies 
from various countries compiled by d’Cruz & Satterthwaite (2005) also sug-
gest moving away from the rhetoric of ‘rights’ and ‘demands’ to ‘self-help’ 
and ‘precedent-setting’ at the grassroots level. Perhaps the most important 
change here is a shift from organisations of the urban poor making demands 
on the government to demonstrating to governments what they can do (and 
what governments could achieve) in partnership with them. This is based 
in part on the recognition of urban poor organisations that government sys-
tems – for instance, for land management, infrastructure and services – are 
too weak, ineffective or rooted in vested interests to deliver for them in con-
ventional projects. In part, it is recognition that these non-partisan civil so-
ciety actors must define, design and manage the ‘solutions’ if these are to be 
appropriate, especially for the poorest. This change is most evident in the In-
dian National Slum Dwellers Federation in the early 1980s, as it moved from 
not only fighting evictions and making demands on government but also to 
developing projects and programmes that set precedents for community-gov-
ernment partnerships that urban poor organisations designed and managed – 
working with the NGO SPARC and the cooperatives of women slum and pave-
ment dwellers (Mahila Milan). This change can also be seen in Thailand in the 
land-sharing projects and the community organisations and federations that 
developed there – also with support from local NGOs. This change had great 
significance not only for the work of the federations in India and Thailand but 
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also for the way in which all the urban poor federations have worked.
This raises the question of why this has not happened in Latin America 
where, in many nations, squatter organisations were stronger and urban poor 
organisations were important parts of citizen movements fighting dictator-
ships and demanding democracy and respect for civil rights. A careful consid-
eration of this is beyond the scope of this book – although part of the reason 
may be that when the dictatorships were overthrown and democracy came 
(or returned), the organisations of the urban poor weakened, in part because 
their constituents assumed that now they had a government that represented 
them (and some of them, or the staff of the NGOs they worked with, became 
part of the government), in part because their members got involved in party 
politics, which created divisions in urban poor settlements that were previ-
ously united, and in part because in some cities or districts the new politi-
cal systems did deliver more for them. It is also entirely legitimate for urban 
poor organisations to expect governments that they help to elect to deliver 
for them. The potential divisiveness of this issue is illustrated by the divisions 
among the urban poor organisations in South Africa mentioned earlier, as the 
apartheid government was replaced by the first democratic government. Just 
as in Kolkata after the Communists came to power, many urban poor leaders 
in South Africa have not seen the value of forming an urban poor/homeless 
federation, because their party (the African National Congress) is in power 
and they assume that it will deliver for them. Some of these leaders were also 
successful in standing for election – so the urban poor had some of their col-
leagues in office (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). This is another example of co-
optation of the non-partisan grassroots organisation into the party system. In 
order for civil society organisations to be effective agents in planning from 
the bottom up, therefore, it is important that they remain independent of po-
litical parties.
One of the most important features of the successful urban poor and 
homeless federations is their explicit avoidance of any political alignment or 
affiliation (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). This can mean major disadvantages 
in particular circumstances – as in Kolkata for instance, as local politicians 
inevitably steer benefits to members of their own party, and often prevent 
benefits from going to neighbourhoods or communities that did not explic-
itly support them. Politicians or bureaucrats expect the urban poor organisa-
tions to act as clients under their patronage (and patron-client relationships 
also mean a hierarchical power relationship and a lack of possibilities for the 
urban poor to design and manage their own ‘solutions’). A difficulty arising 
from this in South Africa lies in the fact that ANC politicians were wary of (or 
actively opposed to) community organisations that were not within their par-
ty. The larger and more successful the federation, the more national and local 
politicians will want to get its support, or will fear its capacity to generate 
opposition if such support is not forthcoming. This never makes for an easy 
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relationship between federations and politics (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005).
This refusal of the federations to endorse any political party is particularly 
important for three reasons:
It keeps the federations open to all comers. If they align with any politi-■■
cal party, this inevitably excludes those from other political parties. This 
is a particular problem of the ward committees in Kolkata. Even though 
ward committees were officially envisaged to be apolitical bodies, the rules 
of their constitution indirectly exclude those people belonging to political 
parties other than the ward councillor’s party.
It protects their independence, continuity and capacity for independent ac-■■
tion. One reason for the declining influence of many key urban poor move-
ments in Latin America has been their members’ diffusion into different 
political parties, once they thought they had achieved the political reforms 
they had fought for. However, the federations do not discourage the active 
political involvement of their members, and many federation leaders have 
been elected into office – although they cannot remain as federation repre-
sentatives if they do this (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). Being independent 
of political parties can also provide some protection from undemocratic 
and repressive governments who target opposition parties.
It allows them to negotiate and work with whoever is in power locally, re-■■
gionally or nationally. This has opened the federations to much criticism 
from NGOs and academics, as the federations can work with governments 
controlled by political parties that NGO staff or academics oppose (and 
who are also opposed by large sections of the urban poor). The response 
of the federations to this is that they have a duty to get the best possible 
deal for their members from whoever is in power (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 
2005). They do not have the luxury of being able to wait until the ‘correct’ 
political parties are in power. This does not mean that the federations do 
not fight and, where needed, oppose governments. For instance, federa-
tion groups frustrated by delays and broken promises will often take il-
legal action – for example, invading land, as in the case of Ruo Emoh in 
South Africa (People’s Dialogue on Land and Shelter, 1999). Similarly, in 
Mumbai, when the railway authorities began a large-scale demolition of 
railway slum dwellers’ homes in 2000, going against an agreed work plan 
between the railways, the state government and the federation, federation 
members occupied the railway tracks and paralysed Mumbai for a couple 
of hours while they contacted senior politicians and civil servants to get 
the demolitions stopped. The federation showed that it had the capacity 
to disrupt transport for the rest of the city dwellers when needed. But it 
chooses instead to seek a solution to which its members contribute – as it 
has done in the community-managed resettlement programme (d’Cruz & 
Satterthwaite, 2005). All the federations seek creative and mutually benefi-
cial relationships with politicians and bureaucrats. As noted earlier, in the 
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many public events that are part of the federations’ methods (house model 
and toilet exhibitions, opening of a new housing scheme, celebrations on 
land acquired for a housing project), the federations often use these events 
strategically to thank politicians and bureaucrats and give strong public 
acknowledgement of their role.
Thus the politics of the federations are the ‘politics of patience’ in negotiation, 
consensus building and long-term pressure rather than confrontation, and 
are based on the understanding that federating gives this more power. This is 
clearly evident from the success story of the federation of sex workers (DMSC) 
in Kolkata discussed in Chapter 1. DMSC’s success can be partly attributed to 
its avoiding confrontation with the ‘powers that be’. Urban poor groups often 
fail in their negotiations because they have not developed any mechanism to 
exploit their numbers, their knowledge and their potential for large-scale mo-
bilisation as citizens. Underlying the federation model is a model of teaching 
and learning, where the goal is for the poor to ‘own’ the expertise that is nec-
essary for them to claim, secure and consolidate basic rights in urban hous-
ing and access to infrastructure and services (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005, 
p. 54). This is a key characteristic of a successful federation of the poor that 
was missing in Chhinnamul’s organisation in Kolkata as described by Mageli 
(2001), mentioned in Chapter 1. The organisation was driven by its NGO part-
ner, Unnayan, which kept Chinnamool from claiming ownership of its achieve-
ments.
 5.3.2 Lessons and policies for the political class
This research has important lessons for the political class at all levels. Na-
tional government has a role to play in setting the political agenda and gen-
eral values such as social justice, participatory decision making, including 
the voices of women and of marginalised populations, etc. It needs to cre-
ate conditions that push for greater transparency in the planning process. Al-
though legislation at the national and the state level alone cannot ensure the 
effective adoption of bottom-up approaches to planning, it can create the le-
gal basis for action by other actors. The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act 
passed in the Parliament was significant in institutionalising decentralised 
decision making in India. The Freedom of Information Act 2005 is also a step 
in the right direction. It can enable media and civic activist groups to subject 
planners, bureaucrats, and politicians involved in public decision making to 
greater scrutiny and thus mobilise support in favour of or against planning 
decisions that take place in the ‘shadows of power’. Just as an example of the 
opaque nature of the current planning process in Kolkata, I faced enormous 
resistance to when I tried to access supposedly public information (such as 
minutes of the meetings of a ward committee in Dum Dum Municipality in 
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North Kolkata and the minutes of the meetings of the KMPC’s sector commit-
tee on transportation), even for educational purposes. The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, if implemented the way it is envisaged, can force bureaucrats and 
politicians to allow public scrutiny which will enhance their accountability to 
the public they serve.
At the local level, as discussed earlier, bottom-up planning and partisan 
control of planning cannot go together. Planning needs consensus, whereas 
parties look for cleavages. There is a need to ‘departisanise’ planning. The po-
liticisation of local planning is inevitable, but there are precedents in which 
planning politics is non-partisan. Also, parties act as actors in realising hege-
monic projects within their roles as mediators between the government and 
society (Jessop, 1990, p. 318f). And there are examples of non-partisan elec-
tions in Scandinavia (Aars & Ringkjob, 2005; Bergman, 2004) and North Amer-
ica (Raymond, 1992; Schaffner et al., 2001; Siegel, 1994) that offer possibilities 
of the politicisation of local politics without the divisiveness and hierarchical 
control that are associated with political parties.
Despite the constitutional amendment, in India the real authority for ur-
ban planning still rests with the state governments. If governments at the 
state level are really committed to the cause of a bottom-up approach to 
metropolitan decision making, then the state leadership needs to show the 
political will to increase participation by non-partisan organisations at the 
grassroots level. For example, in West Bengal, a change in the ward commit-
tee rules by the state legislature can make the ward committees less prone 
to party influence. Including local party workers from the opposition party 
would make ward committees more inclusive and create checks and balances 
to the power of all local leaders. Although political parties that have advo-
cated decentralised planning have benefited in subsequent elections, they 
have refrained from changing the existing patron-client relationships that ex-
ist in most communities in India. Only charismatic leaders at the municipal 
level (such as Dr Shantanu Jha, chairman of Kalyani municipality) who are 
really committed to the cause of participatory planning from the ground up 
have made significant improvements in strengthening the ward committees 
and involving citizens in ward-level deliberations. To replicate such actions, 
all political parties need to make use of the KMPC as a forum for the most 
dedicated local leaders by nominating the best of their councillors for KMPC 
elections.
In addition, as my analysis suggests, currently the state government has 
considerable influence in KMPC’s operations. The West Bengal government’s 
minister for municipal affairs and urban development is the ex-officio vice-
chairperson of KMPC and the chief minister of the state is the ex-officio chair-
person. Most KMPC meetings are presided over by the minister of municipal 
affairs and urban development where ward councillors from the same party 
hesitate in opposing or questioning suggestions made by him or other state-
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level party representatives. Therefore, in order to let elected and nominated 
members decide solutions that are most appropriate to local level needs and 
aspirations, the state government should stay away from moderating KMPC 
functioning.
One important traditional role for party politicians is to act as an inter-
mediary between communities and the state agencies that supply infrastruc-
ture and services to communities. This relationship can bring with it divisive 
and demobilising side effects, but the negative political effects must be bal-
anced against the positive effects of the infrastructure itself (see Evans, 2002, 
p. 231). Also, opposition parties may be less effective at providing traditional 
services, but they deliver more positive political side effects. When opposi-
tion parties become strong enough to win local or state-level elections, they 
do two important things. First, when they grow out of a base in social and 
community movements, opposition parties support increased participation by 
communities and social movement groups. Second, they challenge the exclu-
sive emphasis on the accumulation of power that generally characterises the 
discourse of dominant parties (and the economic elites that support them). 
These effects can be seen both in Asia (Taiwan) and in Latin America (Mexico 
and Brazil) (see Evans, 2002).
If parties are not the uniformly nefarious actors that they were sometimes 
portrayed to be in the literature on urban community struggles, they are, even 
under the best of circumstances, imperfect intermediaries, certainly not solu-
tions in themselves. Parties, particularly opposition parties, can however pro-
vide two kinds of support. At the macro level, they can open political space 
for communities and other social movement groups to participate in debates 
over rules and policies. They also create discursive space, enabling imaginar-
ies to extend beyond the standard monolithic emphasis on accumulation and 
development. At the micro level, they can provide organisational niches that 
give innovative community leaders extra leverage. Evans (2002, p. 233) gives 
examples from Brazil and Mexico.
It would be foolish to suggest that parties are the solution to communi-
ties’ needs for external linkages. Control, clientelism and co-optation, and the 
quest for partisan advantage play much too large a role in the repertoires of 
even progressive parties. Nonetheless, it would be equally foolish for activ-
ists and community leaders to ignore the possibilities that party structures 
afford and the ways that oppositional parties can open up the larger political 
environment for new discourses and new forms of participation (Evans, 2002, 
p. 234).
 5.3.3 Lessons and policies for planners and bureaucrats
Communities need capable public institutions desperately, but, unfortunately, 
they need states quite different from the ones that currently confront them. 
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The question is how that difference might be reduced. ‘The apparent inability 
of existing states to combine capacity for effective public action with open-
ness to grassroots initiatives and responsiveness to community needs defines 
what is lacking in existing public institutions’ (Evans, 2002, p. 236). Political ef-
forts to restructure existing state apparatuses at the national level are admi-
rable endeavours, worth pursuing but unlikely to produce the desired combi-
nation of capacity and openness in the foreseeable future. Efforts to transform 
city administrations appear to be more promising, but local governments will 
still sit in the shadow of national rules and power. Less ambitious, but more 
likely to produce concrete results, are what Peter Evans calls ‘jujitsu tactics’ – 
efforts to leverage the conflicts and contradictions that already exist within 
state apparatuses to shift the balance of state action toward livability.
‘Jujitsu tactics’ are based on the premise that most public institutions are 
both collections of organisations, some of which actually have a vested inter-
est in promoting livability, and aggregations of individual incumbents, some 
of whom are potential allies. Even state bureaucracies with relatively effec-
tive forms of hierarchical coordination are fraught with conflicts among com-
peting projects and organisations. The balance of power among these com-
peting interests within the state depends in part on the effectiveness of their 
allies in society. If planners and bureaucrats, who are most familiar with the 
internal conflicts and contradictions within the state apparatus, make effec-
tive use of potential allies – communities, NGOs, and other institutions – to 
strengthen the position of these allies in their conflicts within the state, pros-
pects for livability increase substantially.
Some of the planners I talked to during my fieldwork were shrewd actors 
who understood and used the internal power struggles within the state bu-
reaucracy to allow greater participation from grassroots communities. There 
were others who were reluctant to take risks and feared public participation 
and greater transparency in the planning process as a threat to their power 
and authority. Among the planners in KMDA, I found that those who were 
trained in social sciences (such as geography and economics) understood and 
used the power dynamics within the state apparatus to broaden and level 
the playing field for non-state actors to get involved in local planning. On the 
other hand, those planners who were trained in the British-style master plan-
ning curriculum that is taught in various engineering and technology colleges 
in India tended to be risk-averse and doubtful about the value of increased 
participation. This suggests a need for reforms in planning education and 
curriculum, to show the way planning as a profession can work in other cities 
in the developing world. Kolkata’s case also demonstrates that metropolitan 
planning processes need expertise in communicative, people-centered prac-
tices and shrewd strategic actors who understand the power dynamics of the 
wider political context. The training and education of planners needs to in-
clude a broader skill-set than simply collecting and analysing data and mak-
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ing projections for the future.
Like many professionals, planners identify problem areas based on the 
perceptions of those who hire them. Since most planners in the developing 
world are hired by the state at the provincial or metropolitan level, they often 
miss the real picture about whom they are planning for. They often plan top-
down instead of consolidating plans from the bottom up. This research sug-
gests that planners be responsible to (even though they may be paid by state 
governments) municipalities rather than the state for them to be most effec-
tive in local decision making.
 5.3.4 Lessons for civic activists, NGOs 
and international agencies
Overall, the external connections that these intermediaries provide play an 
essential role in enabling communities to become effective agents of livabil-
ity. Romantic visions in which individual communities can somehow resolve 
problems of livelihood and sustainability on their own are analytically mis-
guided and a political disservice (Evans, 2002, p. 234). The combination of 
providing access to a broader range of ideas and supplying connections to a 
network of other potentially supportive organisations is the archetypal NGO 
contribution. NGOs also are better able to transform immediate local strug-
gles of federations into specific instances of universal issues, such as hous-
ing rights and social justice. Unnayan in Kolkata (like SPARC in Mumbai) did 
show these characteristics of a successful NGO. What was missing in Unnayan 
was that it did not let its community partner Chinnamool be the main driving 
force in their alliance while it took the back seat, acting as a reservoir of strat-
egies and ideas. This is fundamentally important for the successful operation 
of federations.
As discussed earlier, federations of the poor and the marginalised are also 
seeking to change the way in which international agencies, NGOs, and other 
intermediaries work. This agenda introduces controversies as to who has le-
gitimacy to speak for ‘the poor’. Bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and de-
velopment banks (such as the World Bank and the different regional develop-
ment banks) work with and through national governments. So too do United 
Nations agencies which, like the development banks, are overseen by govern-
ment representatives. Within these international agencies, national govern-
ments from low- and middle-income nations regard themselves as the legiti-
mate representatives of their citizens – and if elected or appointed by elected 
governments, they have a strong justification for this. Yet as demonstrated by 
d’Cruz & Satterthwaite (2005), one of the main reasons why urban poor and 
homeless organisations and federations are needed is because ‘representa-
tive’ democracies were not addressing their needs. Thus, it is not surprising 
that conflicts arise in international agencies and at international meetings 
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over who has legitimacy to speak for the urban poor. It is also uncomfortable 
and often embarrassing for national or city politicians or civil servants from 
low- and middle-income nations, who are the official government delegates 
to international agencies or at international meetings, to have representatives 
from the urban poor or homeless organisations from their country or city at 
these meetings – and sometimes publicly questioning their official state-
ments and speeches (d’Cruz & Satterthwaite, 2005). For the federations, the 
potential for conflict is moderated by the fact that they are seeking construc-
tive engagement with their governments. Indeed, the federations often invite 
senior government staff and politicians to come with their representatives 
to international conferences, to emphasise their desire to work with govern-
ments and to explain how they do so. However, the official international aid/
development system has made insufficient formal provisions to encourage 
the involvement of people’s organisations in their work or to become more ac-
countable to people’s organisations for their decisions and policies. Many in-
ternational agency staff members recognise the legitimacy of the federations 
and the contributions they can bring to more effective development, but their 
agencies’ structures and modes of operation usually present many blockages 
to more equal partnerships with them. As my research demonstrates, DFID 
was instrumental in forcing the West Bengal government to act on its stated 
commitment to bottom-up planning through setting up KMPC. More needs to 
be done in the way of incorporating informal neighbourhood groups or com-
munities of urban service users (such as the Bus and Railway Commuters As-
sociations) to be part of the decision-making process. DFID’s funding can be 
used as leverage to force the present structures in the state to insert voices 
from such groups.
All these lessons and policy recommendations are tied to one another. 
Each of them is necessary but not a sufficient condition to enable public deci-
sions to be made by consolidating decisions made at the lower levels. There is 
a need for a concerted effort from all actors to make any significant change in 
the way decisions are made in large metropolitan regions in the developing 
world.
 5.4 Future direction of research
The view that one dominant party with little opposition is detrimental to the 
cause of promoting a bottom-up system of public decision making that so 
many in Kolkata espouse, has not gained much currency in the public con-
sciousness in the city, even among its intelligentsia. It is not hard to imagine 
that this is the case in many other cities in the world. This research therefore 
hopes to raise this as an issue fit for further study. It also highlights the need 
to evaluate actual effects – the costs and benefits – of decentralised govern-
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ance within particular contexts, independent of the government’s stated ob-
jectives.
Every research method has its strengths and weaknesses. Since this study 
focused on ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about a contemporary set of events and, 
as noted above, addressed a process not yet thoroughly researched, a case 
study was the logical choice for a methodology. However, the most significant 
limitation of single-case qualitative research is the difficulty of determining 
cause and effect from one reconstructed case. I have tried to address this 
limitation by triangulating my observations in Kolkata with those from the 
existing literature on other cities. There is an important distinction in terms 
of conceptualisation of the issue at hand that needs to be made explicit. My 
aim for this research was to understand the complex process of planning in 
a large metropolis in the developing world. In the process I hoped to discover 
broader lessons for governments to bring about bottom-up planning. I focused 
my attention in this research to finding the answer to the question: why have 
governments not been able to create institutions for public planning that al-
low consolidation of plans from the bottom up? As Sandercock (1998) points 
out, there is an alternative question that might help us better achieve the aim 
I describe for this research. That is to ask: what are the various ways by which 
the marginalised are opposing/resisting state-sponsored planning or making 
and implementing their own plans? The Alliance in Mumbai is one among 
several other examples of such an effort. Future research should document 
such ‘insurgent planning’ in cities where such planning seems non-existent. 
Kolkata, Harare, Singapore, and Beijing are all possible cases for such a study. 
This will provide evidence of truly bottom-up strategies that urban residents 
are employing in the face of increasing marginalisation within the formal 
planning apparatus.
As Wampler (2004) suggests, vertical accountability, generally framed as 
the control of public officials by citizens, primarily via elections, has received 
significant attention as scholars have analysed how citizens can use elections 
to exercise control over public officials (Przeworski et al., 1999). Horizontal 
accountability, the distribution of authority among different departments or 
branches of government, has also received attention as scholars have sought 
to evaluate the consequences of institutional arrangements that were de-
signed to strengthen democratic practices and rights (O’Donnell, 1998). Soci-
etal accountability, the pressures placed on state agencies by civil society or-
ganisations to encourage elected officials and bureaucrats to abide by the rule 
of law, has emerged as a counterbalance to the other two approaches; it can 
directly link ongoing political activity in civil society to formal political insti-
tutions (Smulovitz & Peruzzotti, 2000).
Given the imperfections of each type of actor in the governance process, 
progress toward urban livability could be envisaged only by thinking in terms 
of ‘ecologies of agents’, in which synergies compensated for imperfections 
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and overall effects transcend the capabilities of individual actors. The con-
cept of an ‘ecology of agents’ that was put forward by Peter Evans in his book 
Livable Cities is crucial for achieving structural changes that will allow for a 
truly bottom-up approach to metropolitan decision making. Like Castells’s 
vision of the ‘network society’, the idea of ecologies of local political agents 
focuses on the power of connections rather than the capacities of individual 
actors. Though it does not negate the existence of Castells’s ‘space of flows’, 
this imagery focuses on a more modest set of networks, with very different 
aims, rooted in a ‘space of places’. While more modest, the constellations of 
actors that are the focus of this study still have the potential to collectively 
effect change, if only they can figure out how to better exploit the social and 
ideological resources at their disposal. Future research should therefore be di-
rected to helping identify these resources in particular contexts.
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  Abstract
This research highlights the gap between the official rhetoric and the political 
reality of democratic decentralisation and bottom-up planning using an in-
depth study of the metropolitan planning process in Kolkata, India. The key 
question that I address here is: how do elected officials at different governmental 
levels, professional planners, and ordinary citizens interact in the process of metro-
politan planning, and which players dominate the process?
I focus on the dynamic interactions between planners and the operation of 
the political process that shapes this reality. The empirical material for this 
case study includes interviews with actors involved in the metropolitan plan-
ning process in Kolkata, documents in the form of study reports, master plans, 
minutes of meetings, and official memos produced by the planning agency 
and by other organisations and individuals involved with metropolitan plan-
ning in Kolkata. Archival data from local and national newspapers were also 
used to substantiate some of the information gathered from other sources.
My analysis of the case illustrates the following: (1) there are differences 
in the real motives for the state to pursue decentralisation and what it claims 
to be behind its decentralisation policy; (2) the planning process is unlikely to 
be truly bottom-up if power is concentrated within any one political party; (3) 
external funding, either from international agencies or higher levels of gov-
ernment, has the potential to force change in the local and regional struc-
tures of decision making so that the voices of ordinary people can be included 
in public decision making; (4) for the effective implementation of bottom-up 
approaches to metropolitan planning the planning bureaucracy needs to be 
independent of the political class; (5) bottom-up planning requires that plan-
ning capacity be built from a grassroots level. This requires devolution of both 
responsibilities and means/resources to carry out those responsibilities to the 
lowest level of planning; (6) the politicisation of decision making along party 
lines limits planning from the bottom up. Political parties in Kolkata and West 
Bengal are hierarchical organisations where members are accountable main-
ly to those above them. Therefore they are unlikely to become advocates for 
multiple constituencies and effective agents of change for bottom-up plan-
ning processes.
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  Abbreviations and 
acronyms
ANC African National Congress
BDP Basic Development Plan 
BPL Below Poverty Line
CAA Constitutional Amendment Act
CBO Community Based Organisation
CIT Calcutta Improvement Trust
CO Community Organiser
CPI-M Communist Party of India-Marxist
CMPO Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organisation
CSO Civil Society Organisations 
DDP Draft Development Plan
DFID Department for International Development
DMSC Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee
EIUS Environment Improvement in Urban Slums 
GoWB Government of West Bengal
IAS Indian Administrative Service
ILGUS Institute for Local Government and Urban Studies
IPP Indian Population Project 
KMA Kolkata Metropolitan Area
KMC Kolkata Municipal Corporation
KMDA Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority
KMPC Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Committee
KUSP Kolkata Urban Services for the Poor
MARC Municipal Administrative Reforms Committee
MLA Member of Legislative Assembly 
MP Member of Parliament
MPC Metropolitan Planning Committee
NIMBY Not In My Back Yard
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NHG Neighbourhood Groups 
NRY Nehru Rozgar Yojana 
NSDP National Slum Development Policy
SFC State Finance Commissions 
SJSRY Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgaar Yojana 
SPARC Society for the Promotion of Area Resources Center
SUDA State Urban Development Agency
TCPO Town and Country Planning Organisation
TPO Town Planning Officer
UBSP Urban Basic Services Programme 
UCRC United Central Refugee Council 
ULB Urban Local Body
UPE Urban Poverty Eradication 
WB World Bank
WC Ward Committee
WHO World Health Organization
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